Klaus написал:

Оригинальное сообщение #66041
Паровой траулер MOULMEIN

Klaus спасибо, а нет данных по "Крейн", "Мино", "Гуль" и "Снайп"?
Кстати, если интересно есть текст официального заключения следственной комиссии правда на французском и английском.

andreyfinn написал:

Оригинальное сообщение #66044
Кстати, если интересно

Естественно!

Klaus написал:

Оригинальное сообщение #66041
остановлен выстрелом с UC-27 и утоплен открытием кингстонов

Самозатопление?
Самозатопление под угрозой расстрела?
Открытие кингстонов высадившимися немцами?

Еще один документ. Дает представление о потерпевших - ответчиках. Названия всех потерпевших судов.

Отредактированно Geomorfolog (15.05.2009 11:51:09)

Report of the Commissioners Appointed in Conformity with Article 6 of the St. Petersburg Declaration of the 12th
(25th) November, 1904.
1. The Commissioners after minute and prolonged examination of the ensemble of the facts that have come to their knowledge concerning the incidents submitted to them for investigation by the St, Petersburg declaration of the 12th (25th) November, 1904, have in this report proceeded to give an analytic statement of those facts in their logical order.
In communicating the principal opinions of the Commission on each important or decisive point of this summary expose, they believe that they have thrown sufficient light upon the causes and the consequences of the incident in question, and at the same time upon the responsibilities resulting therefrom.
2. On the 7th (20th) October, 1904, the second Russian squadron of the Pacific Fleet, under the chief command of Vice-Admiral Aide-de-Camp General Rohzdestvensky, anchored near Cape Skagen with the intention of taking in coal before continuing its voyage to the Far East.
It appears, according to the deposition made, that from the time when the squadron left the roadstead of Reval, Admiral Rohzdestvensky had caused the vessels under his command to adopt minute precautions with the object of placing them fully in a position to repel an attack by torpedo-boats during the night, either at sea or when anchored.
These precautions seemed to be justified by the information frequently sent by the Agents of the Imperial Government respecting hostile attempts that were to be apprehended, and which in all probability would take the form of attacks by torpedoboats.
Furthermore, during his stay at Skagen, Admiral Rohzdestvensky had been informed of the presence of suspicious vessels off the Norwegian coast. Besides, he had learned from the captain of the transport Bahan, who had come from the north, that on the night before he had seen four torpedo-boats, which had only a single light at the masthead.
This news caused the Admiral to leave twenty-four hours earlier than he had intended.
3. Consequently each of the six distinct sections of the squadron steamed off separately in turn, and reached the North Sea independently of each other in the order mentioned in Admiral Rohzdestvensky's report ; this general officer commanding in  person the last section, composed of the four new battleships Prince Suvaroff, Emperor Alexander III., Borodino, Orel, and the transport Anadyr.
This section left Skagen at 10 p.m. on the 7th (20th) October. The first two sections were ordered to proceed at a speed of twelve knots, and the following sections at ten knots.
4. Between 1.30 and 4.15 on the following afternoon, the 8th (21st) October, all the sections of the squadron were passed in succession by the English steamer Zero, the captain of which vessel examined the different units closely enough for them to be recognized from his description of them. Moreover, the results of his observations are in general agreement with the indications given in Admiral Rohzdestvensky's report.
5. The last vessel passed by the Zero was the Kamchatka, according to the description which he (the captain of the Zero) gave of her.
This transport, which at first formed part of the same group as the Dmitri Donskoi and the Aurora, was, therefore, at the time alone and about ten miles behind the squadron, having been obliged to slacken speed owing to a damaged engine.
This accidental delay was perhaps incidentally the cause of the subsequent events.
6. As a matter of fact, towards eight o'clock in the evening this transport met the Swedish vessel Aldebaran and other unknown ships, which she fired upon, doubtless owing to the apprehensions aroused in the momentary circumstances by her isolation, the damages to her engines, and her slight fighting value.
However this may be, at 8.45 p.m. the captain of the Kamchatka dispatched to his commander-in-chief by wireless telegraphy the statement respecting this meeting that he was " attacked on all sides by torpedo-boats."
