Мамай написал:

#1419433
Посмотрел сразу после первой ссылки. Ничего интересного там нет. Для чего Вы здесь уже который раз ссылаетесь на тамошнее обсуждение - совершенно непонятно.

Там есть ответы на заданные Вами вопросы. Если Вам это совсем не интересно или просто лень читать, то о чём тут можно говорить?

Kliper написал:

#1419437
Там есть ответы на заданные Вами вопросы.

Коллега, это Вам только кажется, что там есть ответы на эти (и другие) вопросы.
Почему Вам так кажется, это уже другой вопрос. Но, ...это - уже Ваши проблемы.

А между прочим, есть воспоминания очевидца про участие марсиан в победе в ВОВ...

Врывшись в землю с головой,
самокруткой
грел ты
душу,
когда
жахнула впервой и пошла
играть <катюша»...
Кто-то слух пустил про Марс:
мол, сговорено заране -
и по немцам,
мстя за нас,
долбанули марсиане.
Мол, открылся фронт второй!
А войска,
секрета ради,
под землей прошли дырой,
но не спереди, а сзади...
А не бывшее вовек
выло,
грохало,
гудело...
Что тут может человек,
коль сама земля горела?!
И кто почками был слаб -
опростался бестолково...
Не успев пуститься в драп,
сгинул полк
горнострелковый.
И такая тишина
в уши втиснулась,
как вата, -
будто кончилась война...
Когда
жахнула она
раз четырнадцатый кряду.
Тридцать лет уж
той поре
(а и ныне ломит уши),
как под Вязьмой на Угре
вышла на берег «катюша».

Я лично, предлагаю не закрывать трусливо на это глаза и не игнорировать как обычно принято в научном мире, а всерьез рассмотреть роль марсиан в нашей Победе!

Kliper написал:

#1419420
Про громоздкие мехкорпуса

Именно, что громоздкие.

Корпуса по 500-1000 танков на зф и юзф раздолбил противник в хлам
А Лелюшенко имея не более сотни танков вполне от немцев отбивался - т.к получил в мк пто, вместо бтт, был усилен пехотой.создал фактически боевую группу. Вывод - чем меньше танков, тем лучше.

РыбаКит написал:

#1419496
Дима, сходи лучше в тему 1/35

Ты б лучше папку входящих ЛС почистил.

Летом 1941 года танковые корпуса Юго-западного и Западного фронтов гоняли из угла в угол и они, корпуса, несли потери не от огня противника, а от собственного движения. И бой приняли уже части от корпусов и не одновременно. А по оставленным танкам у нас нет сведений, как воевали танкисты: просто бросали танки, отгоняли в болота или принимали бой - один танк против колонны немцев. Ведь в описании боев летом 1914 года есть все это. Есть рассказ о том, как отступающие нашли в гуще леса танк Т--26 и на нем воевал до соединения с нашими войсками. и вышли к войскам на найдем танке.
И как этому - верить или нет? Ваше мнение.

Старый Судоремонтник написал:

#1419535
А по оставленным танкам у нас нет сведений, как воевали танкисты: просто бросали танки, отгоняли в болота или принимали бой - один танк против колонны немцев.

Это утверждение или вопрос?

Игнат написал:

#1419503
Читаю.
Смотреть можно с любой позиции. Но про снабжение, размещение, управление и прочее мы даже не будем говорить.
© Источник: https://history-forum.ru/viewtopic.php? … start=1020

Ваши слова? Зачем думать когда можно железные коробки считать.
Чсх вот вся рота не в ногу один погучик в ногу

Если уж берётесь цитировать мои слова, то цитируйте их целиком:

Kliper: Если было всего три танковых батальона, то значит в каждом находилось по 85 танков. Думаю, это явный перебор.

Кадук: Явный перебор?
Это смотря с какой позиции смотреть.Это у немцев танки были поштучно,в РККА их тысячи были.Чего мелочится?

© Источник: https://history-forum.ru/viewtopic.php? … 67#p197256

Kliper: Смотреть можно с любой позиции. Но про снабжение, размещение, управление и прочее мы даже не будем говорить. Достаточно того, что (258+26+6)х30=8700 Тогда как всего в РККА имелось около 5000 БТ-7: https://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/%D0%91%D0%A2-7
Куда более реалистично выглядит цифра 158: (158+26+6)х30=5700.

© Источник: https://history-forum.ru/viewtopic.php? … start=1020

Так зачем в ДАННОМ СЛУЧАЕ обсуждать сложности содержания батальонов из 85 танков, если общее количество танков БТ-7 по штату оказалось почти в два раза выше числа находящихся в строю машин? Я там пытался объяснить, что обсуждаемый штат не был рассчитан на 30 мехкорпусов, но куда Вам это понять. Ведь в словах оппонента Вы ищите изъяны, а не смысл.

