Большое спасибо за ответ.

QF написал:

#1288768
ля линкора второго класса опциональна скорость (до тех пока она не ниже минимальной принятой для линии) и обязательным являются наличие броневого пояса и тяжелых орудий. От первого класса он отличается толщиной брони и тяжестью орудий.

Для крейсера опциональны защита и тяжелые орудия, но обязательна скорость не ниже, чем у вражеских крейсеров.

И как у Вас тут различаются "Имперьюзы" и "Орланды"?

QF написал:

#1288786
"Имперьюзы" и "Орланды" - крейсера. В этом отношении они вообще не различаются.

Интересно, а чего же тогда англичане "Имперьюзы" на момент постройки однозначно относят к броненосцам 2-го класса?

Алекс написал:

#1288798
Интересно, а чего же тогда англичане "Имперьюзы" на момент постройки однозначно относят к броненосцам 2-го класса?

Читайте внимательно англичан:

"She will rank high among cruisers, and high among second-class iron-clads"

Алекс написал:

#1288813
А к лету 1885 г., когда "Орландо" выпрс в водоизмещении почти в 2 раза

"The belted cruiser is a ship of about 5,000 tons' displacement, and 3,000 tons' weight of hull, including armour"

До почти десяти тысяч он не рос, вы что-то путаете.

Алекс написал:

#1288813
парламентарии всячески настаивали на сокращении расходов на флот

И здесь вы путаете. Парламентарии настаивали на увеличении расходов на флот. Весь сыр-бор заключался в том, что была попытка поставить под сомнение компетенцию адмиралтейства и недостаточное строительство им кораблей было одним из аргументов критиков.

Алекс написал:

#1288813
появилась спасительная версия, что мы строим достаточно дешевый броненосец 2-го класса

Эта версия создана вполне конкретным представителем оппозиции и отнюдь не для спасения адмиралтейства.

Алекс написал:

#1288813
Следующий виток возвращения к тому, что мы строим броненосный крейсер

Это и вовсе загадка, потому как адмиралтейство не меняло своей позиции.

QF написал:

#1288816
До почти десяти тысяч он не рос, вы что-то путаете.

Так Вы посмотрите на характеристики первоначального проекта, а не сравнивайте с тем, что появилось к ноябрю 1884 г.

QF написал:

#1288816
И здесь вы путаете. Парламентарии настаивали на увеличении расходов на флот. Весь сыр-бор заключался в том, что была попытка поставить под сомнение компетенцию адмиралтейства и недостаточное строительство им кораблей было одним из аргументов критиков.

Это Вы путаете. Там менялось все с головокружительной быстротой.

Если честно, я даже не знал, что на "Имперьюзы" изначально собирались воткнуть локомотивные котлы:


"The circumstances which have caused this apparent loss are—firstly and chiefly, the changes involved in the adoption of a modified type of boilers. It was intended, in the first instance, to fit them with a locomotive type of boiler, and then it was decided after the trial of the Polyphemus to change the type."


Также, если кому-либо нужно, то могу привести занимательный текст на тему общих принципов принятия решений в адмиралтействе. Но там реально стена текста.

QF написал:

#1288879
Также, если кому-либо нужно, то могу привести занимательный текст на тему общих принципов принятия решений в адмиралтействе. Но там реально стена текста.

Если честно, то во всей дискуссии хотелось бы читать тексты, которые оппоненты приводят в пример
я худо бедно знаю немецкий, английский для меня темный лес... массивы выкладываемого текста просто выводят в ступор, мне интересна тема, но... такое ощущение, что дискуссия ведется между двумя игроками, как в покере - все остальные скинули карты - осталось только двое, которые в теме

Отредактированно Сумрак (20.06.2018 00:19:09)

Сумрак написал:

#1288884
хотелось бы читать тексты

Для полноты картины не хватает более подробной истории развития проекта в стенах Адмиралтейства Отдела Главного Конструктора. Может быть автор ветки расскажет об этом...

Правь, Британия, морями?