7. In order to understand the influence which this news might have had upon the subsequent decisions of Admiral Rohzdestvensky it must be remembered that in his anticipations the attacking torpedo-boats whose presence had thus been announced to him, rightly or wrongly, as being some fifty miles behind the section of the ships under his command, might overtake him towards one o'clock in the morning in order to attack him in his turn.
This information decided Admiral Rohzdestvensky to signal to his ships towards ten o'clock at night to redouble their vigilance and to expect an attack from torpedo-boats.
8. On board the Suvaroff the Admiral had deemed it indispensable that one of the two superior officers of his staff should be on duty on the Commander's bridge during the night, in order to superintend in his stead the progress of the squadron and let him know immediately should any incident occur.
Moreover, on board all the ships the permanent orders of the Admiral prescribed that the chief officer on duty was authorized to open fire in case of a manifest and imminent attack of torpedoboats.
If the attack were made from ahead he was to do so on his own initiative, and in the contrary case, much less pressing, he was to refer to his commanding officer.
With regard to these orders, the majority of the Commissioners considered that they involved nothing excessive in time of war and particularly in the circumstances which Admiral Rohzdestvensky had every reason to consider very alarming in view of the impossibility in which he found himself of verifying the accuracy of the warnings that he had received from the agents of his Government.
9. Towards one o'clock in the morning on the 9th (22nd) October 1904, the night was semi-obscure, somewhat overshadowed by a slight and low mist. The moon only showed itself at intervals through the clouds. The wind blew moderately from the southeast, raising a long swell, which made the vessels roll 5 degrees on either side.
The course followed by the squadron towards the south-west necessarily led the last two sections, as was eventually proved, to pass in the neighborhood of the habitual fishing-ground of the flotilla of the Hull fishing-boats, consisting of some thirty of these small steamers and covering an area of some miles.
It results from the consistent depositions of the British witnesses that all these boats carried their regulation lights and trawled, according to their customary rules under the lead of their " admiral " and pursuant to the indications conveyed by conventional rockets.
10. According to communications received by wireless telegraphy nothing unusual had been signaled by the sections which preceded that of Admiral Rohzdestvensky in traversing these regions.
It subsequently transpired that, notably. Admiral Folkersam, having been led to skirt the flotilla of the north, very closely examined the nearest trawlers with his electric searchlights, and having thus recognized them as inoffensive, quietly proceeded on his way.
11. It was shortly afterwards that the last section of the fleet, led by the Suvaroff flying Admiral Rozhdestvensky's flag, arrived in its turn near the trawlers' fishing-ground. The course taken by this section carried it nearly into the midst of the flotilla of trawlers, which it would have been obliged to skirt, but to the southward, when the attention of the officers of the watch on the bridge of the Suvaroff was attracted by a green rocket, which put them on their guard.
This rocket, fired by the " admiral," indicated in reality, according to their conventions, that the trawlers were to trawl on the starboard side to windward. Almost immediately after this first alarm, according to the depositions, the observers on the bridge of the Suvaroff, who were scanning the horizon with night-glasses, discovered " on the crest of the waves in the direction of the starboard cathead and at an approximate distance of eighteen or twenty cables," a vessel which appeared to them suspicions, because they saw no light, and the vessel seemed to be coming straight towards them.
When the suspicious vessel was lighted up by a searchlight, the men of the watch believed they detected a torpedo-boat going at high speed.
It was for these reasons that Admiral Rohzdestvensky opened fire on the unknown vessel. The majority of the Commissioners express on this point the opinion that the responsibility for this act and the results of the cannonade sustained by the fishing flotilla rests with Admiral Rohzdestvensky.
12. Almost immediately after opening fire on the starboard side the Suvaroff perceived ahead of it a small boat barring its course, and was obliged to turn to port in order to avoid colliding with it. But this boat, lighted up by a searchlight, was recognized as a trawler.
