BATTLE OF SUNDA STRAIT
28 Feb. -1 March, 1942
by Vincent P. O'Hara
TIME:  2215 February 28 - 0045 March 1
WEATHER/VISIBILITY/SEA STATE: Clear/night, full moon 6 or 7 miles/calm
SURPRISE: Allies
MISSION: Allies to escape to Ceylon then attack transports, Japanese to protect transports. 
The Battle of the Java Sea marked the collapse of Allied seapower in the Dutch East Indies.  After the two Dutch cruisers were torpedoed and sunk around midnight the American heavy cruiser Houston and the Australian light cruiser Perth, complying with Admiral Doorman's final order, broke off and fled east making for Tandjungpriok, the port of Batavia. The exhausted crews remained at battle (or action) stations all night, but contrary to expectations, the Java Sea was clear of enemy forces at dawn. Perth, followed by Houston (Captain Waller of the Australian cruiser being senior to Rooks, captain of Houston) made port about noon, but when they tied up at the main dock, the port authorities advised that only 1,000 tons of fuel oil remained and this was being reserved for Dutch ships.  After being told that few Dutch ships remained afloat, the authorities permitted Perth to take on 300 tons, bringing her to about 50% of capacity.
They determined that Houston had enough fuel to make Australia.  The two cruisers were also short on ammunition. Houston had about 50 rounds each for her six operative 8" guns while Perth had only 20 rounds for each of her 6" guns.  There was no replenishment available at Tankjungpriok for this critical need. 
 
At about 1400 Admiral Helfrich, the Dutch admiral in command of Allied naval forces, ordered the two cruisers to proceed to Tjilatjap on the south coast of Java along with the Dutch destroyer Evertsen. There the Admiral unrealistically hoped to gather the remnants of the ABDA fleet (less the Royal Navy contingent of the Western Strike Force which had been permitted to withdraw to Columbo the day before) and continue the battle. Aerial reconnaissance made as late as 1500 hours on the 28th indicated the western route via the Sunda Strait was clear and that the Japanese invasion fleet was still ten hours steaming time away. 

The Western Strike Force (light cruises Danae, Dragon, Hobart and destroyers Scout, Tenedos and Evertsen) had already navigated the Sunda Strait bound for Ceylon after an unsuccessful sweep of the waters north of Batavia on the night of February 27-28. Only Evertsen returned to Batavia after being separated from her British and Australian companions by a storm. 
The two cruisers cast off at 1900 on the evening of February 28. Evertsen apparently failed to receive orders instructing her to accompany the cruisers; accordingly she was forced to follow about an hour behind.   The cruisers cleared the channel and reached the open sea by 1930 and set course west for the straits and, hopefully, safety. 
This was a realistic expectation but for one thing: the intelligence regarding Japanese movements received by Waller and Rooks was faulty. The invasion fleet of 56 transports and a powerful escort that was supposed to arrive off the Straits at approximately 0100 hours on the 1st, several hours after the Allied exit, was actually about four hours ahead of this schedule.

Japanese scout planes observed the Allied cruisers throughout the day on the 28th so their presence close to the invasion beaches should have come as no surprise; yet, the Japanese dispositions seemed to discount the possibility of opposition.   The invasion fleet divided into three groups.  Ten transports escorted by light cruiser Yura and the 22nd DD DIV (Satsuki, Minatsuki, Fumitsuki and Nagatsuki) sailed for Ajner Lor west of Sunda Strait. The second group, light cruiser Sendai and the 20th DD DIV (Amagiri, Asagiri and Yugiri) split off and made for Semarang, well east of Batavia in central Java.  The main force arrived off St. Nicolaas Point, the extremity of Java marking  the entrance to Sunda Strait,  on the evening of the 28th.  Six transports deployed at Merak on the western side of the Point while 27 transports landed the main body of the 2nd Infantry Division at Bantam Bay east of St. Nicolaas Point.  Heavy cruisers Mikuma and Mogami,light cruiser Natori and destroyers Shiratsuyu, Shirakumo, Murakumo,  Shirayuki, Hatsuyuki, Asakaze and Shikinami deployed at various points north and west of the landing zones, up to a half hour's steaming time away.  Fubuki patrolled the eastern approaches while Harukaze and Hatakaze remained in the bay with the transports along with the 1st minesweeper DIV (W1, W2, W3 and W4).  Further north and beyond the battle zone the light carrier Ryujo, the seaplane carrier Chiyoda, the heavy cruisers Kumano and Suzuya and the destroyers Isonami, Shikinami and Uranami provided distant cover. 

