арт написал:

#1399487
Правда дал ответ не на мой вопрос.

Ваш вопрос или имеет вот тот ответ или не имеет смысла.

WindWarrior написал:

#1399456
Предлагаю обсудить

прим.1 Лакруа, р 437
прим.2 Лакруа, р 437
прим.3 Фридман, US cruiser, p 195
прим.4 Робертс, р 172
прим.5 Лангерер, Варшип №42, p 110
прим.6 Лакруа, р 438, 441
прим.7 Лакруа, р 451
прим.8 Фридман, US cruiser, p 195
прим.9 Фридман, British cruiser, p 172
прим.10 Робертс, р 172
прим.11 Фридман, British cruiser, p 173
прим.12 Браун_1, от Нельсона до Вэнгарда
прим.13 Браун, 2
прим.14 Лакруа, р 437
прим.15 Лангерер, Варшип 2018, 2
прим.16 Лангерер, Варшип №41, р 39
прим.17 Штиль, Дуэль №22, р 19
прим.18 Лангерер, Варшип №42, р 111
прим.19 Лангерер, Варшип №41, р 39

Another new factor was the appearance of the Mogami-class light cruisers . Early in February the Japanese navy minister announced, as he was bound to under the treaty, that they would mount fifteen 6.1-in guns and would make 33 knots on a displacement officially given as 8,500 tons. Whether this was ever a realistic design figure is unclear; certainly the Japanese constructors cut many corners to aim at so much firepower on so little displacement, and certainly they had to strengthen the ships a great deal later on. In 1933, however, the advent of these ships electrified both the U.S. Navy and the Royal Navy.
With the Japanese example in hand the General Board could no longer settle for twelve guns in a "balanced" ship, particularly since the new shell greatly reduced the value of whatever armor C&R could provide.

— Фридман p 194-195

15. The Japanese Threat and the British Reply
They decided also to so build as to be able to rapidly convert 6in cruisers to 8in if necessary. With these ideas paramount, they laid down in late 1931 two light cruisers, nominally of 8,500 tons, carrying fifteen 6.1 in guns, and with a designed speed of 35 knots. The Admiralty viewed this with disquiet, and hoped that these were not to be the forerunners of a class of such ships.
Despite strenuous efforts by the Intelligence departments, only the barest information found its way into British hands. The Japanese communicated only the minimum data demanded under the terms of the 1930 Treaty, and rejected advances that proposed the kind of information sharing that was common among the British, American and French Navies at the time, and which gradually increased as the threat of war drew nearer.
British apprehension heightened when two more ships of 8,500 tons were laid down about a year after the first pair, and in June 1933 the Japanese announced their intention to build four more light cruisers, this time of 10,000 tons. Ship for ship, these would easily be superior to any of the British light cruisers, and, on paper, would seem almost to equal the 8in ships of the County Class.
The knowledge that a potential enemy would have within a few years two new classes of powerful cruisers, able to threaten British trade routes, forced Britain to respond, and in August 1933 the DNC was asked to prepare a series of sketch designs for examination by the Board of Admiralty.
The requirement for the main armament was not, as one might have expected, fifteen 6in guns (to match the Japanese), but twelve 6in in four triple turrets, which allowed for better fire control and spotting, on a smaller tonnage.

— Равен/Робертс британские крейсера ВМВ p 172

The Admiralty’s plans for numbers of small cruisers were thwarted when other countries, particularly Japan, began to build large cruisers with numerous 6in guns. The Mogami class were declared at 8500 tons with fifteen 6.1in guns which caused a sensation

— Браун, от Нельсона до Вэнгарда, 1
.

Considerable thought was given in all major navies to the value of the big 6in ship as against those armed with 8in. The 6in could fire more quickly, 6–8 rounds per minute as opposed to 2 for the 8in (5 possibly for the RN turrets), which also had longer range, better penetration of armour and caused more damage when it hit. The key question was whether the slow-firing 8in could inflict fatal damage on a 6in ship between 28,000 and 20,000yds, the maximum effective ranges of the 8in and 6in gun respectively. Most navies seem to have favoured the 6in ship, although Japan took the opposite view and re-armed her big 6in ships with 8in guns. The USN built large numbers of both types and introduced much heavier shells for both guns.41 Wartime experience strongly suggests that hits on a manoeuvring target at over 20,000yds were rare, justifying the 6in armament.42"

