GUNNERY NOTES AND EXPERIENCES IN ACTION OFF FALKLAND ISLANDS: INVINCIBLE

The most immediate results of the experience obtained in the Action off the Falkland Islands has been gent in my telegram No.28.

The "INVINCIBLE" and “INFLEXIBLE” fired a greater number of rounds than has been used in any previous action, and attention is called to the detailed report made by the Captain of “INVINCIBLE”.

Ever since I hoisted my Flag in the “INVINCIBLE” there have been continual partial failures which have had to be dealt with by the Ship's Staff; fortunately nothing serious occurred during the Action but the general fittings cannot be considered entirely satisfactory.

2.           I fully concur with the Captain of “INVINCIBLE” submission for an improvement in the arrangements for embarking ammunition as detailed in "INVINCIBLE's” letters of 6 February 1914 & 4 June 1914, and referred to in Admiralty Letter G. 14363/14/9271 of 21 April 1914 and telegram No. 9 from Admiralty G, of 8 July 1914 to the Commander-in-Chief Portsmouth.

I would also submit that the approved alterations to the Hydraulic Machinery mentioned In Admiralty Letter G. 9779/14 24148 of 3 November 1914 may be taken in hand at the earliest opportunity.

FCD Sturdee.


Enclosure “A” to letter No. A1/4 of 18th December 1914.


GUNNERY REMARKS

The following remarks are forwarded very fully as it is thought there may be many points of use and interest.

I consider that firing "P" and "Q" turrets across the deck is a mistake, and except in an emergency shall not permit of It in future.

On the whole I am of opinion that Director Firing would have been most valuable; every endeavour was made to avoid hampering the Fire Control by funnel smoke, and with small success.

At no time during the action was my view of the enemy from the Conning Tower obscured in any way, but the after turret, and at times the midship turrets were very much hampered. From time to time for short periods only, was the Fore Control hampered.

“A” Turret:

The jar of the left gun firing caused the breach control lever of the right gun to jerk over to close, with the result that the breach closed before the spoon tray was clear. The rear corner of the spoon tray indented the obturator pad and was between breech screw and the rear side of the mushroom head, so that, the breach could not be worked till it was cleared. A spare obturator and lock were shipped, but the gun misfired at intervals owing the vent stalk being slightly bent.

Delay of 30 minutes was caused to the right gun by this accident.

The turret was hit between the guns and the explosion caused the apron to be pierced and considerable blast was experienced in the working chamber. The apron being bent down acted as a brake, and stopped the turret from training. This defect was quickly overcome.

The fuse cap of a lyddite shell dropped down the trunk and got underneath the right main cage. The right cage on descending, could not, in consequence, free the interlocking gear and allow the shell and cordite doors to be opened. The right gun was put into secondary loading, projectiles being taken from the working chamber shell bins, and the cordite up the auxiliary hoist from the handing room. The Gun loading cage being used as before.

The cap came off when a shell was being rammed from the main cage into the gun loading cage. The accident occurred just before the end of the action.

The air blast pipe on the gun was shaken out of its slip, and was broken by the recoil. The left gun had to cease fire as the turret was filled with suffocating smoke. A new flexible pipe was rigged, but by the time this was done "Cease fire” had been ordered.

This was the only hitch of any kind which occurred to the left gun which fired 109 rounds.

“Q” Turret:

The left breech 'became difficult to open, and had to be assisted by levers; probably due to a tube becoming bent through not being properly inserted. The link actuating lock was slightly distorted. As the gun was still in action no immediate action was considered necessary.

Securing pin of locking plate of tilting gear of right main cage sheared with the result that the projectile tray tilted slightly and fouled the tip of the waiting tray.

The blast from “P” turret when "P" turret was firing starboard was severe and made communication with sight setters by voice pipe very difficult owing to deafness.

“P” Turret:

The pin securing the clutch connecting the shell and cordite rammers shook out, with the result that the shell rammer went forward without the cordite rammer. It was quickly replaced.