Kliper написал:

#1419675
Если уж берётесь цитировать мои слова, то цитируйте их целиком

Сам себя не процитируешь? Кстати ваш текст будет читаться намного интереснее если, например, заменить слово танк на труселя, или выбирать из слов только вторую и четвертую буквы- глядишь и смысл появится.

DM1967 написал:

#1419698
Так где тема "1/35"?

http://tsushima.su/forums/viewtopic.php … 7#p1419377

РыбаКит написал:

#1419688
мне достаточно сообщить нашим танкистам, что это вы за тормозили производство М26 и замену им Шермана перед Оверлордом

Эммм... А у американцев было на что менять Шерманы перед Оверлордом ??? Это часом не сказки Купера из "Смертельных ловушек"?

Elektrik написал:

#1419772
А у американцев было на что менять Шерманы перед Оверлордом

T25 and T26
T25E1 variant

The T25 and T26 lines of tanks came into being in the midst of a heated internal debate within the U.S. Army in the mid-1943 to early 1944 over the need for tanks with greater firepower and armor. A 90 mm gun mounted in a massive new turret was installed in both series. The T26 series were given additional frontal hull armor, with the glacis plate increased to 4 in (10 cm). This increased the weight of the T26 series to over 40 short tons (36 t) and decreased their mobility and durability as the engine and powertrain were not improved to compensate for the weight gain.

The T26E3 was the production version of the T26E1 with a number of minor modifications made as the result of field testing. In February 1945, the T26 was fielded in the European theatre, where its performance received early praise from Army Ordnance officials.[23] The Army named the tank after Army General John J. Pershing when it was redesignated the M26 in March.[24][25]
After the war

Post World War II, some 800 M26 tanks were upgraded with improved engines and transmissions and 90-mm gun and were redesignated as the M46 Patton.
Delayed production
Gunner Seat M26A1

The M26 was introduced late into World War II and saw only a limited amount of combat. Tank historians, such as Richard P. Hunnicutt, George Forty and Steven Zaloga, have generally agreed that the main cause of the delay in production of the M26 was opposition to the tank from the Army Ground Forces, headed by General Lesley McNair.[26][27] Zaloga in particular has identified several specific factors that led both to the delay of the M26 program and limited improvements in the firepower of the M4:

1. Tank destroyer doctrine
    McNair, who was an artillery officer, had promulgated the "tank destroyer doctrine" in the U.S. Army. In this doctrine, tanks were primarily for infantry support and exploitation of breakthroughs. Those tactics dictated that enemy tanks were to be engaged by tank destroyer forces, which were composed of lightly armored but relatively fast vehicles carrying more powerful anti-tank guns, as well as towed versions of these anti-tank guns. Under the tank destroyer doctrine, emphasis was placed only on improving the firepower of the tank destroyers, as there was a strong bias against developing a heavy tank to take on enemy tanks. This also limited improvements in the firepower of the M4 Sherman.[28] The US Army Ground Forces that supported this doctrine got the approval of new TD projects, one of them using the same 90 mm gun, while at the same time they were blocking tank projects.
2. Simplification of supply
    McNair established "battle need" criteria for acquisition of weapons in order to make best use of America's 3,000-mile-long (4,800 km) supply line to Europe by preventing the introduction of weapons that would prove unnecessary, extravagant or unreliable on the battlefield. In his view, the introduction of a new heavy tank had problems in terms of transportation, supply, service, and reliability, and was not necessary in 1943 or early 1944. Tank development took time, and so the sudden appearance of a new tank threat could not be met quickly enough under such criteria.[29]
3. Complacency
    A sense of complacency fell upon those in charge of developing tanks in the U.S. Army because the M4 Sherman, in 1942, was considered by the Americans to be superior to the most common German tanks: the Panzer III and early models of the Panzer IV. Even through most of 1943, the 75-mm M4 Sherman was adequate against the majority of German armor, although the widespread appearance of the German 7.5 cm KwK 40 tank gun during this time had led to a growing awareness that the M4 was becoming outgunned. There was insufficient Intelligence data processing and forward thinking to understand that there was an ongoing arms race in tanks and that the U.S. needed to anticipate future German tank threats. The Tiger I and Panther tanks that appeared in 1943, were seen in only very limited numbers by U.S. forces and hence were not considered as major threats.[30] The end result was that, in 1943, the Ordnance Department lacking any guidance from the rest of the army, concentrated its efforts in tank development mainly on its major project, the electrical transmission T23.[31] By contrast, the Russians and British were engaged in a continuous effort to improve tanks; in 1943, the British begin development of what became the 51-ton Centurion tank (although this tank would reach service just too late to see combat in World War II) and, on the Eastern Front, a full-blown tank arms race was underway, with the Soviets responding to the German heavy tanks by starting development work on the T-34-85 and IS-2 tanks.