MR.GOURLEY (Sunderland) , in rising to move the following Resolution which stood in his name on the Paper:

— That a Select Committee be appointed to inquire into the designs upon which ships of war are now being built, and how far they are in harmony with the transition in Naval construction and tactics, and also the necessity for an organized system of harbour and coast defence, said, that on several occasions requests had been made for the appointment of a Committee upon the ship-building policy of the Admiralty.

Lord Brassey, when in that House, had asked first for a Royal Commission, and subsequently for a Committee. Other Members had done the same thing, but the Government of the day had always refused. Three grounds had been put forward for their refusal—in the first place, that it would be impossible to find enough Members who would be able to deal with a subject so difficult; secondly, that such a Committee would delay Admiralty work; and, in the third place, that it would remove the responsibility from the proper shoulders.

Now, he denied that the first of those objections applied at the present time, whom there was a larger number of Naval officers, Artillery officers, and Engineer officers in the House than over before; and also Members engaged in every kind of iron manufacture and shipbuilding—men who had built ironclads themselves.

As to the second objection, would such a Committee, he asked, have delayed the progress of vessels like the Inflexible, which took eight years to build, and cost some hundreds of thousands of pounds more than the estimate; the Polyphemus, which took seven years to build; or the Colossus, which all last year lay in the waters of the Silent, a monument of Admiralty folly in regard to her guns? If there were a Royal Commission or a Committee of this 590 House to inquire into the policy of the Admiralty, it would not, he was confident, delay progress with regard to those largo types of vessels or any other type; but, on the contrary, promote efficiency and progress.

In answer to the third objection, about removing responsibility from the officers connected with the Admiralty, he was bound to say that at the present moment, though there was every kind of official at the Admiralty, it was extremely difficult to fix responsibility when anything went wrong; in his opinion, all responsibility should attach to the first Lord. The objections hitherto raised by the Admiralty against his proposal, therefore, held no longer, as the First Lord of the Admiralty and the Government could easily find a sufficient number of hon. and gallant Members quite fit to deal with all the technical problems involved in designing and completing ships of war.

The report of Lord Dufferin's Committee, appointed 12 or 13 years ago, after the capsizing of the Captain, was the only detailed Report the House possessed with regard to our designs of ships, with the exception of the Memorandum issued the other day by the noble Lord the First Lord of the Admiralty (Lord George Hamilton). That Committee—which, by the way, was a Departmental Committee appointed to inquire into the line of policy pursued by the Admiralty itself—in other words, appointed by the Admiralty to sit in judgment on the Admiralty—considered that the Devastation was the strongest type of iron-clad then afloat; and is even yet—subject to slight additions to her bow armour—considered by experts to be the strongest type of iron-clad yet designed.

But the question he would now like to ask was this—how far the policy recommended by Lord Dufferin's Committee with regard to iron-clad armour had been carried out by the Admiralty? Now, it appeared from the Report of the noble Lord that in the case of the Warspite and the belted cruisers, instead of the armour being, as recommended by Lord Dufferin's Committee—and endorsed by Parliament two years age—18 inches the water, it was actually (although designed to be 18 inches above the water) found, on completion of the ships with their complement of coal on board, six inches below the water.

If there was nothing more than that against the designers of the Admiralty, he contended that he had made out a case for a Committee.

What must be the consequence if these vessels went into action? The consequence must be that they would be in a worse plight than if they had been built without armour at all. What applied to the Warspite and to the belted cruisers applied also to the Admiral class. These vessels were built on the citadel principle, a largo part of the vessel fore and aft being entirely without armour. He could not help thinking that the millions of money expended on those ships had been spent on the wrong type of vessel altogether. If he was correct in his information, Herr Krupp had already invented a gun which could throw a shell five miles, and designed for the very purpose of destroying, if possible, these unarmoured iron-dads. The shell which would be thrown from the gun carried a very heavy charge of powder, and, being fitted with a sensitive fuse, was certain to be very destructive.