The cordite occasionally jammed in the gun loading cages owing to the cordite levers jamming out of centre. The cages were sent to working chamber and quickly cleared. As this jam had occurred on previous occasions the flash doors on the gun loading cages had been previously taken off to facilitate the clearing of a foul cage.

A nut falling on the flash door in the gun loading hoist prevented the door opening fully with the result that the gun loading cage came down on the edge of it bent it. It was quickly straightened, and the gun only out of action for a couple of minutes.

Severe blast was experienced when “Q” turret was firing port side, Gun layers, Trainers, and Sight setters were deafened, dazed, and had their heads banged and against adjacent projections. Trainers had to be relieved constantly as they were too dazed to train on the enemy properly. Orders in Gun-house had to be shouted in men’s ears as all were deafened.

“X” Turret:

Shortly before ethe end of the action the intercepting valve of the working chamber transfer rammer of the left gun failed to allow the pressure to get to the rammer control valve. This was due to the adjustable connecting rod shaking out of adjustment.

The shell and cordite were transferred from the main cage the gun loading cage by hand till the end of the action.

General Remarks on Turrets:

A large quantity of water was used by the wash-out squirts, and leaks, but it was not necessary to use salt water. Pressure appeared to be rather low occasionally, and this fall may have been due to all the turrets being fired and guns all run out more or less at the, same time.

All three pumps were in use.

The turret machinery worked well, and no breakdowns occurred beyond those mentioned in the detailed report on the turrets. No breakdown of a serious nature occurred, and all guns were in action at "Cease fire".

The air blast was very satisfactory, and the air flasks in the turrets did not have to be used at all. The fitting of the system of using air pressure from the ship's main ring was only completed by the ship’s staff two days before the action. The air pipe of the left gun of “A” turret breaking showed clearly the vital importance of the air blast to clear the guns of smoke. There are practically no means for gun smoke to escape from the turrets; and the failure of this air blast quickly put a turret out of action.

Fire Control Installation:

The Fire Control worked well, and no portion of the electrical fire control ceased working during the action except the Rate Transmitter in the Fore Top which was blown off its brackets and rendered useless.

A certain amount of damage was done to the voice pipes. The 3-inch pipes from the Fore Top to the Fore Transmitting Station were crushed in by an 8” projectile just above the transmitting station. One of these , however, could be used, and was used for control during the last two hours of the action.

The majority of the temporary flexible voice pipes leading into the Conning Tower were destroyed by the explosion of a shell which hit the starboard strut of the foremast on the level of the Conning Tower. The blast from this shell knocked the Control Officer, and several men in the Fore Top down, tore the Mark VI Dumaresq from its platform, and knocked over the Rate Transmitter in the Fore Top putting it out of action.

Two 3-inch voice pipes were broken just under the control top, and squashed flat, probably by splinters.

Range Finders:

Fore Top Range Finder was in correct adjustment previous to the action, but was found to be much out shortly after fire had opened.

Range taking was impossible during the greater part of the action, due to funnel smoke, gun smoke &c.

Range finder was on several occasions covered with spray from shell bursting short and sending up quantities of water into the Fore Top.

“A” turret reports - Range taking was most difficult. Owing to great range and elevation of guns, the  muzzles fouled the range finder.

Glasses were continually obscured by spray.

The use of lasin on the glasses was found very effective.

"P” turret reports - Range taking practically impossible owing to smoke chiefly from funnels.

“Q” turret reports - impossible to use the range finder during the long period of smoke interference.

“X” turret reports - Range taking was impossible owing to smoke from our own ship.

General - Some means should available to clean spray from range finder windows, without sending men on top of the turret. It is thought that a 6-inch round hole might be cut in the roof of the turret under each window, so that a man can put his hand up and wipe over the window.

Control of Fire:

Fire was controlled from the Fore Top generally, but on three occasions turrets had to be put into local control, on one occasion primary control from “A” turret was resorted to. These periods only lasted for two or three minutes each, and were due to the target being entirely obscured by funnel smoke from the Fore Top.