— Браун, от Нельсона до Вэнгарда, 2

Although British proposals at the London Conference included allowing the US Navy 10,000-ton cruisers with 6in guns, the Admiralty seems not to have taken such ships seriously, since Lender could stand up to any 6in gun cruiser, and she was a far more economical proposition. Surely foreign navies would see this logic. Unfortunately that was not the case. Both the US Navy and more ominously the Japanese Imperial Navy ordered large 6in gun cruisers, of the Brooklyn and Mogami classes. Controller added that the newest French cruisers, most clearly comparable to the Leaders displaced 7,500 tons, and that the addition­al 500 tons would have been most useful. It would be better to abandon hopes of getting fourteen ships within the Treaty limit in order not to accept gross inferiority DTD favoured reducing the number to thirteen to ensure that ships more fully met requirements, bur did not want to imitate the new foreign ships. Director of Plans pointed out that 6in cruisers were under the same 10,000-ton limit as 8in ships. It might therefore be possible to postpone building large cruisers until the 1934/5 programme in hopes that a competition in cruiser size might be avoided and some agreement reached ar the next arms-control confer­ence, expected in 1935. DCNS wanted to wait until late in 1932 to decide the 1933/4 programme, because an arms-control conference was beginning at Geneva in 1932. It might be possible to point out at that conference that cruiser size, hence cost, was being pushed up, and perhaps some action might be taken to cap cruiser size. ACNS agreed. Fourth Sea lord wanted to concentrate on cruiser quality rather than quantity; numbers could be made up in some other way. Second Sea Lord considered British cruisers deficient in ahead fire, but it would be unwise to follow the foreign navies towards larger, more expensive ships.

— Friedman, British cruisers - two world war and after, p 172

"The Royal Navy could nor continue to build small cruisers which would be outclassed by the new foreign ships ... Chatfield decided to defer such construction for a year while building the sort of large cruisers the Americans and, more importantly, the Japanese, were building.".

The Staff Requirement for the 1933 cruiser.... It caled for twelve 6in guns in triple turret

— Norman Friedman - British Cruisers Two World Wars and After, p 173

The maximum range of 27,400 m surpassed that of the 6in (152mm) guns fitted in the light cruisers of the US Brooklyn class and was comparable to the 8in (203mm) gun mounted in the American heavy cruisers which were seen as Mogami’s likely opponents.

— Лангерер, Варшип 2018, 1

Yasufumi9 states that a cruiser of the Mogami class in a fight against a US cruiser of the Brooklyn class would have been forced to reduce the range to less than 10,000m in order to pierce the front shield of the main guns. He suggests that the decision to up-gun the Mogamis was very much influenced by the increased penetration of the 20cm gun, which could pierce the front shield of the US turrets at 15,000m."

— Лангерер, Варшип 2018, 2

Therefore, the classification that arose of light and heavy cruisers depended entirely on the calibre of guns, not displacement. The London Treaty also established a ratio of 10:6 between the USN and IJN for heavy cruisers (8in) and 10:7 for light cruisers. The overall ratio was roughly 10:6:5. Despite this, the IJN still considered that heavy cruisers would help compensate for their relative inferiority in battleships.

They would form part of the 'advanced force' (Zenshin Butai). Before the decisive gunnery action they would deliver night torpedo attacks to reduce the imbalance between USN and IJN forces. In four ship divisions these ships would pierce the defensive barrier around the American fleet both to allow their destroyers to fire torpedoes, and to fire their own torpedos. As a result, IJN Tleaty cruiserd had a very heavy torpedo battery, which was considered indispensible for their strategic role. (See also Kitakami, Warship 37.)

By contrast, British cruisers emphasised radius of action at the expense of guns and protection. The American ships were reasonably well protected, especially by their thick armoured deck, and had almost the same armament as the IJN ships and a larger radius of action. In general, they were more than a match for the Japanese ships. One of their strategic tasks was to join the aircraft carriers in a fast reconnaissance force to spearhead the USN drive across the Pacific. As a result, they carried a large number of aircraft.

Japanese studies of aircraft catapults, stowage and landing began in 1924. Seaplanes were considered vital for reconnaissance, patrol and fire control; this was especially true of Treaty cruisers. The Furutake class had a takeo ff platform and one seaplane; Kinugasa was the first ship to be equipped with the compressed air Kure No 1 catapult (Kure Shiki Dai Ichi G6 Shashutsu). In 1930 this was replaced in all ships by the gunpowder propelled 'Type Kure No 2 catapult model 1', which became standard for the Treaty cruisers. On the Takao class two catapults were fitted, one on each side. Previous ships had been fitted wiih only one. The Furutakas and Aobas caried only one seaplane, the Myoko`s two and the Takaos three. The American Pensacola class ships were equipped with two catapults and four seaplanes. This became the standard for all USN Tleaty cruisers.

— Лангерер, Варшип 41, р 39

The investigation of stability in Japanese warships after the Tomozuru inсident (the torpedo boat capsized in heavy seas on 12 March 1934) revealed that the Mogamis were deficient in this respect. Anticipating the outcome of the enquiry, the plans of Tone were altered. The main armament was reduced by one turet, and concentrated on the forecastle. This left the quarterdeck free for aircraft and torpedoes, to suit the strategic and tactical requirements of leading the reconnaissance (advanced fotce) during the decisive encounter with the Americans. Consequently, the Tone class (basic design C-38) were completely different from their predecessors. The concentration of the main armament forward was also intended to counter a serious dispersion of shot. This had been a problem since the Myoko class, which the reduced distance between the fore and aft barbettes in the Takao class had been less effective in curing than the connection of C and X barbettes with the superstructure deck in the Mogamis.(See Warship 26 p88-9). Besides reducing dispersion, the new arrangement was also intended to act as an experiment for lhe Yamato class.

