Восмерка виновата?2 мая "Амур" поставил мины.2 броненосца -минус.Увидели японскую "восмерку"?Кстати-дата.

British Naval Attache Reports, p. 58:

MINE-LAYING OPERATIONS OFF PORT ARTHUR, APRIL 12th and 13th

(Report from Captain W. C. Pakenham, R.N., dated 13th April 1904.)
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    On 11th April a portion of the Japanese fleet left harbour. One division of this squadron was composed of all the battleships, and in second were placed two armoured cruisers and two cruisers of the second class. The squadron comprised also one small cruiser, 12 destroyers, three torpedo boats, and a small mining vessel. In addition, the small craft towed two rough boats fitted as mining launches, and covered in with tarpaulins.
    Having steamed at slow speed throughout the night, the squadron stopped on the following afternoon to permit the final preparation of the mines. Of these, the mining vessel got ready 12, the launches 18 each of a smaller kind, while several of the destroyers had three.
    Amid hearty cheers from the battleships, the cruiser division and the torpedo and mining flotilla then continued their course towards Port Arthur, while the battle squadron began slowly to retrace its way in the direction whence it had come.
    For the first time the scheme in course of execution was fully and openly discussed. It had been decided that the small vessels should drop mines in the entrance to Port Arthur, and that, while engaged on this task, those of their number who were not unencumbered by mines should deal with any opposing force. As soon as the mines were laid, the flotilla was to set out to join the battle fleet at a rendezvous a few miles from the port. The junction was to be effected about daybreak.
    Dawn was also to find the cruiser division fairly close in to the entrance to Port Arthur, when it was hoped the evidently weak constitution of this division, and its apparently unsupported position, might lure the Russians across the mine field. If this were crossed in safety, the Russians might pursue in force until the Japanese battleships were discovered, and these might then interpose between the Russians and their harbour, and thus compel the Russians to fight; or the latter might think the opportunity a fairly favorable one, and might themselves seek an engagement. Meanwhile the six armoured cruisers (originally left behind at the last anchorage) were to have placed themselves at hand, though not in sight, so that,  should the Russian fleet seek or accept battle, it could be almost immediately faced by a force of almost overwhelming superiority, which would leave it no alternate between a beating at sea or a disordered flight across an enemy's minefield.
    This ingenious combination met with some measures of success. What happened was this. In the side of Japanese the scheme was carried out in every particular. The mines were laid, and their daring layers returned unhurt. The light cruiser division did exactly as directed. They drew out a considerable part of the Russian fleet, and then fled towards the battleships, which were encountered as pre-arranged. The Russians, however, after approaching Japanese battle squadron until colors and outlines were becoming clearly visible, and a serious encounter seemed inevitable, changed their tactics, put their helms a-starboard, and made for the entrance of Port Arthur, without undue haste, but in no distinguishable order. On the opposite quarter to the occupied by the Russians, and only very dimly distinguishable trough the haze, it was now possible in the Japanese fleet to mark the neighborhood  of the armoured cruiser division. It seems probable that the hasty change of tactics by the Russians may have been caused by a warning from a hill signal station, from which this reinforcement, invisible to the fleet, may doubtless have been observed.
    By some inexplicable good fortune, the Russian ships seem to have escaped damage from the mines during their exit from port, but their return was less fortunate. As the Japanese battleships were parading backwards and forwards before the port (going at a speed of 15 knots, each ship flying two largest ensigns, not firing, although at quarters for action), attention was attracted by en escape of steam from a funnel of one of the larger Russian ships. While speculating as to the cause of this, a pillar of blackish water and smoke suddenly rose at her side 200 feet into the air, sank a little, then spread by degrees, and concealed her from view. When the cloud had drifted away, the unfortunate vessel could no longer be seen, and the silence of the Japanese fleet was broken by an involuntary burst of cheering and hand clapping, which was, in turn, succeeded by sympathetic murmurs as the awful probable significance of such an event as that just witnessed, was realized. All agree that one of the recently laid mines must have been the cause of the explosion. But which was the ship insured; had she sunk, or had she managed to remain afloat? No one could tell. Some said it was the "Bayan", and that she had sunk. Most thought it was the "Petropavlovsk", and that she had only been seriously injured. At the distance the Japanese fleet had then attained from the entrance of the port, the outlines of the Russian ships were merging into into those of the land, and were seldom distinguishable from them. A small cruiser was directed to examine and report. On her return, it was stated she had been able to make out one of the "Petropavlovsk" class in a sinking condition, and had also seen seven or eight other Russian ships outside the port, firing into the water in every direction, doubtless with the object of thus destroying mines at or near the surface.
    After one more unmolested parade past the forts, the Japanese fleet withdrew; but for long after, the booming of the Russian guns could be heard, and a splashes of their shot seen, as the Russians strove to solve the puzzle set them by Admiral Togo.
    In the battle squadron it is believed that shots were exchanged, between the Russians and light cruiser squadron, but without damage on either side.
    It now only remains to add that the light cruiser squadron reported having encountered two Russian destroyers during the night, one of which is believed to have been sunk, while the other made good for escape. The destroyers sent to lay mines were not fired on by the forts. Although there had been a skirmish with some Russian boats, this was felt to be a slighting and in adequate defence. The destroyers therefore, before withdrawing, amused themselves by firing at all the searchlights they could see. The battleships had only one alarm during the two nights spent at sea, and this one, taken with great coolness, proved groundless.