He thought that, in regard to the differences of opinion regarding the Devastation and the Admiral class of ships, a case had been made out for inquiry; and he did not think that any hon. Member would hold the opinion that vessels of this class could now be considered fit for ocean fighting. They must be kept within the range of their coal supply. Only fancy a squadron of these vessels having to proceed to New York; how could they reach that side of the Atlantic on an emergency, seeing that they only carry four or five days' fuel? Why, they would have to be conveyed with huge colliers or become targets for swift belted cruisers, provided with speed, coal endurance, and long-range Krupp shell guns.

Another typo of ship to which Lord Dufferin's Committee referred was the Vanguard class, which was too weak in the lower structure. The Committee recommended that the lower structure of vessels of this class should be strengthened. What happened subsequently proved the correctness of the statement of the Committee, because the Vanguard was shortly afterwards sunk. Another type of vessels regarding which Lord Dufferin's Committee made inquiry was the Inconstant class, built for the purpose of cruising. But these vessels were built for ocean cruising; yet, strange to say, without any coal endurance, and the Committee recommended that in future that type of ship should be smaller, and constructed with more power, with large heavy guns, and efficient coal endurance.

How did the Admiralty rectify the defects which were pointed out in regard to the Inconstant class? They built two ships, the Iris and the Mercury, to steam 18 knots; but what was the result when they were completed? During the progress of the Egyptian war, the Peninsular and Oriental Company's fleet beat the Iris, which was engaged as a despatch vessel, by between 12 and 21 hours, and this at a time when the Iris was conveying Lord Wolseley on an emergency for the purpose of taking the command of the Army of the Nile; the truth being that those vessels cannot steam more than 14 knots in place of 18 as originally intended.

The Board of Admiralty intended to build a number of quick vessels to steam 19 and 20 knots. Judging from past experience, he feared that when these vessels were completed they would find that the Admiralty had made mistakes with regard to these new vessels similar to those which they had made in the past in regard to other types of ships.

Seeing that the Admiralty made such grievous mistakes between the inception of their designs and the completion of them, how could they expect the House to have confidence in the present system; he had no confidence in the present system; and, therefore, he asked for the appointment of a Committee, not for the purpose of thwarting the work of the Admiralty, but for the purpose of assisting and enabling it to come to right and proper conclusions with regard to the designs which they were preparing for the defence of the Empire.

He also wished to know who was responsible for the defects which were said to exist with regard to the Agamemnon and the Ajax?

Who was responsible for the present condition of our Channel Squadron? He believed that on the last occasion on which the Channel Squadron was manœuvred at sea, it was not possible to manœuvre it at more than six miles an hour. In the face of an efficient enemy, the squadron would have but a poor chance of escaping without injury at such a miserable speed as that.

Without in any way depreciating our Navy, he believed that, owing to the numerous defects in our naval administration with respect to ships and designs, in the event of war, our chance of success would have to rest mainly, if not entirely, on the bravery, ingenuity, and pluck of our seamen. The noble Lord the First Lord of the Admiralty and his practical coadjutor (Lord Charles Beresford), believed in grouping and in organization. He maintained that if they grouped the ships of all classes and all types, and exercised them in the game of war, there would be a much better chance of discovering the defects than by sending them on such cruises as was at present the practice. The Admiralty had a splendid opportunity of doing this at the present moment. They had the Channel Squadron at Gibraltar, and the Mediterranean Squadron in the Mediterranean.

In his judgment, it would be a wise policy if the Admiralty enabled both squadrons to come together, in order to test both men and ships by exercising them in the game of war—a policy about to be illustrated by the French in a sham attack upon Gibraltar. The hon. Gentleman concluded by moving the Motion which stood in his name.


***


THE SECRETARY TO THE ADMIRALTY (Mr. FORWOOD) (Lancashire, Ormskirk) said, he thought that many of the reflections of the hon. Member for Cardiff (Sir Edward Reed) upon the mode in which the business had been done at the Admiralty were just. These reflections, he believed, arose from circumstances similar to those pointed out by the hon. Member for Sunderland (Mr. Gourley) in reference to defective designs. No one would gainsay the importance of the question raised by the hon. Member for Sunderland, nor would anyone deny the propriety of bringing before the House the system under which our ships of war were designed. He did not intend, even if he were prepared, to defend the design of each and every vessel that had been adopted by the Admiralty.

