mina написал:

Оригинальное сообщение #243611
наземные комплексы в тот момент имели только одно преимущество - дальность
из боевая устойчивость/готовность к старту  были слишком низки, и в случае "вырубающего удара" шансы на успешный запуск были малы

Это понятно. Но в той данной конкертной ситуации у наземных комплексов было ещё одно важное преисущество, о чём писалось здесь: их видимость, осязаемость. Ведь Хрущёв ,принимая решение о размещении наших ракет на Кубе, вовсе не предполагал, что им предстоит стать участниками реальных боевых действий ,это была демонстарция. А для целей демонстрации наземные комплексы годились лучше, чем морские.

Мамай написал:

Оригинальное сообщение #243622
Лихо.

реально
ключевой параметр - время
в отличии от наземных комплексов "вырубание" ПЛРБ первым внезапным ударом исключено (при условии должного обеспечения их БУ - организационного и технического)

и это было ключевым фактором

Эд написал:

Оригинальное сообщение #315657
СССР – независимая держава, и мог размещать свои ракеты, где хотел: договорились бы с Мексикой – в Мексике; договорились бы с Канадой – в Канаде.

+ 100!

kursiv написал:

Оригинальное сообщение #315769
вдруг убрался

Убрался потому, что цель (как ее тогда понимало советское руководство) была достигнута.

kursiv написал:

Оригинальное сообщение #315779
защитить Кастро

Ну да, именно это, если судить по решению Президиума ЦК КПСС от 24.05.1962.
Здесь и сейчас еще далеко не все ясно. Но Куба не Гренада (даже тогда), и подготовка широкомасштабных военных действий США не могла остаться незамеченной. Я остаюсь при своем частном мнении, что США на Кубу не напали бы в любом случае. Заявление об отказе от нападения на Кубу в обмен на вывоз ракет с Кубы представилось для США вполне приемлемым. А вообще все эти ракеты, в т.ч. и Торы с Юпитерами, были уже устаревшим оружием, на смену им пришли ПЛАРБ - в США раньше, в СССР - несколько позднее. 

Наверное, Хрущеву следовало встретиться с Кеннеди весной 1962 г. Не знаю, было ли это возможно.

kursiv написал:

Оригинальное сообщение #315810
Хрущев этим и загорелся всерьез

Симпатии и антипатии - все же эмоции. Конкретно дела делались в соответствии с решениями Президиума ЦК КПСС.

Exval написал:

Оригинальное сообщение #315915
Президиум ЦК КПСС диктовал свою волю Хрущёву, а не наоборот?

Все же руководство страной носило коллегиальный характер, по крайней мере формально. И если цель развертывания ракет была также и военной, то это должно было найти какое-то отражение в решениях Президиума.

Сегодня ровно 50 лет как на Кубу, в рамках операции "Анадырь", было отправлено первое судно - сухогруз «Хабаровск».

Dilandu написал:

#1001135
Все было куда хуже чем раньше казалось...

Да уж, сценарии, в которых ТМВ начинали компьютеры явно не на пустом месте создавались...

Вполне может быть и утка. Надеюсь, честно говоря.

Вы об этом?

Where to start? My personal opinion is that I don’t believe Bordne’s story.

I was a Mech 1 on launch crew 28 at site 3B – Nightlong Bravo - in 1965. As
a Mech 1, I was responsible – along with the launch officer – for launching the missiles should the need arise. It was my job to crank a centrifugal switch called an LEU (Launch Enable Unit) at 75 RPM while the Launch Office pressed both launch buttons. Either button would work, but just in case. There were no launch keys - just an LEU and 2 launch buttons. Again, Bordne is wrong.

To crank the LEU or press the launch buttons, you had to break wire seals. To the best of my knowledge, none of those seals was ever broken. I have never cranked an LEU even though I sat right next to it.

The LEU was behind my desk and a little to my right while the launch buttons were on the LCSC (Launch Command and Status Console). Those controls were about 10 feet apart. There was no way a single person could do both.

First, we didn’t receive launch authorization on a clear radio frequency that anyone could hear. That’s just plain silly. And we didn’t receive it via the phone lines – equally silly. It came by way of teletype. That was the ONLY encrypted method of communication at the sites. We had to change punch cards on a regular basis to maintain sync with the 313 Air Division

Many times we would find our radio (AN-TRC 75) jammed. We would call in a “How 1” to the White Beach Naval Station and they would triangulate the signal. Pretty much every time it came from China. We would then change to an alternate frequency. Think about it. If the Chinese were jamming our frequency, then obviously they could hear us and they did listen to us.

The 313th Air Division did a study on our telephone security. When you were counting up a missile to arm it, you would report certain steps to OCU Operations Control Unit). You reported step 103, 207 and 600B. You also
indicated when you expected it to be armed – 600B was armed. We would call it in as “Blank 1 is 5 (launch bay). Blank 2 is 103, Blank 3 is 2230, etc.”
After listening to our landlines for a week, we got an ass chewing because they figured out everything we were saying. So much for the landline and a launch order.

Add to that the fact that the landlines were buried and leaked made for unreliable communication. During the rainy season, it could be tough to
use the landline for anything. Under those circumstances we would fall back on the radio, but we STILL DID NOT RECEIVE LAUNCH ORDERS by radio.