When the Fourth Fleet was struck by a typhoon during the autumn manoeuvres on 26 September 1935 the hulls of the latest ships showed signs of weakness, particularly the welded joints. Aboard Mogami and, Mikuma, welded seams tore open and plates were dented. The problem of inadequate hull strength and poor welding had been noted during the Mogami trials in March 1935. As a result, the Naval Arsenal Kure investigated the

Fourth Fleet Incident and issued a statement in January 1936. The use of welding was to be limited to well supported structures and exclude all strength members. This new construction policy was only partly adopted

in Tone, but for Chikuma riveting was used almost throughout.

— Лангерер, Варшип 42, р 110

The 15.5cm guns were nominally retained for political reasons. In fact, by 1936 the construction of Tone was so far advanced that such alterations would have been almost impossible; the design change had been carried out around the time she was laid down. When the Naval limitation treaties were abrogated on 31 December 1936 the Navy General Staff decided to fit them with 20.3cm guns at once. Therefore, the ships were built as heavy cruisers, not converted like the Mogamis. The Staff also cancelled the fifth 12.7cm AA twin mounting which was to have occupied the centreline on the quarterdeck, and replaced the original 20mm with 13mm and 25mm guns.

These alterations affected construction time. Tone was launched on 21 November 1937 and completed on 20 November 1938. It had been intended that she complete in March 1938. Chikuma was launched on 19 March 1938 and handed over on 20 May 1939, 14 months late. Further delays had been caused by the large amount of work required to improve hull strength in the wake of the Fourth Fleet Incident and the modernisation of the existing capital ships. This delayed many vessels of the Second Naval Armament Replenishment programme.

The Tone class included all the lessons learnt in the 1934 and 1935 disasters, and during the construction of lhe Mogami class. Consequently, they were the most successful of all the Japanese heavy cruisers, and very popular with the fleet. Completing the Tones and converting the Mogamis gave the Japanese parity with the Americans in heavy cruisers when the Pacific War broke out. Both sides had 18. The four Takaos formed CruDiv 4; the three Myokos formed CruDiv 5; and the Furutaha/Aobo classes formed CruDiv 6; the Mogamis CruDiv 7 and, the Tones CruDv 8. These formations would link up with Destroyer squadrons (DesRons) to form night battle groups to attack the American battle line after the outer defences had been breached by the guns of BatDiv 3, consisting of the forth Kongo class reconstructed fast battleships and the torpedoes of CruDv 4.

Placing the Tones last indicated that their primary task was not night action. They were to act as the eyes of the advanced force (essentially ships as the night battle force) in the interception of the American scouting force as it crossed the Pacific. This was a force of carriers and heavy cruisers, which the Japanese intended to defeat in order to gain the strategic advantage for the night action preceding the decisive daylight battle. These strategic plans explain why the Japanese wanted to maintain parity in heavy cruisers.

— Лангерер, Варшип 42, р 111

By January 1938, work on all four ships was completed. This was followed by a 1939 refit for the entire class, which replaced the triple 6.1-inch turrets with rwin 8-inch turrets. What finally emerged by the starr of the Pacific War was a ship with capabilities similar to the previous classes of heavy cruisers. The Mogami class now carried ten 8-inch guns, a secondary battery of eight 5-inch guns mounted in rwin gun mounts, and a heavy torpedo armament with reloads. Protection was on the same scale as previous classes ofImperial Navy heavy cruisers.

— Марк Штиль, Osprey Duel #22, p 19

арт написал:

#1399492
Т.е. иных вариаций вы неприемлите?

В этой ветке- нет. А в других, на эту тему, можете прочитать множество словей.

арт написал:

#1399499
задачи ТКР ни чем не отличались от задач других крейсеров

Ой все...

WindWarrior написал:

#1399456
больших легких крейсеров"[

Кстати, маленькое замечание, в статье не упомянуто, что эти крейсера до самого конца в японском флоте классифицировались как лёгкие, по моему у них что то вроде крейсеров второго класса, а так же, что вариант перевооружения на 203 мм допускался с самого начала, но вовсе не был индетерминированным- указывалось что это может произойти если Япония окажется вне договорной системы, по каким либо причинам. Поэтому, например компоновка размещения передних башен делалась исходя из длины 155мм орудий и переход на более длинные 203 мм был сопряжён с определёнными трудностями.

Отредактированно РыбаКит (30.11.2019 00:15:16)

РыбаКит написал:

#1399571
Кстати, маленькое замечание, в статье не упомянуто, что эти крейсера до самого конца в японском флоте классифицировались как лёгкие,

С чего бы?Их переклассифицировали,лень дату искать когда.Причем какое то время ЕМНИП они числились класса А,при этом оставаясь с 155мм артиллерией.