During these periods the turrets report that they had great difficulties firing, and that spotting was practically impossible.

During each lull in the action “Check fire" was ordered from the Fore Top to all turrets, and opportunities were taken to make good minor defects.

The control of fire was generally most difficult due to the following causes:

1.       Funnel smoke, and gun smoke from our own ship, which at times completely obscured the target.

2.       Spray from short shot occasionally covering all glasses with salt water.

3.       Considerable shaking of the mast whenever “A” turret was fired – this was chiefly due to the starboard strut of the foremast being much damaged.

4. Spotting voice pipe to Fore Transmitting Station being put out of action; the pipe that was being used was also crushed, and orders had to be shouted down and constantly repeated.

5. Dumaresq and Rate Transmitter being knocked down, made it necessary to shout rates down the voice pipe.

6.    The Control Party in the Fore Top were twice knocked down by blast of bursting shell, but no one was injured.

7.    Considerable spread of our own fall of shot, apparently due to the Gun-layers and Trainers of “P" and “Q” turrets being much dazed by blast when turrets were fired across the deck, and also to the laying being (reported by all Gun-layers except “A”) very difficult owing to own funnel smoke, and also splashes of enemy shell falling short.

8. Great difficulty in keeping the shot on the target, due to the rate constantly changing. This appears to have been due to the enemy zig-zagging, and at the long range these alterations of course, in and out, I could not be detected by eye or by rangefinder. This zig-zag appears to have been at least two points each side of the enemy’s normal course, and the alteration of course to have taken place every three or four minutes.

9.    The range was generally 12,000 to 14,000 yards. Fire was opened at 16.000 yards with the guns at their maximum elevation.
Except at the close of the action the range was outside 10,000 yards.

10.  It was often very difficult to see overs, or hits, unless a bright flame accompanied the hit. This was especially the case Towards the end of the action when there was some mist.

Miscellaneous:

1.        A number of pins of caps of lyddite shell were very difficult to remove probably due to the transfer rammer in working chamber bearing on the caps when ramming the shell into the gun loading cage.
Special hooks had to be made for these pins, and pliers were also provided.
Some pins could not be removed at all, and shells were fired with their caps on.

2.       Total number of 12” rounds fired 513.

3.       The only damage consequence to the gunnery equipment of the ship is that done to No.2 4-inch gun, starboard, which was cut in half by a shell. The other damages to guns and mountings are all of a trivial nature, and can be repaired by ship’s staff.

Arrangements for embarking and readjusting ammunition.

At the end of the action the following amount of ammunition remained in the four turrets:

“A” 12 rounds.
“P” 112 rounds.
“Q” 104 rounds.
“X” 29 rounds.

It therefore became urgently necessary to equalise what was left as quickly as possible.

The rearrangements for embarking, and therefore for making the above mentioned re-adjustment of ammunition are however badly designed, very slow, and not without danger, and it is urgently submitted that the proposals put forward in “Invincible’s” letters of 6th February 1914 and 4th June 1914 (referred to in Admiralty letters G. 14363/14/9271 of 21st April 1914 to Commander-in-Chief Portsmouth) may be reconsidered.

“Invincible” will shortly have to embark approximately a ¾ outfit, and in the circumstances of war it is most necessary that this shall be effected quickly and safely.

Ссылка на первоисточник:
https://www.tapatalk.com/groups/allthew … tml#p23129

Огромная просьба к хорошо владеющим английским языком сделать перевод.

Отредактированно Nemo-800 (12.08.2021 11:07:25)

Спасибо! Жду продолжения. А то я как собака- смысл понимаю, но для других лучше не писать.

Алекс написал:

#1514153
Алекс (

Здорово! А можно я когда вы закончите перевод, его в своем ЖЖ в соответствующей статье выложу с указанием авторства?

Алекс написал:

#1514153
Осколки снаряда большие и скорее являются последствиями частичного, а не полного взрыва или детонации. Уго

Я лично в этой фразе завис, что частичная детонация не догадался.