Бѣлоусовъ написал:

Оригинальное сообщение #61546
Позже за "Гайдамаками" оставили распоряжение быть при флагманских кораблях. И Ухтомскому в бою 28 июля могло пригодиться их присутствие.

Не факт, что могло пригодиться. Вспомните неудачный опыт Цусимы по прикреплению к ЭБРам-флагманам миноносцев.

Бѣлоусовъ написал:

Оригинальное сообщение #61546
Что-то не видно рядом с "Петропавловском" "Всадника"?

А почеу они должны быть обязательно видны? Может, был ближе к берегу. Может, подотстал. Посмотрю у себя когда дома буду....

andrew1965 написал:

Господа, подскажите бестолковому, кто-нибудь из вас читал этот документ ("Правду о Порт-Артуре"?") Где бы найти? Сильно надо, ага.

Части первая и вторая есть на Google Books. Была ли третья - затрудняюсь сказать. Там же есть английский перевод.

Россiя написал:

Оригинальное сообщение #61656
Не факт, что могло пригодиться.

Я про невозможность передачи флажного сигнала с "Пересвета" на другие корабли, как случилось. А инструкция давала почти прямое указание на такую вероятность.

Бѣлоусовъ написал:

Я про невозможность передачи флажного сигнала с "Пересвета" на другие корабли, как случилось. А инструкция давала почти прямое указание на такую вероятность.

Мне персонально представляется сомнительной как способность минных крейсеров совершить переход во Владивосток, так и их способность поддерживать продолжительное время 13-узловый ход.

Россiя написал:

Оригинальное сообщение #61732
Только эти корабли были бы сразу отправлены в хвост эскадры, или куда-нибудь подальше от боя.

Почему отправлены куда-то? Ведь их специально включали в состав эскадры в бою для наблюдения за сигналами

Россiя написал:

Оригинальное сообщение #61732
Ведь один 12" снаряд решил бы судьбу этого кораблика

Сначала в него нужно угодить.

Не стали бы японцы бить по "Гайдамакам".

vs18 написал:

Оригинальное сообщение #61721
Части первая и вторая есть на Google Books.

Только что оттуда. Ссылок на книгу много, а самой книги -- увы. Пидемо в библиОтеку, оннахо...

Мы с Вами говорим о 1904-м годе.

Бѣлоусовъ написал:

Оригинальное сообщение #61747
Мы с Вами говорим о 1904-м годе.

Мы с Вами говорим об альтернативе и, следовательно, мы обязаны делать выводы только на основе реальных событий. Так что вот так
Пошел спать...

Отредактированно Россiя (02.05.2009 22:10:06)