Mistakes had, no doubt, been made, and would continue to be made, in those designs; but when constructing fighting machines that had to be worked under so many and such varying conditions of service, he thought they wore yet a long way off making a perfect fighting ship. When he used the term "mistakes," he did not impute blame to anyone, or mean that the errors were errors that should have been apparent to the designers. They were not errors by the light of the information that the designers had at the time that they designed the ships. Experience and use daily developed alterations and changes in the type of vessel required. He could not do bettor than quote from the Report of the Committee of 1871—Lord Dufferin's Committee, viz.:— A perfect ship of war is a desideratum which has never yet been attained, and is now further than ever removed from our reach. Any near approach to perfection in one direction inevitably brings with it disadvantages in another.

As he understood the object of the hon. Member, it was not so much to raise questions as to the suitability of this or that vessel, but rather to consider whether the principles on which designs were prepared and adopted by the Admiralty were such as to enable the country to obtain the best form of battle ship. Naturally those who supported the formation of a Committee on Designs illustrated their arguments by reference to failures in vessels that had been constructed.

But, to his mind, the real question to be determined was, not whether certain failures had occurred under the existing system, but whether, under any other arrangement, we should obtain, on the whole, a more serviceable Navy than the one we at present possessed. He believed that the general system adopted in regard to approving and designing of vessels by the Admiralty was good if worked out on plain, proper, sensible business lines. No doubt, in theory, a "Committee on Designs" sounded most attractive; but in practice he was inclined to believe that it would be found, not only unworkable, but prejudicial.

What was required in a vessel, especially in a fighting vessel, was a homogeneous design. The scantlings, dimensions, displacement, power, armament, should all proceed upon one common basis. This uniformity could best be secured by intrusting the work to one competent and responsible designer. In no science was there greater room for differences of opinion than that of the naval architect, and two experts were but seldom found, to agree on any one point. Therefore, if a Committee of exports was called together, and that Committee was composed of men of strong minds, the probability was that each would have some special point in construction to which he attached importance; that he would force his particular hobby upon his colleagues, with the result that a patchwork ship would be designed, one that could not possibly fulfil in a satisfactory manner any one requirement.

A design prepared under such a Committee would be no one man's production. There would be no individual responsible, and if it did not succeed there would be no on to whom blame could be personally attached. In his judgment the Admiralty system of preparing and approving designs was, as he had said, if conducted on business lines, a more satisfactory form of Committee with individual responsibility than could be devised by any plan of a Committee.

No Navy in the world required such a variety of type of vessels as did England. In addition to the necessity of maintaining a powerful fighting fleet, provision had to be made for the naval police of the globe, and for a fleet to protect our extending and ever growing commerce. We required ships for deep sea service, for river service, and vessels that would keep the sea for a lengthened period without loss of speed, or the necessity of being frequently placed in dry dock. The depository of all this knowledge was the Admiralty. The information daily gained from the officers in command of our numerous stations was alone in the possession of the officials of the Admiralty. They alone were able to watch the performances of each and every type of cruiser, and by the vast experience thus gained they were in the best position to know their faults and defects, and to guard against similar errors in new vessels.

The Admiralty possessed, in addition, a full knowledge of the progress of naval construction of all other nations. This, combined with their own experience, placed the Department in a position that could not be attained by any Committee of experts composed of gentlemen not daily in touch with the naval operations. The Admiralty had a highly trained Constructive Department, presided over by a gentleman who had attained European note as a designer of war ships. It was at the earnest request of the noble Lord now at the head of the Admiralty that Mr. White was induced to leave the Elswick Works and place his services at the disposal of the Government. "When objection was raised last year to Mr. "White continuing to act as consulting engineer for a certain period to the Elswick Works he determined to cease his connection with them, and in September such connection terminated. During the period after Mr. White had left Elswick and come to the Admiralty, he believed that gentleman had never once been consulted by the Elswick firm as to work which they had had in hand; but it would not have been possible for the Admiralty to obtain his valuable services had not the First Lord allowed him to be consulting adviser to that firm for a short period.

