AlexeyRA написал:

Оригинальное сообщение #140351
я уже говорил - есть большой шанс влететь под учения ПВО

Дык, если ПВО охотно спутало японцев со "стратегами", то почему оно не сможет столь же охотно спутать японцев с "учебной атакующей группой"? Тут ведь дело не в самих учениях, а в организационных структурах, реализующих распознавание цели и принятие стратегических решений (применительно к учёниям - продолжать тратить учебный боекомплетк или всё-таки подвезти боевой?). Ну будут в разгаре учения - ну будет возле всех орудий учебный боекомплект, а во всех истребителях холостые патроны - от этого результативность японского первого налёта как-то радикально изменится?

AlexeyRA написал:

Удар по П-Х в РИ - это вспомогательный рейд флота

Теперь понятно, а то раскричались было многие...

AlexeyRA написал:

Угу... правда, с ЛК Ямамото Кидо Бутай даже удрать вряд ли удастся.

А от кого удирать? У чьих ЛК скорость больше, неужто у америкосовых?

AlexeyRA написал:

что будут делать 6 АВ, если вдруг встретятся на обратном пути в СМУ, скажем, с парой КРТ и 5-6 ЭМ USN?

ОК.

AlexeyRA написал:

А ну как флот США таки соберётся и пойдёт спасать Филиппины?

Так вроде именно на это и заточена классическая яп. доктрина ген. мор. сражения. В ней изложено где кого искать и что с ним дальше делать.

yuu2 написал:

А когда они будут "под зонтиком" аэродромов Манилы, то никакие "зеро" из Индокитая и никакие береговые торпедоносцы их не достанут

В РИ не очень то "зонтик" и местных спас, а "рассредоточенные по антидесантной схеме" ЛК и подавно не спасет. Будет им море Сибуян жемчужной гаванью. Ну ещё разве на Яву драпануть могут.

yuu2 написал:

Оригинальное сообщение #140390
чтобы снять весь учебный боекомплект и поставить боевой нужно меньше времени, чем на просто постановку боевого?

Проблема не в "поставить" , а в том что склады на замке, ЕМНИП.

yuu2 написал:

Оригинальное сообщение #140681
и весь следующий день дрыхнуть будет - в чём разница?

Он будет дрыхнуть на посту, а не дома.
---
Добавка к книжкам:
Далл, "Боевой путь императорского японского флота"
Добавка к старому: http://tsushima4.borda.ru/?1-10-0-00000077-000-40-0

Alexey RA
   
А давайте... В первом приближении это выглядит так:
Конец налёта второй волны, ЕМНИП, 10:00 (Футида продолжал наблюдение до 11:00, вернулся в 13:00).
Возврат на авианосцы - 2 ч (с посадкой).
Перевооружение - 1.5 ч (это я по опыту Мидуэя).
В любом случае решение на удар принимается в 13:30 на основе доклада Футиды.
Полёт к цели - 2 ч (со сбором ударной группы).
Удар - 0.5 ч.
Возврат - 2 ч.
Итого - 4.5 ч., что даёт нам время возвращения и посадки третьей волны где-то в 18:00.
Для Гонолулу имеем:
"Sunrise: 6:56am
Sunset: 5:49pm"
Т.о., посадка будет идти в сумерках, переходящих в ночь.
Данные по Гонолулу я взял отсюда, забив Гонолулу и Декабрь 1941. Впрочем, насчёт темноты Вы может быть и правы, ибо кроме захода Солнца есть и сумерки
"Nautical Twilight
Nautical twilight is defined when the sun is 12 degrees below the horizon. At the beginning or end of nautical twilight, under good atmospheric conditions and in the absence of other illumination, general outlines of ground objects may be distinguishable, but detailed outdoor operations are not possible, and the horizon is indistinct. "
В этом случае:
"Twi N: 6:05
Sunrise: 6:56
Sunset: 17:49
Twi N: 18:41
Moonrise: 21:26
Moonset: 9:55"
-------
www.cgsc.army.mil/carl/download/csipubs … earl_b.pdf