In order to prevent the firing of the vessels from being directed against this inoffensive boat, the axis of the searchlight was immediately raised 45 degrees. Thereupon the Admiral signalled to the squadron the order " Not to fire on the trawlers." But while the searchlight illuminated this fishing-boat, according to the depositions of the witnesses, the observers on the Suvaroff perceived on the port side another vessel which appeared to them suspicious because of its resemblance to that which they were firing on upon the starboard side.
Fire was at once opened on the second object, and was thus carried on from both sides, the line of ships having by a retrograde movement returned to its original course without having modified its speed.
13. In accordance with the permanent orders of the squadron the Admiral indicated the object on which the fire of the ships was to be directed by fixing the searchlights upon them, but as each ship swept the horizon in every direction around it with its own searchlights in order to guard against a surprise it was difficult to avoid confusion.
This firing, which lasted from ten to twelve minutes, caused serious damage to the trawler's flotilla. It was thus that two men were killed, six others wounded, that the Crane sank, and that the Snipe, the Mino, the Moulmcln, the Gull, and the Majestic suffered more or less serious damage.
On the other hand, the cruiser Aurora was hit by several projectiles. The majority of the Commissioners declare that they lack precise elements to identify on what object the ships fired, but the Commissioners unanimously recognized that the boats of the flotilla committed no hostile act, and the majority of the Commissioners, being of opinion that there was no torpedo-boat either among the trawlers or on the spot, the fire opened by Admiral Robzdestvensky was not justifiable.
The Russian Commissioner, not believing himself warranted in concurring in this opinion, stated his conviction that it is precisely the suspicious vessels that approached the Russian squadron for a hostile purpose that provoked the firing.
14. Respecting the real objects of this nocturnal firing, the fact that the Aurora was hit by a few projectiles of 47 millimeters and 75 millimeters would seem to be of a nature to give rise to the supposition that this cruiser, and perhaps even other Russian vessels, delayed on the track of the Suvaroff without that vessel being aware of it, may have provoked and attracted the first firing.
This error may have been caused by the fact that this ship seen from behind showed no visible light, and owing to a  nocturnal optical illusion experienced by the observers on the flagship.
In this connection the Commissioners declared that they lack important information enabling them to ascertain the reasons which brought about the continuation of the firing on the port side. In presence of this conjecture certain distant trawlers might have been confounded with the original objects, and thus cannonaded direct. Others, on the contrary, may have been hit by a fire directed on objects further off.
These considerations, moreover, are not in contradiction with the impression of certain trawlers who, finding themselves hit by projectiles and remaining lit up in the radius of the searchlights, might have believed themselves to be the object of direct aim.
15. The duration of the firing on the starboard side, even from the standpoint of the Russian version, seemed to the majority of the Commissioners to have been longer than appeared necessary. But this majority considered that it is not sufficiently informed, as has just been said, with regard to the continuation of the firing on the port side.
In any case, the Commissioners willingly acknowledge unanimously that Admiral Rohzdestvensky personally did all he could from beginning to end to prevent the trawlers, recognized as such, from being the objects of the fire of the squadron.
16. However that may be, the Dmitri Donski having eventually intimated her number, the Admiral decided to give the "stop fire " signal. The line of his ships then continued its route to the Bouth-west without having stopped.
In this connection the Commissioners are unanimous in recognizing that, after the circumstances which preceded the incident and those which gave rise thereto, there was at the closing of the firing sufficient uncertainty as to the danger incurred by the section of the ships to decide the Admiral to proceed on his way.
At the same time the majority of the Commissioners regret that it did not occur to Admiral Rohzdestvensky, while going through the Straits of Dover, to inform the authorities of the neighboring maritime Powers that, having been led into open fire in the vicinity of a group of trawlers, those boats of unknown nationality required assistance.
17. The Commissioners, in closing this report, declare that their appreciations formulated therein are not in their spirit of a nature to cast any discredit either on the military value or the sentiments of humanity of Admiral Rohzdestvensky and of the personnel of his squadron.

