Так ее обнаружение как-бы закрыло все тайны и догадки. Лодка обнаружена в пределах финского минного заграждения примерно там, где смотритель маяка Меркет днем 3 января 1940 г. визуально наблюдал лодку, а затем и взрыв на минном поле.
Разрушения характерны для подрыва на мине с последующей детонацией торпед в носовой части. Из-за этого носовая часть до дульного среза 100-мм орудия фактически отсутствует, точнее, превратилась в огромное поле обломков. Из восьми торпед в носовой части остался лишь хвост одной торпеды. Затем при сильном ударе оставшейся части корпуса о грунт  он переломился по переборке между 4 и 5-м отсеками. О силе удара говорит и то, что от корпуса при этом отваливались отдельные листы прочного корпуса.

Есть вот такая сонограмма

lupodimare89 написал:

Оригинальное сообщение #711378
19 June 1942

I can't find in German docs the exact time of bombing. Do you know it?

lupodimare89 написал:

Оригинальное сообщение #711378
If the damage was caused by friendly fire German attack, who made it? He-111, Ju-88  etc...

I haven't Luftwaffe docs.

lupodimare89 написал:

Оригинальное сообщение #711378
About Italian CBs vs Sevastopol evacuation there were some other reports of depth charges attacks, but without damage reported on CB.

The soviet submariners often thought that they were attacked too, but usually the facts of ASW-attacks didn't confirmed by axis forces.

Большое спасибо за ответ и сонограммы!
Правда по повреждениям вопрос не исчерпался, налицо два взрыва - в носовой части и в районе дизельного отсека, при ударе о грунт еще ни одна ПЛ пополам не ломалась, да еще так, чтобы две части корпуса оказались в 10 метрах друг от друга, а вот от взрыва - совсем другое дело. Где-то я читал что глубина на месте гибели С-2 очень мала - всего 23 метра...

Botik Petra Velikogo написал:

Оригинальное сообщение #711617
съемки района разлома корпуса по переборке 4 и 5-го отсеков не показывают следов взрыва. Четкий словно скальпелем разрез поперек корпуса с абсолютно ровными краями.

Прошу прощения, про этот факт не знал, вопросов больше нет.

I add another thing:
In that site at number "19" there is a page of the italian MAS in Black Sea
More mistakes, but it gives the exact hour of the italian MAS attacks against cruiser Molotov:
It's say at:
H.0120 of day 3 August: Mas-528 start attack move.
H.0127 of day 3 August: reports that 2 torpedoes hits the target. That's seen "sinking".
H.0138 of day 3 August: Mas-528 launch her depth charges claiming damage on the leader destroyer that is reported chasing the Mas.

I hopes it can help to make a clear valuation if the Mas was responsable or not for the damage on Molotov.



The article mention the author J.Meister claim that the soviets admitted that Kharkov too was damaged.
(if i understood well, Meister wasn't an exactly correct author).

Article adds that Mas-573 launched a torpedo without effect before the attack. of Mas-578

The articles ends with an interesting confirmation on damage on Mas-578: it's say
"Una volta in porto, verranno rilevati dei danni ad alcune paretie e i mozzi delle eliche, dopo essere stati smontati in cantiere a Gurzuf, risulteranno praticamente fusi".
Basically, it's seems these are small splinters hits (and/or light machine guns hits) and over-heating damages on propellers.

Sorry ! Damn.. MAS-568 of course.
Ok, so, here it's the full text translated from the box  of MAS-568 action.

2 august 1942
h. 18.00  German convoy leave Fedosya and Ivan Baba to Mariupol
h. 19.00 From Fedosya leave the IV-MAS Flottilla, MAS-573 (Castagnacci), MAS-568 (Legnani), MAS-569 (Ferrari), to the assigned positions for the protection of the convoy.
h. 19.30 It's known that MAS-573 for issues at one engine is stopped 10 miles from coast (Gulf of Fedosya) and there it remains waiting
h. 21.00 MAS-568 reaches its point of waiting at 30 miles East of Fedosya, it starts hydrophonic listening. MAS-569 keeps on until the point at 10 miles further east.
h. 23.15 An almost full moon brights almost all the the horizoon to east