На Декабрь 1941 в 53d Coast Artillery Brigade было 4 полка ЗА, из которых 2 кадрированных (50% л/с) и 2 - 100% укомплектованности.
По наличию вооружения:
86 из 98 - 3"
20 из 120 - 37 мм (хе-хе-хе, и нам будут говорить о некомплекте МЗА в СССР)
113 из 246 - 0.5"
Однако, только на позициях батарей 64-го полка имелись готовые к стрельбе боеприпасы (ну и на фортах, конечно). У остальных полков боеприпасы хранились в Ordnance Depot - предполагалось, что атакующие силы будут замечены заранее, так что времени для выдачи боеприпасов вполне хватит (дежа-вю крепчает... ).
"The 53d Coast Artillery Brigade had two regiments at half strength and two at full strength, they were short equipment (they had 86 of98 3-inch guns, 20 of 120 37mm guns, and 113 of 246 .50-caliber machine guns), and only the 64th Coast Artillery Regiment had ammunition at its battery locations (the assumption was there would be enough notice of an attack to issue ammunition)."
USS Ramapo, Reports of Pearl Harbor Attack

The Officer-of-the-Deck the, at about 0755, saw a Japanese dive bomber come in very close and drop a couple of bombs. He sounded general quarters and, as the guns were manned, fire was opened with all A.A. guns, using ammunition from the ready boxes. The machine guns opened up first, and the 3", using preset fuze setting of 2.5 seconds, shortly afterwards. The starboard 3" gun was blanked off through a large arc, by the crane on the dock but managed to fire from time to time. The machine guns on the Motor Torpedo Boats on deck opened fire shortly after the Ramapo. "

Евгений Пинак

http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/pha/congress/part_2.html#66
"In the case of the Army, the following table reflects the places and
times at which antiaircraft units were in position: [43]

In position and ready
Regiment Battery to fire

Sixty-fourth A (searchlight) at Honolulu 10:00 a.m.
(alerted at 8:15 a.m.) B (3-inch) at Aiea 10:00 a.m.
C (3-inch) at Aliamanu 10:30 a.m.
D (3-inch) south of Aliamanu 11:00 a.m.
E (searchlight) at Ewa- (Time not
Pearl Harbor known)
F (3-inch) at Pearl City 11:05 a.m.
G (3-inch) at Ahua Point 10:30 a.m.
H (3-inch) at Fort Weaver 10:00 a.m.
I (37-mm) at Aliamanu (Known only
K (37-mm) at Hickam Field that batteries
L (37-mm) at Hickam Field were in posi-
tion before
11:45 a.m.)
M (37-mm) at Wheeler Field 11:55 a.m.
Ninety-seventh A (searchlight) at Fort
Kamehameha 8:34 a.m.
(alerted between 7:55 F (3-inch) at Fort Kamehameha 8:55 a.m.
and 8:10 a.m.). G (3-inch) at Fort Weaver 8:30 a.m.
H (3-inch) at Fort Barrett 10:20 a.m.
Ninety-eighth. A (searchlight) at Schofield (Time not
Barracks known.)
B (3-inch) at Schofield Barracks 9:55 a.m.
C (3-inch) at Schofield Barracks 10:30 a.m.
D (3-inch) at Puuloa Dump,
south of Ewa 11:45 a.m.
F (3-inch) at Kaneohe Naval Air
Station 1:15 p.m.
G (3-inch) at Kaneohe Naval Air
Station 1:15 p.m.
H (3-inch) at Waipahu High
School 1:30 p.m.
Two Hundred and A (searchlight) at Ewa (Time not
Fifty-first known)
B (3-inch) at West Loch 11:45 a.m.
C (3-inch) at Ewa Beach 11:45 a.m.
D (3-inch) at South of Ewa 11:45 a.m.
E (50-caliber) at Navy Yard
Pearl Harbor 12:41 p.m.
F (37-mm) at Navy Recreation
area 12:30 p.m.
G (37-mm) at tank farm,
Schofield Barracks 11:00 a.m.
H (37-mm) at Navy Yard 12:05 p.m.

One antiaircraft detachment was located at Sand Island when the attack started and engaged the enemy with 3-inch guns at 8:15 a. m., shooting
down two enemy planes at that time.
The foregoing table reflects that of 31 army antiaircraft batteries, 27 were not in position and ready to fire until after the attack and in
several instances not for a considerable period of time after the attack.