THE BRITISH AND RUSSIAN CONTENTIONS.
The following table gives the contentions of the British and Russian Governments, as set forth in the cases presented to the Commission by the British and Russian Agents on February 13, and the corresponding findings of the Commission.
British Contentions.
I. That on the night of the 21sfr was in fact no torpedo-boat or destroyer present among the British trawlers or
in the neighborhood of the Russian fleet, and that the Russian officers were mistaken in their belief that such
vessels were present, or in, the neighborhood, or attacked, or intended to attack, the Russian fleet.
II. (a) That there was no sufficient  justification for opening fire at all.
(b) When opened, there was a failure to direct and control the fire, so as to injury to the fishing fleet
(c) The firing upon the fishing fleet was continued for an unreasonable time.
III. That those on board the Russian fleet ought to have rendered assistance to the injured men and damaged vessels.
IV. That there was no fault of any kind in the conduct of those on the British trawlers or those connected with their management.

Findings of the Commission
I. Upheld by the majority of the Commissioners.
II. (a) Upheld by the majority of the Commissioners.
(b) The Commissioners acknowledge unanimously that Admiral Rohzdestvensky personally did all he could
to prevent the trawlers, recognized as such, from being the objects of fire of the squadron.
(c) The majority considered that firing was continued on the starboard side longer than was necessary, but that
it was not sufficiently informed as to the duration of the fire on the port side.
III. The Commissioners are unanimous in recognizing that there was at the close of tiring sufficient uncertainty as to the danger incurred by the section of ships concerned to decide the Admiral to proceed on his way.
The majority of the Commissioners regret that it did not occur to Admiral Rohzdestvcnsky while going through
the Straits of Dover to inform the authorities of the neighboring maritime Powers that the trawlers required assistance.
IV. The Commissioners unanimously recognized that the boats of the flotilla committed no hostile act.

Russian Contentions.
I. That the cannonade was caused exclusively by the approach of two torpedo-boats, proceeding without lights, and at full speed, towards the squadron.
II. That the fire of the squadron was directed exclusively against the two suspicious vessels, and that the trawlers were only hit in consequence of unavoidable accidents.
III. That the squadron did everything in its power to diminish the risks incurred by the lishermen through the cannonade necessitated by the approach of the two torpedo-boats.

Findings of the Commission.
I. The majority of the Commissioners are of opinion that there was no torpedo-boat among the trawlers.
They consider that the Aurora, and perhaps other Russian vessels, delayed on the track on the Suvaroff, without that vessel being aware of it, may have provoked and attracted the first firing.
II. The majority of the Commissioners declare that they lack precise evidence as to the object on which the ships fired.
III. See reply to British contention II.(b).

The Russian Government drew the following conclusions from the evidence submitted to the Commission:

A. That the cannonade of the Russian squadron on the night of October 21-22, 1904, was ordered and executed in the legitimate accomplishment of the military duties of the chief of a squadron.
B. That consequently no responsibility can possibly rest upon Admiral Rohzdestvensky or any of his subordinates.

Findings of the Commission.
A. The Commissioners find that the precautions taken by Admiral Rohzdestvensky to repel a torpedo attack
were justified, but the majority hold that the fire opened by Admiral Rohzdestvensky was not justifiable.
B. The majority of the Commission are of opinion that the responsibility for the cannonade and its results rests with Admiral Rohzdestvensky.

Сергей написал:

Оригинальное сообщение #66114
Так что вопрос скорее, останется открытым,

Я говорил не о "закрытии вопроса", а о версии, которая складывается из доступных сейчас источников. И в этой версии нет пока места немецким или японским командирам миноносцев.

Сергей написал:

Оригинальное сообщение #66114
Т. е. зачем им врать напропалую?

И что значит – не исторические источники?

Вы хотите, чтобы всё было зафиксировано при нотариусе? Они  же опубликовали свои тексты. Изучайте. Анализируйте.

Нет, никто не врёт, и семёновский японский офицер и пикулевский немец - говорят чистую правду, там, наверное, был целый отряд из миноносцев ряда стран, затесавшийся среди рыбаков! Но хотелось бы услышать про рапорт немецкого командира миноносца, датированный осенью 1904 года, а не про "газетную заметку с воспоминаниями ветерана". Вот этот рапорт, я полагаю, многие захотели бы поизучать и проанализировать!

Прежде всего, в британская прессе поначалу проскакивало мнение, что стрелявшие были японцами. Вот известный рисунок, изоьражающий гибель CRANE

В современной подписи указано буквально - "IN THE MISTAKEN BELIEF THAT THEY WERE JAPANESE WARSHIPS"... Но это все дела минувших дней.
CRANE.
Фото не имею.
Укомпл. 10,1903 Goole Shipbuilding & Repairing Co Ltd в Гуле, зав. № 55 как CRANE H756 для Kelsall Brothers & Beeching, приписка Гулль.
Стальной однопалубный паровой траулер в 168 брт, 63 нрт, 110,3х20,9х11,45 футов, 1 ВТР пр-ва C. D. Holmes & Co в Гулле, 45 ном. л.с., 1 винт.
22,10,1904 утоплен в ходе Гулльского инцидента, погибли Джордж Смит, капитан и Уильям Ричард Легготт, 3й помощник, семеро остальных рыбаков ранены.