Алекс написал:

#1514162
Скажем так, что это мой вариант перевода.

Все равно лично мне очень нравиться и вполне достойно для введения источника в оборот.

Алекс написал:

#1514235
Алекс

Я тут еще вкусненького нарыл в свете нашего спора по Коронелю. В спец тему выкладывать не буду, все равно  тема РН похоже тут интересна паре подобных нам фриков

EXTRACTS FROM VARIOUS PAPERS DEALING WITH THE QUESTION OF ACCUMULATION OF CORDITE AT GUN STATIONS.

G.16264-13.

On the other hand it has always been a guiding principle that accumulations of ammunition near the guns were to be avoided, as the ignition of such by enemy’s shell fire might prove disastrous.

I do not think this principle should be departed from, and if it be considered desirable and necessary to stow ammunition in cases on deck for preservation, they should. In my opinion, be opened up and the contents distributed in K.A. cases immediately action is imminent.

(sd.)…F.C.T. Tudor,
D.N.O.
4th June, 1913.

G.20778-13.

Further experience has shown that the ammunition supply in this ship is so poor, that a great loss of life and probably the complete loss of the ship from the enemy’s shell fire is likely to be the result of guarding against a local cordite fire by not keeping a ready supply at the guns.

(sd.)…Fred C. Dreyer,
Captain, H.M.S. Amphion.
15th October, 1913.

G.14774-14.

If however, the cordite be retained in ammunition boxes or cases it is less liable to ignition than if in K.A. cases, but, if ignited, the initial conflagration would be more fierce since about five charges in a more or less confined space would be affected, and an explosion of some force would probably result.

The explosion would, however, be mild in comparison with the explosion of the enemy shell which caused it, and is therefore not of great account.

(sd.)…F.C.T. Tudor,
D.N.O.
29th January, 1914.

G.14774-14.

These trials show that the rate of supply depends on the work inside the magazines of removing cartridges from cases. I am of the opinion  that a supply of cartridges should be removed from their cases when the ships prepare for war and be kept ready in bags in the magazines. By taking the risk of possible explosion (in the event of a cartridge being stuck) and starting with 10 projectiles at each gun, the rate of supply should be adequate.

(sd.)…N. Berkely Milne,
Admiral, Commander-in-Chief.
9th April, 1914.

G.15134-14.

DAY ACTION:
In older ships regard must be had to the possibility of fire caused by the ignition of cordite charges being communicated to the ammunition passages and possibly to the magazines; in the newer ships, except light cruisers, this danger is very much less as there are no trunks for flame to pass down, no ammunition passages where large quantities of ammunition are exposed, and supply is made from small ready use magazines which would not have a great deal of cordite in them.

(sd.)…G.N. Callaghan,
Admiral.
27th April, 1914.

G.15134-14.

Preparation for Night Torpedo Boat Attack.
A rapid and sustained fire delivered at the moment the Torpedo craft are sighted is essential. The danger of the charges being ignited by the fire of enemy’s heavy ships may be disregarded.

(sd.)…S.C. Colville,
Vice Admiral.
15th April, 1914.

G.15134-14.

It is considered more important to have the ammunition provided and ready for immediate use and to risk the chance of a cordite fire, rather than to guard against a fire, and to have the ship unprepared for an attack.

(sd.)…G. Warrender,
Vice Admiral Commanding Second Battle Squadron.
12th April, 1914.

G.15134-14.

Although 20 rounds per gun, in the case of the 6-inch, would mean a large amount of cordite in the 6-inch battery, it is considered to be more important to provide ammunition for the guns to fire at the enemy, and accept the remote chance of a local cordite fire by having too little ammunition at the gun (i.e. no chance of hitting the enemy), resulting in the destruction of one’s own ship.

(sd.)…R.K Arbuthnot,
Rear Admiral Commanding 2nd Battle Squadron.
23rd March, 1913.

G.15134-14.