With regard to the general question, he had already stated that in his opinion the machinery and system of the Admiralty for providing efficient war vessels was good. He had qualified that statement by the stipulation that it must be carried out in a businesslike way, and he was bound to admit that this had not always been the case in times gone by. The Construction Department had brought forward designs and vessels had been ordered without the designs being properly referred to the officers responsible for the manning, arming, and machinery of the vessels.

The Chief Constructor had stated on his designs his views on these matters, and had estimated the displacement of his vessel for a certain weight of armament and engines, and an estimated complement of crew. These conditions had not always been examined by the officers best acquainted with these details. Proposals had thus been accepted without being properly examined. Subsequently, from time to time after the vessel's construction had commenced, serious alterations had been made in these important details, adding largely to the weight to be carried by the vessel beyond her original design. Vessels had also been kept an undue length of time under construction, and, as improvements developed in naval appliances, alterations and additions had been made to such ships incompatible with the ideas of those who designed them.

In illustration of this absence of procedure on business lines, to which the mistakes were almost entirely duo, he might cite one or two examples from vessels included in the Estimates now before the House. The Mersey, for instance, was designed and partly constructed to be a flush-decked ship to carry 14 6-inch guns, four on her spar deck, and 10 on her between-docks. When, however, the vessel was completely framed, a change of idea had come over the Admiralty, and they had altered her from a flush-deck ship to a vessel with a poop and forecastle, and a deep open waist, Her armament was altered by placing one heavy 8-inch gun on board in lieu of two of the 6-inch guns. Her sea-going trim was quite altered, and the increased cost for completing this vessel had been £50,000.

It had not infrequently happened that the Admiralty had allowed a ship to be commenced before they had finally determined the armament. The Benbow was an example of this. Her designer had proposed that she should carry two 63-ton guns in each of two barbettes; the Admiralty, instead of determining whether this armament was proper or not, contracted for the vessel at separate prices for the hull and barbettes, so that if they changed their mind as to the armament, they could more readily arrange with the builders the cost of such change; but the most important factor in the whole matter was overlooked—namely, that the lines of the hull were drawn to carry at a given displacement, and the question whether the vessel could carry at that displacement depended largely upon the weight of the armament to be put on board. What was the result? After the work on the ship had gone on for some time, there was no 63-ton gun ready, but there was a 110-ton gun completed which the Admiralty thought might be very well suited for the Benbow. Consequently, instead of the two barbettes being armed each with two 63-ton guns, it was determined to place 110-ton guns in each of the barbettes, rendering necessary serious alterations in the size of the barbettes. They also increased her armament by four 6-inch guns and 12 six-pounders; so that by the time the Admiralty had made up their mind as to the armament of this vessel, she was called upon to carry something like 500 tons of extra dead weight, or equal to one foot extra displacement beyond that at which she was originally designed to float.

In a similar way, 250 tons had been added to the weight of the belted cruisers now building beyond their designed capacity. Allusion had been made to the ridiculously small coal rapacity of the Impérieuse and the Warspite; but since these ships were designed, 430 tons of extra armament, machinery, and other things had been added to the weight after the lines of the hull had been determined upon.

He gave these facts in order to bear out his contention that whatever fault there might be in connection with the designs of ships under construction, the blame did not lie with the system under which ships were designed, but was clue to a want of business aptitude in giving effect to that system. When every effort was made to minimize weights in the ship, and the designer worked to the nearest ton, the importance of what he had stated would be realized. These matters had engaged the attention of the present Board of Admiralty from the day they came into Office, as the Report laid before the House by the First Lord would show. The policy laid down by his noble Friend at the head of the Admiralty and his Board, was to require that before a vessel was commenced there should be obtained in writing from the Director of Naval Ordnance and Engineer-in-Chief their opinion on the armament and machinery proposed. Then, after the design had been considered by the Controller, and before going to the Board collectively, a paper should be sent to members individually, so as to give them an opportunity of criticising and considering the design before the order was given for the vessel. As the Board included a number of most distinguished and experienced naval officers, he was satisfied that those designs would be closely and sharply criticized from the Naval point of view, as they ought to be; and the faults and defects which he had endeavoured to point out would be remedied by those gentlemen in the course of the careful examination they would give to the designs. Once passed by the Board, the order was most precise that no alteration or addition was to be allowed. When thus approved in every detail the designer could prepare the lines of the vessel, knowing exactly what she had to carry in weight, and what duties she was expected to perform.