The extraordinary lack of readiness of Army antiaircraft units appears to have been occasioned largely by the time required for moving into
position and the fact that ammunition was not readily accessible to the mobile batteries. [44] "

Alexey_RA

Как и следовало ожидать, наиболее быстро in position and ready оказались 64 полк БО (тот самый, у которого боеприпасы были на позициях батарей) и 97 полк БО (зенитки фортов). По этой же ссылке:
"...only a limited amount of ammunition was in the hands of troops of the Hawaiian Department. The Coast Artillery Command had previously been authorized to draw, and had drawn, ammunition for its fixed positions only, including antiaircraft. However, at these installations, the shells were kept in boxes in order to keep the ammunition from damage and deterioration. The ammunition for
the mobile guns and batteries was in storage chiefly at Aliamanu Crater and Schofield Barracks. "

Кстати, мы ещё кое-кого забыли - Marines тоже имели свою ЗА:
"А complement of 652 marines were assigned at Pearl Harbor in the 1st Defense Battalion (-), 2d Engineer Battalion, 3d Defense Battalion, and 4th Defense Battalion. These marines had four 5-inch AA guns, eight 3-inch AA guns, 20 .50-caliber machine guns, and 16 .30-caliber machine guns. (...)
In December 1941 the marine ground elements were well trained and prepared for combat with ammunition readily available."

Кое-что есть - в ООВ по П-Х указана численность по 97 полку БО (странно, правда, что прожекторная батарея А показана как 3"):
"A-97 four 3 inch AA Ahua Point
F-97 four 3 inch AA Battery Closson
G-97 four 3 inch AA Fort Weaver
H-97 four 3 inch AA Fort Barrette "
Исходя из этого, можно предположить, что батареи 3" по штату четырёхорудийные (правда, остаётся неясность с прожекторными батареями - та же батарея А 97 полка БО почему-то в ООВ вооружена 3"). В принципе, на это указывает также численность ЗА: у нас есть 18 - 3" батарей, 5 прожекторных, 7 - МЗА и 1 - пулемётная; на них 72 мобильных + 26 стационарных (есть 60 мобильных и 26 стационарных) - 3", 120 (есть 20) - 37мм и 246 (113) - 0.5".
По стационарным ЗУ неясно, к кому они относятся (к полкам ПВО или к полкам стационарной артиллерии фортов), ибо 97 полк БО, на который я ранее думал, был сформирован лишь в июле 1941 и вооружён 20 - 3". Родоначальник же ПВО П-Х - 64 полк БО - вообще имеет только одну "подозрительную" батарею Н на Fort Weaver. А на cdsg.org, к несчастью, прямо говорится, что из-за неполноты информации артиллерию ПВО БО они не указывают:
"Not Listed: Coast Artillery Corps troops manned several other types of harbor defense weapons and sites which are not listed here due to incomplete information held by the compiler. This includes: all fixed (emplaced) antiaircraft (AA) guns; some of the temporary railway carriage guns (8" RY, 12" RM) parked at site (unless emplacements were built, but some positions prepared in Hawaii during WWII may not be listed); some of the WW II emergency Navy guns & mounts, the 75mm howitzer mounts used in Panama, field mounted 155 GPF batteries, fire control stations; and searchlights."

По 37 мм батареям неясно - их слишком много, аж целых 7 штук, для 20 МЗУ, имевшихся к 7 декабря, и слишком мало для штатных 120 МЗА. ЕМНИП, в них штатно должно было быть по 8 МЗУ и 8 ЗПУ... На это же указывает ещё один факт: после планируемого на конец 1941 формирования в 53 бригаде ещё одного полка ПВО БО количество штатных МЗУ должно было увеличиться со 120 до 144 (24 установки на 3 батареи - как раз по 8 штук). На самом деле, МЗА можно вообще исключить из рассмотрения, ибо:
"The 37-mm. guns had been in Hawaii for almost ten months before ammunition for them arrived on 5 December 1941, and there had been very little for the antiaircraft machine guns, so that firing practice for even the small number of guns available for defense against dive or torpedo bombers or other low-flying planes had been more or less out of the question. "
http://www.army.mil/cmh-pg/books/wwii/Guard-US/ch6.htm стр. 169

Там же, кстати, указана причина, почему большинство орудий и боеприпасов не находились на позициях - половина позиций находилась в частных владениях, однако... посему в ходе учений расчёты ЗА располагались на близлежащих дорогах, стараясь не нарушать границы частных владений, а боезапас с мая 1941 вообще в поле не вывозился, оставаясь на складах...
"About half the mobile 3-inch guns were assigned action stations on private property, and in practice sessions during the months before the Japanese attack the gun crews kept to nearby roads and carefully refrained from trespassing. Except during practice sessions the guns and the regiments that manned them were concentrated in three areas some distance from their battle stations, and at all times after May 1941 ammunition for the guns remained in the Ordnance depot. "