It is considered more important to provide ammunition for the gun to fire at the enemy and accept the remote chance of a local cordite fire, than to guard against such fire by having little or no ammunition at the gun – i.e. no chance of hitting the enemy, resulting probably in the destruction of one’s on ship.

(sd.)…Fred C. Dreyer,
Captain, H.M.S. Orion.
4th April, 1916.

G.15134-14.

The likelihood of having to repel a destroyer attack during a day action renders it imperative to have an ample supply of cordite at the 6-inch guns.

(sd.)…Walter Cowan,
Captain, H.M.S. Zealandia.
27th March 1914.

G.15134-14.

During day I do not think it advisable to leave cordite in unprotected positions unattended.

(sd.)…David Beatty,
Rear Admiral.
15th April, 1914


G.15134-14.

It is not considered advisable to leave cordite on he upper deck or in unprotected positions during a day action.

2. The 4-inch crews in this ship have orders to take that ammunition below with them when they retire behind armour. The number of rounds supplied is therefore limited to twice the number of men available for manning the 4-inch guns, which amounts, in the case of Battle Cruisers, to 14 rounds per gun.

(sd.)…Osmond de B. Brock.
Captain, Princess Royal.
1st April, 1914.

G.15134-14.

It should be laid down in the Gunnery Manual that the risk of the explosion of stacked ammunition is secondary to maintaining a rapid fire which should afford the best protection to stacked ammunition.

(sd.)…C.E. Madden,
Rear Admiral.
10th April, 1914.

G.15134-14.

I would suggest that for Fearless, Active, & Forward stowage at the guns be provided for 30 rounds in boxes. This should meet all requirements for day or night as a ready supply. The boxes are recommended in preference to the racks, as it is considered that with such a considerable portion of the ships allowance of cordite at the guns every possible care should be taken to protect it from the weather.

(sd.)…R.Y. Tyrwhitt,
Captain (T).
22nd April, 1914.

G.15134-14.

It is generally accepted that the risk of local cordite fires must be taken in order that a ship may be ready to instantly develop her maximum power of gun fire.

(sd.)…F.C.T. Tudor,
D.N.O.
11/5/14.

G.042-15. – Gunnery Orders 1915. 1st February, 1915.

Experience has shown the great danger of allowing cordite to accumulate in gun positions and causing severe fires. This accumulation should therefore on no account be allowed.

(16) Опора фок-мачты с правого борта около выгородки 4-дюймового орудия № 1   поражена 8,2-дюймовым снарядом, который вошел в опору со стороны правого борта, разорвавшись внутри нее, оторвал кусок длиной 10 футов с левой стороны опоры, а также сбоку за орудийной выгородкой, сильно изрешечен и искорежил носовую дымовую трубу и разрушил трап на мостик.


(17) 4-дюймовая пушка № 2 по правому борту. Поражена 8,2 дюймовым бронебойным снарядом, который перебил орудие посередине, разрушил орудийный щит и продырявил палубу под ним, искорежил тумбу орудия, прошел через палубу полубака, разрушив помещение для хранения боезента и красок, прошел через верхнюю палубу и переборку экрана в кладовую адмирала на левом борту, в который и был найден в шкафу неразорвавшимся . Бронебойный колпачок  был сорван в момент попадания в 4-дюймовую пушку № 2, а головная часть снаряда была слегка повреждена. Снаряд был разобран, внимательно осмотрен на борту и будет отправлен в Вулич.

(18) После того, как основание боевой рубки было частично снесено, накопительный резервуар пресной воды, из которого она поступала потребителям самотеком, получил пробоину, а сигнальное устройство, показывающее положение руля, было повреждено 8,2-дюймовым снарядом, который разорвался при входе в основание боевой рубки с правого борта.

(19) Разрушен борт корабля и лазарет на жилой палубе, водонепроницаемая переборка и дверь в ней пробиты осколками разорвавшегося 8,2-дюймового снаряда, который вошел в лазарет через верхнюю палубу с правого борта у вентиляционного ствола перед  башни «X» левого борта.