At 2215 Fubuki was about 2,500 yards east of Babi Island (13 miles east and slightly north of St. Nicolaas Point) when she sighted strange ships rounding the island to the east.   She shaped a course that took her north of the island and then turned to follow these suspected intruders.   Conditions favored a battle.  The sea was calm, visibility good and the moon full.  As the Allied cruisers rounded Babi, Houston, the lead ship, spotted the lights of Point St. Nicolaas marking the path to safety, and then the dark shape of ships maneuvering dead ahead.  Forewarned of the possible presence of Dutch patrol boats, Rooks concluded they were moving too quickly to be friendly and sounded the general alarm. Shortly after at 2244, Perth detected Fubuki which had been following behind for almost a half hour and challenged her by blinker.  Fubuki replied with a series of green flashes that Perth correctly interpreted as unfriendly whereupon she opened fire.  Fubuki turned, made smoke and launched nine type 90 torpedoes from a range of 3,000 yards. The time was 2245.  The Allies realized they had unintentionally stumbled onto the main Japanese landing and opened fire on the ships in the bay. 

The rest of the Japanese forces were scattered, mostly to the north and west.  Once Fubuki fired her torpedo salvo and withdrew north, only Harukaze and Hatakaze were immediately available to shield the transports and their initial activities were passive in nature. Harukaze got under way at 2231 and covered the entrance to the bay with smoke.
   
Hatakaze plunged into this smoke heading north.   The Allied cruisers sidestepped Fubuki's torpedoes by making a tight full circle and resumed their course toward the light that marked the entrance to Sunda Strait and, hopefully, escape, shooting at targets they could only imperfectly see.  At  2252 Hatakaze began to return fire.  For the first fifteen minutes after the first torpedoes were launched, Houston and Perth were the superior force, but at 2300 this position dramatically changed.  Shiratsuyu arrived from the northwest and engaged  from a position roughly 3,000 to 4,000 yards due north of St.Nichaalos Point. Light cruiser Natori, with Hatsuyuki and Shirayuki opened fire from about 5,000 yards north of the point, charging southwest and rapidly closing range.  Asakaze had been cruising north of the point.  She joined Hatakaze and Harukaze in a column about 5,000 yards northeast of the point. The heavy cruisers Mikuma, and Mogami followed by Shikinami were still on their way, sailing south were about 10,000 yards north and just east of the point.   Finally Shirakumo and Murakumo were steaming hard from the west, but were still 7,000 yards west and north of the point.   Houston and Perth were about 5,000 yards directly east of the point and only a few thousand yards northeast of the transports. They turned south, southeast at 2300 under pressure from the increased tempo of Japanese fire and sailed parallel to the transports for about eight minutes inflicting some damage and remaining undamaged themselves. This condition was to rapidly change.

At 2308 the Allied cruisers turned northeast as they neared Penang Island.   The major portion of the Japanese light forces was heading southeast in three columns: Natori, Hatsuyuki and Shirayuki and finally Hatakaze, Asakaze and Harukaze.    Between 2310 and 2319 they laced the waters around the cruisers with  28 torpedoes.  The Allies replied with everything they had from 8" to .50 c machine guns and, in the case of Perth, even four torpedoes.   The nature of the battle from both perspectives was close and confused.   Gun flashes seemed to erupt from all quarters while the waters boiled with phosphorescent torpedo wakes. Houston suffered the first damage, a hit on her bridge that started a small fire.  Perth remained unscathed despite the constant illumination and heavy fire.  Finally, she took three light hits, but remained essentially undamaged. .  She returned fire with 6"guns under independent control and the 4" pumping out star shell, damaging Harukaze on her rudder and Shirayuki on her bridge. 