To see more IS tanks, see IS tank family.

From mid-1943 to mid-1944, development of the 90 mm up-armored T26 prototype continued to proceed slowly due to disagreements within the U.S. Army about its future tank needs. The accounts of what exactly happened during this time vary by historian, but all agree that Army Ground Forces was the main source of resistance that delayed production of the T26.

In September–October 1943, a series of discussions occurred over the issue of beginning production of the T26E1, which was advocated by the head of the Armored Force, General Jacob Devers. Ordnance favored the 76 mm gun, electrical transmission T23. Theater commanders generally favored a 76 mm gun medium tank such as the T23, and were against a heavy 90 mm gun tank. However, testing of the T23 at Fort Knox had demonstrated reliability problems in the electrical transmission of which most army commanders were unaware. The new 76 mm M1A1 gun approved for the M4 Sherman seemed to address concerns about firepower against the German tanks. All participants in the debate were, however, unaware of the inadequacy of the 76 mm gun against the frontal armor of the Panther tank, as they had not researched the effectiveness of this gun against the new German tanks, which had already been encountered in combat.[32]
Single prototype of 90 mm gun T26 turret mounted on an M4(105) chassis.

Gen. Lesley J. McNair had agreed to the production of the 76 mm M4 Sherman, and he strongly opposed the additional production of the T26E1. In the fall of 1943, he wrote this letter to Devers, responding to the latter's advocacy of the T26E1:

    The M4 tank, particularly the M4A3, has been widely hailed as the best tank on the battlefield today. There are indications that the enemy concurs in this view. Apparently, the M4 is an ideal combination of mobility, dependability, speed, protection, and firepower. Other than this particular request—which represents the British view—there has been no call from any theater for a 90 mm tank gun. There appears to be no fear on the part of our forces of the German Mark VI (Tiger) tank... There can be no basis for the T26 tank other than the conception of a tank versus tank duel—which is believed unsound and unnecessary. Both British and American battle experience has demonstrated that the antitank gun in suitable number and disposed properly is the master of the tank. Any attempt to armor and gun tanks so as to outmatch antitank guns is foredoomed to failure... There is no indication that the 76 mm antitank gun is inadequate against the German Mark VI (Tiger) tank.[33]

General Devers pressed on with his advocacy for the T26, going over McNair's head to General George Marshall, and, on 16 December 1943, Marshall overruled McNair and authorized the production of 250 T26E1 tanks. Then, in late December 1943, Devers was transferred to the Mediterranean, where he eventually led the invasion of Southern France with the 6th Army Group. In his absence, further attempts were made to derail the T26 program, but continued support from Generals Marshall and Eisenhower kept the production order alive. Testing and production of the T26E1 proceeded slowly, however, and the T26E1 did not begin full production until November 1944. These production models were designated as the T26E3.[32]

A single prototype of a T26 turret mounted on an M4(105) chassis was built by Chrysler in the summer of 1944, but did not progress into production.[34]

Hunnicutt, researching Ordnance Department documents, asserts that Ordnance requested production of 500 each of the T23, T25E1, and T26E1 in October 1943. The AGF objected to the 90 mm gun of the tanks, whereas the Armored Force wanted the 90 mm gun mounted in a Sherman tank chassis. General Devers cabled from London a request for production of the T26E1. In January 1944, 250 T26E1s were authorized. General Barnes of Ordnance continued to press for production of 1,000 tanks.[35]

According to Forty, Ordnance recommended that 1,500 of the T26E1 be built. The Armored Force recommended only 500. The AGF rejected the 90 mm version of the tank, and wanted it to be built with the 76 mm gun instead. Somehow, Ordnance managed to get production of the T26E1 started in November 1944. Forty primarily quoted from a post-war report from the Ordnance Dept.[36]
Production
Production finally began in November 1944. Ten T26E3 tanks were produced that month at the Fisher Tank Arsenal, 30 in December, 70 in January 1945, and 132 in February. The Detroit Tank Arsenal also started production in March 1945, and the combined output was 194 tanks for that month. Production continued through the end of the war, and over 2,000 were produced by the end of 1945.