As a Mech 1, I didn’t know the targets for our missiles. I had a top secret –
SIOP (single integrated operations plan) - Crypto clearance and I didn’t have
that info. Neither did the launch officer. We both had the same clearance.

As far as setting the targets just prior to launch? Yeah, right. When you’re arming a Mace B, you count it up to step 600B. At that point, the Earth-rate inertial guidance system starts to monitor the Earth moving under it. It’s suspended on arms that make it very sensitive to Earth movement. At the same time, there is a device to the left toward the front of the missile in the bay called an azimuth alignment unit. It directed a light into the nosecone of the missile. Any movement of the location of that light with respect to the target in the nosecone was regarded as earth movement. It was very sensitive. In fact, if you lay a hand on the missile, alarms will go off and you will make some enemies. The target is already set at that point. You are not preparing for launch – you are simply waiting for the order to launch. The longer the missile sits in 600B “feeling” the Earth move, the more accurate it becomes.

Part of the arming process is for the Mech 3 to use a vacuum pump to simulate various changes in altitude programmed along the course of the missile’s flight path. He does this with a collection of potentiometers that can be set from zero to 999 with zero being on the ground and 999 at maximum altitude. That is all set long before you reach 600B. Originally, the launch crew had a Mech 2 (flight controls) but those duties were divided between the Mech 3 and the Mech 1.

Each of the missiles has a LAGG (launch area guidance group) console. On the front of each console, there is a window with the target’s azimuth. If you
go to http://www.mace-b.com/38TMW/Mi... and scroll down to the photos of the guidance consoles, you’ll see a cover marked “TOP SECRET”. The number under that cover is the azimuth heading of the target. That number is there all the time – even if there’s no missile in the bay. When you count it up and arm it, that number is automatically loaded into the guidance system.

There are no target selections at the time of launch. Those targets were determined long in advance.

When we did a practice launch, we referred to a document called SIOP (Single Integrated Operations Plan). That document was a computer printout
roughly an inch thick. It was filled with possible launch times for all four missiles under our command. Imagine if you launched a missile at a target
and it arrived at the same time as a B-52. If both got there at nearly the same time, whichever got its payload there first destroyed the other aircraft. It was set up so there wasn’t a targeting conflict. We used that same document
should the need arise to actually launch the missiles.

But there is a VERY SMALL grain of truth to his statements. We might be told to launch only certain missiles. We were never told the reason. There
was nothing in the SIOP document that told us the target. I don't recall whether it was by bay number or sortie number.

FYI, I also spent a year in OCU and that added an ESI (extra-sensitive information) to my security clearance. When I got assigned to OCU, then I knew the targets, but I had nothing to do with selecting them or setting them. And I never passed the target info on to the sites.

Launch authorization came from CINCPAC (Commander in Chief Pacific - Hawaii). It did not originate on Okinawa. It came to OCU, but it didn’t go through OCU to the sites. It was communicated to the missile sites directly from the 313th Air Division on Kadena.

As far as carrying authenticators to the site daily, that never happened. Right behind my desk was a locked bookcase with a glass front. Inside, you could
see the authenticators. Those authenticators stayed there until you needed them. They did not travel in a pouch and then sit in a pouch at the site. And the launch officer was not the only one who opened an authenticator. The Mech 1 also opened an authenticator. That was part of the 2-man rule.

Rarely, you would open an authenticator during an exercise. Most of the time, you didn’t bother opening the authenticator because you knew it was an exercise by the type of message you received. But there were exceptions. I think I opened only one authenticator.

I spent two years on Okinawa because I extended my tour by 6 months. I knew the DCO who had his office right across the hall from OCU. If this incident had happened, we would have known. I knew people who were there in 1962. In fact, our Mech 4 was there.

If Bordne is referring to OCU when he speaks of the Missile Operations Center, I worked with a CMSGT who was there in 1962. Never heard a word about it and I was in OCU.

I find it curious that we don’t know the crew position of this guy. Which crew was he on, or what site and complex was he at? But if you make it all up, I guess it really doesn’t matter. If you pinned him down, would he even know how many launch crews there were? Every launch crew member knew that number.

As far as “sounds or tremors” a nuclear attack, that’s also nonsense. The floor of the LCC (launch control center) and ready room were suspended on a 30:1 shock attenuator. HOWEVER, on the LAGG, all the way over to the left right next to my desk was a console called the LDSS (Light Detection and Switch Set). On top of the site above the launch bay doors were two mirrored sensors that were designed to look for a nuclear flash. If one was detected, the LDSS would step all four missiles to 700 which would lock the guidance system. We didn’t need to feel it – we were told quite loudly by the LDSS. Occasionally, a trick of sunlight would trigger one of them. And if it was close enough, the overpressure in the air plenum would slam the blast valves shut to protect the site from overpressure. I painted the blast valves on Site 3 before I was assigned to a crew.

And as for Jon Cloke’s comments regarding Mutually Assured Destruction and the nuclear deterent, the 498th Tactical Missile Group was part of TAC and not SAC. SAC’s mission is to deter. Our mission was to destroy. We were not intended to deter. If we got into the act, deterence had already failed.

Отредактированно Dilandu (03.11.2015 19:59:53)