It would also be the policy of the Board not to be tempted to make alterations in vessels when once their construction was commenced, but to push on the work to completion, adhering to the original design. Such a policy would, he was satisfied, obviate the recurrence of many of the costly mistakes of the past, to which allusion had been made, and would be the best means of attaining the end which the hon. Member for Sunderland (Mr. Gourley) had so much at heart, and with whoso object the Board of Admiralty fully sympathized.

The hon. Member for Cardiff (Sir Edward Reed) would be fully aware of the attempt made in 1871 to obtain the opinion of a Committee of Inquiry on the designs of vessels then being constructed. He would remember the variety of opinions expressed by Members of that Committee, and the difficulty of forming any reliable conclusion from their Report as to the best form of vessel to be built In looking through the evidence given before that inquiry he was much struck by one answer given by the hon. Member for Cardiff, who, on being pressed to express an opinion favourable to the introduction of compound engines into the Navy, said— My feeling is that I prefer to get actual experience rather than evidence—which, even when given from the best authorities, is not always to be trusted—before I would tamper with vessels of that kind. Now, if a Committee were formed, it would have to deal with evidence. For his own part, he preferred the common-sense process recommended by the hon. Member for Cardiff—to be guided by actual experience rather than by evidence. Another point he should notice was that there had been more Committees upon these matters than the hon. Member for Sunderland was aware of.

There was a Committee in 1865, the outcome of which was the construction of the Captain. In 1869 another Committee sat, and the Devastation and the Thunderer were produced; there was a third in 1871, after the Captain was lost; and he thought that, broadly stated, the result of these various Committees was that there were about as many opinions as there were Members on the Committee. It was true the Motion did not suggest the appointment of a permanent Committee on Designs, but was limited to an inquiry into the designs adopted within recent years. Such a proposal would have even a more prejudicial effect on the Service than the appointment of a permanent Committee. The inquiry would occupy months; it would distract the attention of officers; rival schools of ship-building would be heard before the Committee, each with its own theory. If upon so contentious and thorny a subject the Committee should by chance come to a unanimous conclusion, the effect might be to cramp the inventive and suggestive faculties of our naval officers, and to stereotype in our Navy some one system or type of ship. Men in official positions were not over partial to accept responsibility, and he thought the temptation would be great to the designers to shelter their future work behind the recommendations of such a Committee.

The result would be that for some time there would be a stereotyped typo of vessel, and the country would not keep up with that ever-growing progress which so marked the construction of our vessels in the last few years.

It must not, however, before one moment supposed that the present Board of Admiralty considered themselves or their advisers to be infallible, or that they lived in regions above and beyond the reach of outside advice. They were always pleased to receive suggestions, and in the event of difficulty or doubt there would be no hesitation in seeking the counsel of those from the outside who might be qualified to give a reliable opinion. For the reasons, however, that he had endeavoured to lay before the House, the Government could not accept the Motion of the hon. Member—a Motion which, if carried, would make it compulsory upon the Board to appoint a Committee. They hoped by using the machinery they at present possessed, and giving effect to the existing system on business lines, to arrive at the result the hon. Member desired—namely, to provide from time to time the most efficient ships of war that could be produced.

The hon. Member for Cardiff had made allusion to his visit to Devonport the other day. What the hon. Member said he saw there was the outcome of the want of business aptitude in the past. The Admiralty at the time were in a great hurry to get the vessels referred to constructed, and he believed the Admiralty had not made up their minds as to the host form of the vessels when they ordered them. At the present time, however, the Admiralty had made up their minds, and they knew what they wanted in respect of the vessels they ordered from truck to keel, and he believed that was the only way to avoid the mistakes which had occurred in the past. There was no doubt that much of the trouble that had arisen in ships now under consideration, had arisen from the overpace at which the work was pushed on.