At 2319 the Japanese heavy cruisers finally entered the fray sailing west well off the bay.  They fired six torpedoes each at Perth from an estimated distance of about 9,300 yards and then reversed course as they  neared Babi Island.   At about the same time the Allied cruisers turned back toward the St Nicholaas Point.  They were both about out of main battery ammunition and, perhaps, held a final hope of forcing the straits to safety.   But this hope grew even fainter at 2322: geysers began to erupt around Houston as the Japanese heavy cruisers opened fire from about 12,000 yards, assisted by the searchlights of their destroyers.  Mikuma had to cease fire at 2325 due to a defect in her electric circuits, but was able to resume several minutes later.   At 2326 the battle entered its decisive phase.  Harukaze and Hatakaze fired five and six torpedoes respectively followed at 2330 by nine each from Shirakumo and Murakumo.   Harukaze was probably the agent of the first torpedo to hit Perth.  She was making 28 knots when it struck killing all but one of the forward engine crew. . By this time her main batteries were reduced to firing practice shells and her 4" guns star shells.  Two more torpedoes, probably from Shirakumo and Murakumo followed at 2335.  These hit the forward magazine and aft under X turret.  At this point Waller ordered abandon ship, but a fourth torpedo found her before she sank at 2342.  Waller went down with his ship. 351 other member of the complement of 686 were lost with their captain. Another 106 crew died as prisoners of war.

While Perth was engaged by the destroyers, Mogami fired six long lances at Houston at 2327.  This was one of the most effective torpedo salvos of the entire war.  They sped pass their intended target at 48 knots directly into Bantum Bay.  At 2335 five explosions erupted almost simultaneously.   The army transports Sakura Maru (7,149 tons gross), Horai Maru (9,162 tons) Tatsuno Maru (6,960 tons) and the special vessel Ryujo (Shinshu) Maru (8,160) tons all sank in shallow water, although the later two were subsequent raised.  Mogami also sank  minesweeper W2 (807 tons full load displacement) in this barrage, although her loss is also credited to action by Houston and a mine. 

Houston continued the fight alone.  Rooks gave up on the idea of escape and turned his ship back toward the transports.  At 2340 Houston suffered her first major damage, a hit in her engine room which massacred the entire crew.   Her first torpedo hit, again from the salvo fired by Shirakumo and Murakumo followed shortly after.  Nonetheless, she fought on. The action was so close and furious a Houston sailor actually shot out a Japanese searchlight with a rifle.  The Japanese appeared to have some trouble separating their target from their own ships. Houston benefited as Japanese ships illuminated each other and their own transports and she was able to damage three destroyers. Harukaze, Shirakumo and Shikinami.  But the end was inevitable.  At 2250 she was hit on her #2 turret, starting a fire; both magazine were flooded.  Finally three torpedo hits followed in quick succession.  At 2355 Rooks ordered abandon ship.   Five minutes later a bursting shell killed the Captain.  In all Houston took 4 to 6 torpedoes, three entire salvos, eleven individual hits and additional hits that may have been shells or torpedoes.   Every source mentions her flag was flying as she sank, perhaps quoting an account by a crewman: " . . .a sudden breeze picked up the Stars and Stripes still firmly two blocked on the mainmast, and waved them in one last defiant gesture.  Then with a tired shudder she vanished beneath the Java Sea."  Only 368 of her crew of 1,061 survived.