MINO

Укомпл. 12,1903 Goole Shipbuilding & Repairing Co Ltd в Гуле, зав. № 58 как MINO H799 для Kelsall Brothers & Beeching, приписка Гулль.
Стальной однопалубный паровой траулер в 168 брт, 63 нрт, 110,3х20,9х11,1 футов, 1 ВТР пр-ва C. D. Holmes & Co в Гулле, 45 ном. л.с., 1 винт.
10,1904 поврежден в ходе упомянутого инцидента.
В 1935 продан Earl Of Kinnoul и переделан в яхту. Далее следов пока не нашел...
Продолжу позже...

Отредактированно Klaus (15.05.2009 17:32:26)

И потерпевшие члены команд с раскладкой по судам.

GAMECOCK FLEET VESSELS ON THE DOGGER BANK 21 Oct 1904 
Vessel Job Name
     
AMARAPOORA  Skipper  Alfred Cozier Fletcher
AVA     
AUK Skipper  Henry Belton
BASSEIN Skipper  Thomas Edmunds
BURMAH     
CEVIC     
CRANE Skipper  George Henry Smith
DOVE  Second Hand  George Harvey
FAME Skipper  John Mortimer 
GOTHIC     
GROUSE  Skipper  Thomas O`Hara
GULL Skipper George Green 
  Mate  Charles Beer 
  Bosun Edwin Costello
  Chief Engineer  Harry Smirk 
IBIS     
KNOT  Mate  John Watson
MAGPIE carrier    Mathew Peaker 
MAJESTIC Skipper  Herbert Henry
MANDALAY  Skipper  Thomas Leyland 
MARTABAN Skipper  James Higgingbottom 
MARTIN     
MINO  Skipper  Whelpton ( Died 6 Months Later )
Bosun Fred Hartfield 
Mate  William Doughty 
MOULMEIN     
OCEANIC     
OWL Skipper  Herbert Ware
PIGEON  Skipper  William Allen 
RANGOON     
     
ROBIN  Skipper  John Brooks
RUFF Vice Admiral Thomas Carr 
SNIPE  Skipper  James Gillard - vessel had shot through the side 
Second Hand  Frederick Michaelson 
SWIFT - carrier  Skipper  John Thomas Fletcher 
TEAL  Skipper  Thomas Cartwell
TEUTONIC   Thomas Penman
THRUSH Skipper  Henry Pearman
TOM TIT     
WREN
     
J LEYMAN & Co VESSELS
Vessel Job Name
ALPHA - Mission Ship  Skipper  J White 
Surgeon Dr Robert Jacob Colmer 
AVON Skipper  Ralph Fall
CLYDE Skipper W Woolack
DON Skipper John Day
ESK     
FORTH     
GRETA     
HULL Skipper  J Lyon
ISIS Skipper  I Butler 
JED  Mate  William Mitchell
KENNET  Capt  Foot
KENNET  Skipper  Samuel H Foster
LEVEN Skipper  A Edgar 
MERSEY     
NIDD     
OUSE Skipper  J T Keeler   
   

GREAT NORTHERN VESSELS
Vessel Job Name
     
VIGILANT carrier     
JOSEPH & SARAH MILES Mission Ship Surgeon  Dr Hirjeo N Anklesaria.

Klaus написал:

Оригинальное сообщение #66327
RUFF Vice Admiral Thomas Carr

А вице-адмирал как туда затесался?

Может он руководил английскими рыбаками в данном районе.

Ну так бы и написали... Зачем мозг ломать какими-то "адмиралами"...Иногда переводчиков не понимаю.

вольнопер написал:

Оригинальное сообщение #66417
Был так же обстрелян английский госп. пароход "Алха" (?). Если ли его ТТХ?

Увы, у себя не нашел ничего похожего... Может, уважаемый andreyfinn в курсе...