3 august 1942
h. 00.25 MAS-568 receive the message from Station R.T. from Fedosya, about the communication of MAS-573. "Enemy units are bombing the coast".
h. 00.30 message is decodified and its given to MAS-569, then - (sailing) at maximum speed compatibile with sea's conditions (force 3 from North-West) to intercept the the 
             enemy formation along the route of return.
h. 01.05 MAS-568 is framed by the enemy big guns and machine guns and move to the bow where the fire is origined without seeing the ships because its into the shadow zone. Moving at the maximum speed and widening on the left manage to defilade of enemy formation's bow  reaching the shadow zone  than the moonlight
h. 01.20 From the shadow zone, MAS-568 proceed to maximum speed for the attack manouvre and, reached 800 metres, launches torpedoes (two) against the cruiser that,
              sighting it, approaches to the left to offer only the stern and the maximum volume of fire.
h. 01.27 The torpedoes hits the target that's engulfed by a cloud of flames and smoke and it's glimpsed as sinking.
h. 01.38 The destroyer chase the MAS-568 that as defense launch 10 depht charges with the fuze marked to zero that are likely to damage the bow of the destroyer,
              making it stops the chasing. Keeps on strafing from escort fire.
h. 01.40 MAS-568 disengages and sail to return at maximum speed.
h. 04.30 MAS-568 reaches Yalta.

Additionals data:
The document make clears that only MAS-573 and MAS-568 were involved in the action.
In text is said that MAS-573 launched 1 torpedo first, but without effect.

It's interesting that this official record say that cruiser was "glimpsed" as sinking (not confirmed)
and the damage on destroyer with depth charges is said to be "likely", while the text then quote Meister as source for a "Soviet confirmation that Kharkov too was damaged"
(sadly i've not that Meister book, "The Soviet Navy" Volume 1 , year 1971)

Additional data is the further mention to light damages on MAS-568:
1) Fuses parts of engines (probably due overuse)
2) Small damages on hulls (probably due splinters/light fire. But it's unclear if caused by ships or aircrafts).
Alberto Rosselli on RegiaMarina http://www.regiamarina.net/detail_text. … &lid=2
Speak of "soviet fighters attracted by the battle". But the whole article of Rosselli seems filled with mistakes and a bit of propaganda (i've talked about this with other italians).
3) MAS-573 attempted to launch the second torpedo but it didn't came out properly. " e lanciò contro l’unità maggiore un solo siluro perché l’altro era partito erroneamente quando il Mas non era sull’angolo di mira giusto."


Another additional thing.
Legnani, before his death, give an interview and said these things:
1)They could not see the Kharkov and Molotov, and noticed only their gunfire until they managed to move in a different position to see them.
2) It's seems possible that the light damage was caused at the time by the gunfire of the soviet ships: these are the exact words of the Legnani that in an interview said that he was actually lightly wounded.
"Fummo sommersi da proiettili che scoppiettavano intorno a noi come nocciole e fui colpito da una scheggia alla guancia sinistra, della quale m’ accorsi soltanto quando uscimmo da quell’inferno."
"We were "swamped" by shells that exploded all around us as hazelnuts and i was hit a splinter at the left cheek, i've noticed it only when we came out from that hell".
Then it's adds that according him the Soviets believed to have mortally hit the MAS just a moment he started the attack manouvre.

Then there is another very interesting and a bit weird thing. He say this:
"Continuai a manovrare ed a fuggire e mi trovai ‘spiattellando’ sotto la prora del Karkov, che sparava ‘lungo’ con tutte le armi sopra le nostre teste. Eravamo a meno di 200 metri dalla sua prora, nell’angolo morto dei suoi tiri. L’ultima virata, a 50 nodi di velocità, ci consentì di scaricare di poppa le ultime armi a nostra disposizione: 10 BTG (bombe torpedine a getto), calibrate  a spoletta zero, a scoppio  quasi immediato e veramente con gran pericolo per il nostro stesso scafo. Due di questi ordigni colpirono il Karkov tranciandogli di netto la prora sino alla paratia di collisione, la cui tenuta li salvò da un rapido affondamento"
Basically from this interview, it seems that Legnani was just "under" the Kharkov (that fired over the MAS) and the depth charges attack "cut cleanly the bow"

Then again he say
"I cacciatorpediniere di scorta raccolsero i naufraghi del Molotov e presero a rimorchio il Karkov per la poppa. Gli aerei della Ricognizione Marittima sovietica c’inseguirono e ci mitragliarono durante  tutto il nostro rientro. Ma i loro colpi finirono tutti a 30 metri di poppa, ingannati, dall’alto, dalla  scia vistosa e  fosforescente lasciata dal nostro Mas."

Here it's say that the supposed "soviet fighters chasing the MAS" didn't hit the MAS-568, so the slight damage reported was almost surely caused by Molotov and/or Kharkov.
But also it say that while the Molotov "sunk" (not seen) the Kharkov was "towed".