A very large number of ships were put in hand at once, and he was afraid that that care and attention were not given to them which would have been given if the demand had not been so great and oppressive. He was afraid public opinion was somewhat to blame for that state of things. There had been some sweeping remarks by the hon. Member for Cardiff as regarded certain ships which he had named, and, although he had pointed out the differences between their designs and what they would be when they were completed; still he did not wish the House for one moment to suppose that those vessels would be anything but first-class men of war. They might have been better, but there was no hesitation on the part of naval officers of the Board in saying that they would prove good and efficient fighting ships; and if ever the time unfortunately came for their going into action they would be found as good and efficient fighting ships as a British seaman could desire.

QF написал:

#1288878
С первого представления этих кораблей в парламенте и вплоть до печальной развязки, они характеризовались крейсерами всеми, за исключением Шоу. И даже он, будучи одёрнут, вынужден был начать использовать общие определения.

Вы наверное не очень внимательно читаете. Вы тут ссылались на Фридмана, тогда почитайте, что он написал
As of June 1884 the proposed 1885-86 program included a follow-on New Mersey. Rendel wanted a total of four ships (with two in 1885-86), but in the wake of the ‘truth about the navy’ scare that fall the Gladstone Administration was compelled to accept the large supplemental Northbrook Program. The shape of the program was probably influenced by Captain Hall’s 1884 report on British naval weaknesses, in which second-class armourclads were a particular problem.16 Although the new ships were really cruisers with some thick waterline armour, they qualified as ironclads. The first five were ordered under the supplementary Northbrook Program of the 1884-85 fiscal year (actually in 1885), the last two being the 1885-86 ships. They formed the Orlando class.
По состоянию на июнь 1884 года предлагаемая программа 1885-86 включала в себя последующий Новый «Мерсей». Рендел хотел в общей сложности четыре корабля (по два в 1885-1886 годах), но после серии статей «Какова правды о флоте», Администрация Гладстона была вынуждена принять большую дополнительную программу Ноотбрука. На состав программы, вероятно, повлиял доклад капитана Холла 1884 года О слабостях британского военно-морского флота, в котором особенной проблемой были броненосцы второго класса. Несмотря на то, что новые корабли были на самом деле крейсерами с толстой броней по ватерлинии, они квалифицировались как броненосцы. Первые пять были заказаны в рамках дополнительной программы Нортбрука 1884-1885 финансового года (фактически в 1885 году), последние два кораблями были 1885-86. Они образовали тип «Орландо».
«Орландо».
The Elswick armament was not dead. Rendel revived his argument for heavy guns. This ship would have 9.2in guns at the ends (and twelve 6in on her broadside) and much thicker deck armour (2in flat as before, but 6in slopes). She had to be larger, 350ft rather than 300ft long, displacing 4150 tons.
Идеи Элсвика о вооружение не умерли. Рендел возродил свои аргументы в пользу тяжелых орудий. У этого корабля было бы 9.2 пушки в оконечностях (и двенадцать 6-дюймовок по бортам) и гораздо более толстая палубная броня (вместо прежних 2 дюймов 6 дюймов). Она должна была быть больше, 350 футов, а не 300 футов длиной. Водоизмещение 4150 тонн.

А ведь это уже был сильно переработанный относительно первоначального проект с сильно усиленным вооружением и бронированием.

Отредактированно Алекс (20.06.2018 02:24:45)

QF написал:

#1288916
Летом 1885 года Орландо не был в 8300 тонн. Также вы не смогли привести его 2500 тонного прототипа.

Я же вам уже написал, что Вы читаете крайне невнимательно, иногда складывается впечатление, что Вы вообще читаете только себя.

Алекс написал:

#1288747
Первый проект при водоизмещении в пределах "Мерсея" - бронепалубный крейсер с 2" палубой и 8 подводными ТА, с артиллерией существовало несколько вариантов в различной конфигурации 6" или 9,2" и 6", запасом угля в 900 т и скоростью не менее 16 уз..

Сумрак написал:

#1288901
за давностью

Мир меняется.