Судя по приведенному ранее INVESTIGATION OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK, несмотя на то, что на момент атаки лишь 1/4 всех корабельных орудий ПВО были укомплектованы л/с, уже через 10 минут all antiaircraft batteries were manned and firing (все дежурные ЗПУ кораблей вообще открыли огонь немедленно). Отличились крейсера - им, в среднем, хватило 4 минут, за ними ЛК - 5 минут, ЭМ - 7 минут и вспомогательные суда - 10 минут.
"All types had some ready ammunition at the guns, in accordance with their type directives. Battleships and Cruisers, 15 rounds per gun for two guns for the 5-inch anti-aircraft battery and 300 rounds per gun for half of the .50 caliber battery. The Destroyers present all had .50 caliber ammunition available and some 5-inch ammunition, depending on tests that were underway at the moment."
Pearl Harbor Attack: 7 December 1941, Online Action Reports: Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, Serial 0479 of 15 February 1942
Правда, в свете этоих бодрых рапортов, есть один вопрос - а было ли у этих ЗУ вменяемое ЦУ (особенно для "больших горшков" - помнится, на некоторых из них были проблемы с электропитанием), или стреляли "на глазок", по всему, что летает...

Да, кстати, с армейскими батареями я, похоже, маху дал - "At 8:30 a fixed 3-inch battery at Weaver began to fire, and similar batteries at Kamehameha and on Sand Island in Honolulu harbor opened up against Japanese planes"
http://www.army.mil/CMH/books/wwii/Guard-US/ch7.htm
Если сравнить с таблицей готовности батарей из INVESTIGATION OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK, то там как раз есть G (3-inch) at Fort Weaver 8:30 a.m., а также батареи A и F на укреплениях Kamehameha - 8:34 a.m. и 8:55 a.m.... так что похоже, что 97 полк БО таки обслуживал 16 стационарных 3" ЗУ (указанных в ООВ)... но как тогда распределить мобильные 3" ЗУ по другим батареям?

Кстати, насчёт ПВО USMC Gudmen немного приврал... ammunition readily available у них были лишь для стрелковки, а для СЗА, как и у всех наземников - на складах:
"Thirteen machine guns were in action by 0820 and the gunners had already accounted for their first enemy dive bomber. During the next hour and a half the fire of twenty-five more .30's and .50's was added to the yard's antiaircraft defenses, and two more planes, one claimed jointly with the ships, were shot down. The 3-inch guns were never able to get into action. The ammunition trucks did not return from the Lualualei depot until 1100, more than an hour after the last Japanese aircraft had headed back for their carriers."
http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USMC/I/USMC-I-II-2.html

И, возвращаясь к моей излюбленной теме стационарных 3" зениток... порылся я тут в документах The Hart Investigation и нашёл письмо Нокса Стимсону (SecNav to SecWar) от 24 Января 1941:
"There are now in Oahu 26 3" fixed anti-air craft guns (of which something over half are grouped about Pearl Harbor), 56 mobile 3" guns, and 109 .50 caliber machine guns. The anti-aircraft batteries are manned in part by personnel which is also required to man parts of the sea coast artillery. Should an attack on Oahu combine air attack with a gun bombardment, one or the other countering fires would suffer from lack of men."
EXHIBIT NO. 40 (HART INQUIRY)

AlexeyRA написал:

Оригинальное сообщение #141143
дело в том, что для отражения учебного налёта надо запитать системы корабля - те же МПУАЗО, приводы башен/орудий, элеваторы и т.д. А это потребует ввода в действие дополнительных котлов.

А для чего на корабле стоят дизельные электрогенераторы? Или приводы башен и прочее - на паровом приводе?

AlexeyRA написал:

Оригинальное сообщение #141398
На всех остальных же...

Для того, чтобы запитать СУАЗО и приводы зенитных установкок, а также помпы и еще что-то из минимум необходимого для отражения атаки и борьбы за живучесть - хватит или нет? Там же не требовалось запитывать приводы и системы подачи ГК.
Что касается остальных, то, конечно, такой вариант не пройдет.
Но хотелось бы уточнить - а)  на что именно хватало энергии котла, который был под паром, 2) не перебрасывались ли с берега линии передачи электричества для запитки бортовых систем? 