It's POSSIBLE that actually the MAS-568 missed the first target (belived that it was a "cruiser", but could have been something else) and then launched the depth charges in front of the same Molotov believing it was the Kharkov?? The description of the damage (bow cut) and the towing, seems to coincide.
Legnani could have mixed the two ships due the confusion of the battle.

PS
All descriptions of the events doesn't mention German Air attacks, before, during or after the Italian MAS.


Legnani interview
http://www.marenostrumrapallo.it/index. … io-legnani

An italian map of the action:
http://www.marenostrumrapallo.it/images … arie/8.jpg

Very interesting. I examinated this ocassion and have some things about:
1. Probably the Soviet and the Italian sides both used the local time - the common thime of the engagement matched. Molotov got a hit at 01.26 what matched with the Italian observation.
2. Molotov didn't shelled the shore at all. At 00.53 she located a MAS for the first time and tried to evade her. At 01.05 Molotov opened fire agains a MAS, which plased at 20 degree a the the port side. Later Molotov shelled some more cutters (MAS-568 and MAS-573), but every time she located them on her port side. I haven't the soviet plan of the battle, but at 01.12 the operation was broken and soviet ships laid on the course 180 degree, despite the Italian plan. As I understand, no Italian cutters could cut Molotov's cours and attack her from the starboard. At 01.19 and 01.25 the cruiser twice defended against torpedo-bombers from starboard. In the second attack she got a hit from that said. So, from that point of view this was succes of the planes. Molotov saw a MAS for the last time at 02.30.
3. I didn't faind in the German sea documents any mentions about succesfull torpedo-bombers attack on that night, but in Molotov's documents the cruiser beat off seven air attacks.
So, I can't determinate the author of the succes.

One last thing.
And this is important.

It has just be emailed me the pdf file of this article. And it's a very "bad" one. The one that wrote this article made a very harsh criticism to the use of internet about searching on naval warfare and history and the mistakes made on it. I'm sorry to say but it's directly point the finger on old posts on the site warsailors.com
I don't know/remember who made the comments, maybe igor?
However... basically it's say that the version of german air attack is false because it's a "report from an old british site that messed up 2 attacks" the MAS attacks on the night, and the Germain air attacks the day only after in morning and midday. German themselves claimed the sinking of a cruiser the day after.


I... don't know what to say more, apart that this article is not nice, and seems to attack directly the whole internet community that seems to "put in doubt" the honour etc..
pretty much nationalistic..

lupodimare89 написал:

Оригинальное сообщение #715359
It's possible that the Molotov had a number of false-sightings?

I don't think so - see the doc below.

I think we need the original combat reports of MAS commanders. Without this we can't answer on some vital questions, for example: Did MAS crew saw any German aircrafts above battlefield during the action? On what position against the cruiser was MAS-568 and MAS-573 when they did their "succes" salvoes? How many seconds passed between torpedo firing and torpedo hits? and e.t.c.
Could we state, that no German planes took part in action only based on some journal articles? I think, no. For example, I'm very good know the data difference between the German articles and books and German KTBs.

Here is the extract from Molotov war diary.



I wounder to see the same Italian document.

lupodimare89 написал:

Оригинальное сообщение #715359
And what about Kharkov during this night? Kharkov sighted and/or attacked the MAS as it has been reported by Legnani?

Kharkov was in close defence order of Molotov. She fired 59 shell against shore between 00.59 and 01.04 and from 01.07 shifted her fire agaist cutters. She got the order to lay on course 180 degree from 01.12 and from 01.14 got an order to raise her speed to 28 kn. At 01.24 she warned the cruiser about air attack. At 01.28 (after the hit) Kharkov got the order to guard the damaged ship. At 01.53 Kharkov got the order to began towing the cruiser, which couldn't manage her direction of movement by the engins and e.t.c.

lupodimare89 написал:

Оригинальное сообщение #715359
Finally, it remains the question mark about the supposed soviet aircrafts that fired against the retreating MAS.

Likewise no confirmaton about this in the soviet docs. Some planes bombed that night Ivan-Baba and Feodosia, but they didn't see any cutters on sea and haven't any attack on them. The soviet fighters from Caucasus base took off to made CAP above Molotov only at 04.53 and didn't see any cutters too.