(20) Буфет разрушен, палуба под ним и над ним продырявлены, труба шпигата и вентиляционный ствол снесены 8,2-дюймовым снарядом, который разорвался при входе в верхнюю палубу рядом с башней “X” по правому борту, и осколки которого сильно побили парусный катер.
В то время буфет была почти полон продуктов.

Отредактированно Алекс (15.08.2021 20:33:01)

Евгений написал:

#1514342
Это все равно интересно

Конечно интересно. Например эти рапорты с Ибла оказали решающее влияние на формирование облика легких линейных крейсеров и больших легких крейсеров Фишера.

Алекс написал:

#1514438
(22) Seamen's heads (какой-то жаргоизм)

жарг. гальюн для команды
Судя по анатомии "Дредноута" - так и есть.

Повреждения палубы также были вызваны пороховыми газами при стрельбе башен “P” и “Q”, бимсы палубы были искорежены, а настилка палубы сильно разбита.

8,2-дюймовый снаряд с бронебойным колпачком, который был извлечен полностью  целым, был осторожно разобран и осмотрен; похоже, он снаряжен тротилом, и поскольку его конструкция, способ снаряжения и соединения с ним бронебойного колпачка могут иметь новые особенности, все будет отправлено в Вулич для ознакомления. Угол падения этого снаряда, измеренный по линии отверстий, проделанных им в различных палубах, составляет 48˚.

Противник стрелял несколькими типами снарядов, и были извлечены части, по крайней мере, одного снаряда с головным взрывателем.

Большая часть попавших снарядов, по-видимому, разрывалась, и вес их осколков варьируется от примерно ½ унции до двух или трех фунтов, и было найдено несколько целых ввинчивающихся донных частей снарядов с оборванной резьбой.

Снаряд, который проник в угольный бункер № 5, по-видимому, разорвался, а не разрушился после прохождения через днищевую обшивку, поскольку извлеченные куски невелики и на всех видны кристаллические трещины.

Были найдены бронебойные колпачки двух 8,2-дюймовых снарядов и одного 5,9-дюймового снаряда.

Зажигательное действие снарядов было небольшим, это было особенно заметно в кают-кампании, где вся мебель, такая как буфеты, диваны, стулья и столы, была разбита на куски. Однако не было никаких следов огня, кроме налета черного дыма на всем. И нигде краска не загорелась.

Снаряд, попавший в опору фок-мачты с правого борта, вызвал сильное сотрясение поста управления огнем на марсе. Ударная волна, по-видимому, распространяясь внутри опоры вверх достигла мачты, потому что была распахнута дверь, ведущую в пост управления огнем, сбит с ног офицер управляющий огнем, сорван с места Mk. VI Думареск, который был хорошо закреплен, а также вышел из строя дающий датчик скорости.

Значительное количество снарядов, как правило калибром 5,9 дюйма, вообще не разорвалось.

Дым из снарядов был черным, удушливым и сладковатым на вкус.

Отредактированно Алекс (18.08.2021 15:35:08)

Где-то так.

Особо интересен этот абзац

The fuse cap of a lyddite shell dropped down the trunk and got underneath the right main cage. The right cage on descending, could not, in consequence, free the interlocking gear and allow the shell and cordite doors to be opened. The right gun was put into secondary loading, projectiles being taken from the working chamber shell bins, and the cordite up the auxiliary hoist from the handing room. The Gun loading cage being used as before.

Алекс написал:

#1516125
Про стрельбу есть одна конкретная проблема, чтобы правильно перевести, что у них там в башнях отваливалось, а что гнулось нужно очень хорошо представлять устройство этой башни, а я его уже заметно подзабыл. Поэтому сначала нужно на том же английском прочитать книжечку, как это все было устроено и работало, притом с картинками, а уж потом браться за перевод, а то я такое наперевожу, что Вы ахнете.

Так можно подождать?
ну тогда еще поживу