AlexeyRA написал:

Оригинальное сообщение #141398
Камрад, Вы хотите гонять в ходе учений аварийные ДГ, которых всего 2 на корабль?

Нет. Но сколько времени требуется на запуск и выход на рабочий режим?

Добавка к списку книг:
1 - The First Team: Pacific Navy Air Combat from Pearl Harbor to Midway
Journal article by Stu Tobias; Air Power History, Vol. 53, 2006.
2 - Shattered Sword: The Untold Story of the Battle of Midway http://www.shatteredswordbook.com/
взято тут http://tsushima.su/forums/viewtopic.php … 92#p145092 , спасибо Сидоренко Владимир.

Scif

Во исполнении своего обещания, подумал и написал прибавку к списку книг по войне на Тихом океане.

Разумеется, с прибавлением этого полутора десятка названий потребная библиография далеко-далеко не исчерпывается.

Хирата С., Как мы будем воевать.
Ямабэ М., Парашютисты японского флота.
R.J.Francillon, "Japanese Aircraft of the Pacific War".
H.Sakaida & K.Takaki, Genda's Blade. Japan's Squadron of Ases 343 Kokutai.
O.Tagaya, Mitsubishi Type 1 Rikko "Betty" units of World War 2.
G.L. Rottman, Japanese Army in World War II. Conquest of the Pacific 1941-42.
G.L. Rottman, Japanese Army in World War II. The Sought Pacific and New Guinea, 1942-43.

G.Williford & T.McGovern, Defenses of Pearl Harbor and Oahu 1907-50.
T.C.McGovern & M.A.Berhow, American Defenses of Corregidor and Manila Bay 1898-1945.
R.Frank, Guadalcanal.
E.Hammel, Guadalcanal. Decision at Sea.
J.Winton, The Forgotten Fleet. The British navy in the Pacific 1944 - 1945.

N.Friedman, The U.S. battleships. An illustrated design history.
N.Friedman, The U.S. destroyer.
N.Friedman, The U.S. aircraft carriers. An illustrated design history.

Хотя я по прежнему не убеждён, что составление этого списка принесёт пользу. Объяснения - в ЛС.

Отредактированно Сидоренко Владимир (28.11.2009 09:03:16)

Не все знают, а зря. Памятная записка МакКоллума

0p-16-F-2 ON1 7 October 1940
Memorandum for the Director

Subject: Estimate of the Situation in the Pacific and Recommendations for Action by the United States.

1. The United States today finds herself confronted by a hostile Germany and Italy in Europe and by an equally hostile Japan in the Orient. Russia, the great land link between these two groups of hostile powers, is at present neutral, but in all probability favorably inclined towards the Axis powers, and her favorable attitude towards these powers may be expected to increase in direct proportion to increasing success in their
prosecution of the war in Europe. Germany and Italy have been successful in war on the continent of Europe and all of Europe is either under their military control or has been forced into subservience. Only the British Empire is actively opposing by war the growing world dominance of Germany and Italy and their satellites.

2. The United States at first remained coolly aloof from the conflict in Europe and there is considerable evidence to support the view that Germany and Italy attempted by every method within their power to foster a continuation of American indifference to the outcome of the struggle in Europe. Paradoxically, every success of German and Italian arms has led to further increases in United States sympathy for and material support of
the British Empire, until at the present time the United States government stands committed to a policy of rendering every support short of war the changes rapidly increasing that the United States will become a full fledged ally of the British Empire in the very near future. The final failure of German and Italian diplomacy to keep the United States in the role of a disinterested spectator has forced them to adopt the policy of
developing threats to U.S. security in other spheres of the world, notably by the threat of revolutions in South and Central America
by Axis-dominated groups and by the stimulation of Japan to further aggressions and threats in the Far East in the hope that by these
mean the Unites States would become so confused in thought and fearful of her own immediate security as to cause her to become so preoccupied in purely defensive preparations as to virtually preclude U.S. aid to Great Britain in any form. As a result of this policy, Germany and Italy have lately concluded a military alliance with Japan directed against the United States If the published terms of this treaty and the pointed utterances of German, Italian and Japanese leaders can be believed, and there seems no ground on which to doubt either, the three totalitarian powers agree to make war on the United States, should she come to the assistance of England, or should she attempt to forcibly interfere with Japan's aims in the Orient and, furthermore, Germany and Italy expressly reserve the right to determine whether American aid to Britain, short of war, is a
cause for war or not after they have succeeded in defeating England. In other words, after England has been disposed of her enemies will decide whether or not to immediately proceed with an attack on the United States. Due to geographic conditions, neither Germany nor Italy are in a position to offer any material aid to Japan. Japan, on the contrary, can be of much help to both Germany and Italy by threatening and possibly even
attacking British dominions and supply routes from Australia, India and the Dutch East Indies, thus materially weakening Britain's position in opposition to the Axis powers in Europe. In exchange for this service, Japan receives a free hand to seize all of Asia that she can find it possible to grab, with the added promise that Germany and Italy will do all in their power to keep U.S. attention so attracted as to prevent the United States from taking positive aggressive action against Japan. Here again we have another example of the Axis-Japanese diplomacy which is aimed at keeping American power immobilized, and by threats and alarms to so confuse American thought as to preclude prompt decisive action by the United States in either
sphere of action. It cannot be emphasized to strongly that the last thing desired by either the Axis powers in Europe or by Japan in the Far East is prompt, warlike action by the United States in either theatre of operations.