Serg написал:

Оригинальное сообщение #715365
Nella notte tra il 2 e il 3 agosto 1942 al comando del sottotenente di vascello Legnani, attaccò una formazione navale sovietica composta da un incrociatore e da un cacciatorpediniere che avevano bombardato la base di Iwan Baba  nel golfo di Feodosia. Il MAS 568 lanciò due siluri contro l'unità maggiore Delle due armi, lanciate a breve distanza sotto l'intenso fuoco delle unità avversarie, probabilmente una sola colpì l'incrociatore Molotov (10 380 t) asportandogli l'estrema poppa con eliche e timone. L'unità sovietica, nonostante i gravi danni subiti, poté essere rimorchiata in porto, ma rientrò in servizio solo dopo due anni di lavori.

Уважаемый Serg, правилами форума рабочим установлен русский литературный язык. По необходимости в интересах установления истины приходится иногда прибегать к утвердившемуся в качестве языка международного общения английскому. Я лично не понимаю по итальянски и не вижу ни возможности, ни необходимости использовать его в моей персональной ветке.

I understan your reasons and I can wait patiently. The acsess to archives in Russia is very bureaucratic  too, but as you can see I solved some that problems

lupodimare89 написал:

Оригинальное сообщение #715587
This could increase the possibility of presence of German aircrafts actually.

I think so. The German aircrafts attacked Italian cutters at least one time (June 3rd, 1942, MAS with Gen Manstain), so, I think they could repeated this twice.

lupodimare89 написал:

Оригинальное сообщение #715587
if i'm right the two soviet ships had no aircraft escort.

There were no escorts before 05.00.

Мирослав Эдуардович!
Подскажите, пожалуйста - одерживали ли победы наши подводники торпедами 53-27 и 45-36?

maslopoop написал:

Оригинальное сообщение #715986
а про 16 число нельзя подробности? Заранее спасибо, с уважением..

Честно накопанные данные растекаются по интернету и становятся достоянием людей ни разу не бывших в архивах.
Давайте, Вы напишите свои вопросы мне в личку.

pavel123 написал:

Оригинальное сообщение #716040
Подскажите, пожалуйста - одерживали ли победы наши подводники торпедами 53-27 и 45-36?

Конечно, ведь одерживал же победы "Лембит" и "агешки".

han-solo написал:

Оригинальное сообщение #716045
Был ли на это приказ "сверху" или решение командующего флотом?Или всё дело в техническом состоянии кораблей и банальной нехватке эсминцев?А то версий и кривотолков более чем нужно.

Эти документы были уже миллион лет назад введены в научный оборот. В частности:

ДИРЕКТИВА СТАВКИ ВГК № 220074 НАРОДНОМУ КОМИССАРУ
ВОЕННО-МОРСКОГО ФЛОТА, КОМАНДУЮЩЕМУ ЧЕРНОМОРСКИМ
ФЛОТОМ О ЗАДАЧАХ ФЛОТА НА 1944 ГОД
Копии:   командующим войсками 3-го и 4-го Украинских фронтов и Отдельной   Приморской армией, представителю Ставки^
11 апреля 1944 г. 02 ч 15 мин
Ставка Верховного Главнокомандования Черноморскому флоту на 1944 г. ставит задачи:
1.  Систематически нарушать коммуникации противника в Черном море, а в ближайший период нарушение коммуникации с Крымом считать главной задачей. Для действия на коммуникациях использовать подводные лодки, бомбардировочную и минно-торпедную авиацию, а на ближних коммуникациях — бомбардировочно-штурмовую авиацию и торпедные катера.
2.  Быть готовым к высадке в тыл противника тактических десантов силой батальон-стрелковый полк.
3.  Охранять побережье и приморские фланги армий, содействовать фланговым частям армий при их продвижении огнем береговой и корабельной артиллерии мелких кораблей.
4.  Повседневно расширять и закреплять операционную зону флота в Черном море путем уничтожения минных полей, открытия и поддержания своих фарватеров и маневренных районов безопасными от мин.
5.  Обеспечивать свои коммуникации от воздействия противника, в частности, организовав надежную противолодочную оборону.
6.  Путем систематического траления в первую очередь создать возможность плавания по фарватерам с дальнейшим переходом к сплошному тралению загражденных минами районов.
7.  Крупные надводные корабли тщательно готовить к морским операциям, которые будут при изменении обстановки указаны Ставкой.
8.  Быть готовым к перебазированию флота в Севастополь и к организации обороны Крыма.
9.  Быть готовым к формированию и перебазированию Дунайской военной флотилии.
Ставка Верховного Главнокомандования
И. СТАЛИН А. АНТОНОВ
ЦАМО. Ф. 148а. Оп. 3763. Д. 165. Л. 16, 17. Подлинник.