3. An examination of the situation in Europe leads to the conclusion that there is little that we can do now, immediately to help Britain that is not already being done. We have no trained army to send to the assistance of England, nor will we have for at least a year. We are now trying to
increase the flow of materials to England and to bolster the defense of England in every practicable way and this aid will undoubtedly be increased. On the other hand, there is little that Germany or Italy can do against us as long as England continues in the war and her navy maintains control of the Atlantic. The one danger to our position lies in the possible early defeat of the British Empire with the British Fleet falling intact into the hands of the Axis powers. The possibility of such an event occurring would be materially lessened were we actually allied in war with the British or at the very least were taking active measures to relieve the pressure on Britain in other spheres of action. To sum up: the threat to our security in the Atlantic remains small so long as the British Fleet remains dominant in that ocean and friendly to the United States.

4. In the Pacific, Japan by virtue of her alliance with Germany and Italy is a definite threat to the security of the British Empire and once the British Empire is gone the power of Japan-Germany and Italy is to be directed against the United States. A powerful land attack by Germany and Italy
through the Balkans and North Africa against the Suez Canal with a Japanese threat or attack on Singapore would have very serious results for the British Empire. Could Japan be diverted or neutralized, the fruits of a successful attack on the Suez Canal could not be as far reaching and beneficial to the Axis powers as if such a success was also accompanied by the virtual elimination of British sea power from the Indian Ocean, thus opening up a European supply route for Japan and a sea route for Eastern raw materials to reach Germany and Italy, Japan must be diverted if the British and American ( ) blockade of Europe and possibly Japan (?) is to remain even partially in effect.

5. While as pointed out in Paragraph (3) there is little that the United States can do to immediately retrieve the situation in Europe, the United States is able to effectively nullify Japanese aggressive action, and do it without lessening U.S. material assistance to Great Britain.

6. An examination of Japan's present position as opposed to the United States reveals a situation as follows:
Advantages Disadvantages
1. Geographically strong position 1. A million and a half men of Japanese Islands. engaged in an exhausting war on the Asiatic Continent.
2. A highly centralized strong 2. Domestic economy and food capable government. supply severely straightened.
3. Rigid control of economy on 3. A serious lack of sources of a war basis. raw materials for war. Notably oil, iron and cotton.
4. A people inured to hardship 4. Totally cut off from supplies and war from Europe.
5. A powerful army. 5. Dependent upon distant overseas routes for essential supplies.
6. A skillful navy about 2/3 6. Incapable of increasing the strength of the U.S. Navy manufacture and supply of war materials without free access
to U.S. or European markets.
7. Some stocks of raw materials. 7. Major cities and industrial centers extremely vulnerable to air attack.
8. Weather until April rendering direct sea operations in the vicinity of Japan difficult.

7. In the Pacific the United States possesses a very strong defensive position and a navy and naval air force at present in that ocean capable of long distance offensive operation. There are certain other factors which at the present time are strongly in our favor, viz:
A. Philippine Islands still held by the United States.
B. Friendly and possibly allied government in control of the Dutch East Indies.
C. British still hold Hong Kong and Singapore and are favorable to us.
D. Important Chinese armies are still in the field in China against Japan.
E. A small U.S. Naval Force capable of seriously threatening Japan's southern supply routes already in the theatre of operations.
F. A considerable Dutch naval force is in the Orient that would be of value if allied to U.S.

8. A consideration of the foregoing leads to the conclusion that prompt aggressive naval action against Japan by the United States would render Japan incapable of affording any help to Germany and Italy in their attack on England and that Japan itself would be faced with a situation in which her navy could be forced to fight on most unfavorable terms or accept fairly early collapse of the country through the force of blockade.
A prompt and early declaration of war after entering into suitable arrangements with England and Holland, would be most effective in bringing about the early collapse of Japan and thus eliminating our enemy in the pacific before Germany and Italy could strike at us effectively. Furthermore, elimination of Japan must surely strengthen Britain's position against Germany and Italy and, in addition, such action would increase the confidence and support of all nations who tend to be friendly towards us.

9. It is not believed that in the present state of political opinion the United States government is capable of declaring war against Japan without more ado; and it is barely possible that vigorous action on our part might lead the Japanese to modify their attitude. Therefore, the following course of action is suggested:
A. Make an arrangement with Britain for the use of British bases in the Pacific, particularly Singapore.
B. Make an arrangement with Holland for the use of base facilities and acquisition of supplies in the Dutch East Indies.
C. Give all possible aid to the Chinese government of Chiang-Kai-Shek.
D. Send a division of long range heavy cruisers to the Orient, Philippines, or Singapore.
E. Send two divisions of submarines to the Orient.
F. Keep the main strength of the U.S. fleet now in the Pacific in the vicinity of the Hawaiian Islands.
G. Insist that the Dutch refuse to grant Japanese demands for undue economic concessions, particularly oil.
H. Completely embargo all U.S. trade with Japan, in collaboration with a similar embargo imposed by the British Empire.

10. If by these means Japan could be led to commit an overt act of war, so much the better. At all events we must be fully prepared to accept the threat of war.
A. H. McCollum
CC-0p-16
0p-16-F
File

0p-16-F-2 ON1 7 October 1940
Summary
1. The United States is faced by a hostile combination of powers in both the Atlantic and Pacific.
2. British naval control of the Atlantic prevents hostile action against the United States in this area.
3. Japan's growing hostility presents an attempt to open sea communications between Japan and the Mediterranean by an attack on the British lines of communication in the Indian Ocean.
4. Japan must be diverted if British opposition in Europe is to remain effective.
5. The United States naval forces now in the Pacific are capable of so containing and harassing Japan as to nullify her assistance to Germany and Italy.
6. It is to the interest of the United States to eliminate Japan's threat in the Pacific at the earliest opportunity by taking prompt and aggressive action against Japan.
7. In the absence of United States ability to take the political offensive, additional naval force should be sent to the orient and agreements entered into with Holland and England that would serve as an effective check against Japanese encroachments in South-eastern Asia.

Comment by Captain Knox
It is unquestionably to out general interest that Britain be not licked - just now she has a stalemate and probably cant do better. We ought to make it certain that she at least gets a stalemate. For this she will probably need from us substantial further destroyers and air reinforcements to England. We should not precipitate anything in the Orient that should hamper our ability to do this - so long as probability continues.
If England remains stable, Japan will be cautious in the Orient. Hence our assistance to England in the Atlantic is also protection to her and us in the Orient.
However, I concur in your courses of action we must be ready on both sides and probably strong enough to care for both.
D.W.K.
Re your #6: - no reason for battleships not visiting west coast in bunches.

коллеги!позвольте полюбопытствовать:зачем Вам вообще нужны Гавайи?
неужели Вы не обращаете внимания на следующие вещи:
Японии,как воздух необходима молниеносная война,а именно мощными ударами,/подчеркну/хотя бы на какое-то время парализовать/вывести из игры/США,Великобританию,Голландию.Японии,как воздух необходима нефть.
снова делаю акцент на том,что решение двух первых задач/вывод из игры как минимум 3-х "игроков"и необходимость добраться до нефти/решение этих задач возможно лишь при молниеносном ведение войны,сразу на многих направлениях
неужели Вы не видите коллеги,что Гавайи это - ТРЯСИНА!
в случае нападения на них/и что очень спорно/попытки их удержать Япония сразу же,в первые месяцы войны получает "Гуадалканал"

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