On the Japanese side Harukaze was hit by both Houston and Perth suffering 3 KIA and 15 WIA as well as minor damage to her bridge, engine room and rudder .  Houston hit Shirakumo.  Perth landed a 6" shell on Shirayuki's bridge, inflicting 1 KIA and 11 WIA,  Shikinami had minor damage to her prop due to a near miss that reduced her speed to 24 kts.  The Allied cruisers do not appear to have severely punished the transports, certainly not to the extent Mogami did, but it is hard to believe they didn't inflict some damage during their two relatively close range passes against the anchored transports.  The Allied survivors of the battle in particular champion the point of view that the Japanese grossly understated their damage and that as many as 15 ships were sunk.  The Ryujo Maru was the flag of the commander in chief of the 16th Army, General Imamura.  He was directing the landing of the second wave when the explosion from the torpedo hit threw him into the water.  He was three hours struggling ashore, but when his aide finally found him sitting on a pile of bamboo, face blacked with oil, he congratulated the general on his successful landing.   Regardless of whether four or fourteen transports were sunk, of the disruption and delay caused by Houston and Perth the aide's congratulations were essentially deserved.  Imamura accepted the surrender of Java just eight days after he swam ashore.  Any landing that result in such a swift and decisive result must be considered successful. 

In an aftermath to the battle the Dutch destroyer Evertsen, originally ordered to accompany Houston and Perth didn't clear Batavia until 2045. Well behind the Allied cruisers (and unsuccessful in her attempts to contact them) she saw the gun flashes from the battle and attempted to detour around it.  She made it into the strait, but, at 0130 Murakumo and Shirakumo, vigilance no doubt enhanced by the events of the previous few hours, caught the Dutch ship in their searchlights.   They opened fire and rapidly scored seven hits.  The Dutch captain didn't appear to fight very enthusiastically, beaching his command on Sebuku Besar. 
Evertsen had only been in commission since December, so her crew as not fully trained, for some reason had only two of her three boilers in operation and she certainly seemed - at best - an unlucky ship.

会敵 [編集]先行した2隻の連合軍巡洋艦隊は、途中のジャワ島バンタム湾バビ島付近に差し掛かったとき、前方に日本軍の輸送船団を発見した。付近に護衛艦艇を発見できなかったことから、両艦はこれを攻撃すべく突撃を開始した。しかし、既に両艦は3月1日0009（0時9分、以下時間は数字表記のみ）、バビ島東方で哨戒を行っていた駆逐艦「吹雪」に発見されていた[4]。「吹雪」は後方8,000mを追尾し始め、敵艦の行動を逐一護衛司令部に報告していた[4]。一方、セントニコラス岬沖合いで哨戒中だった原司令官座乗の軽巡「名取」、駆逐艦「初雪」「白雪」も0018、東方2万mに敵艦を発見する。更に0029、パンジャン島沖合いを哨戒中の駆逐艦「春風」も距離8,000mで敵艦を発見、通報する。しかしこの時点においても連合軍の2艦は未だに日本軍の護衛部隊を発見しておらず、突撃を続けていた[4]。

原司令官は一刻の猶予も無いとして第三護衛隊全艦に対して集結命令を出した上で、北方沖合を哨戒中だった西部支援隊の第7戦隊第二小隊の重巡「三隈」「最上」、駆逐艦「敷波」に対しても直ちに集合するよう命じた上で、「名取」と第11駆逐隊には「魚雷戦用意」を下令した。原司令官は迎撃準備を整える一方、敵が味方重巡の出現により形勢不利と考えて遁走することも警戒していた。従って戦闘は「名取」と駆逐隊で広い海面に誘い出し、味方船団からも引き離した上で一挙に戦力を集中して撃滅する、という方針を立てた。

しかし、そうこうしているうちに「ヒューストン」と「パース」はぐんぐん船団に近づいていき、0037まず「パース」が照明弾を発射する。これに続いて「ヒューストン」が轟然と輸送船に対して主砲で砲撃を始めたが、距離がまだ遠かったため命中はしなかった。一方、連合軍はようやく後方に艦がいることに気づいた。「パース」が発光信号で誰何を行った直後の

0044、後方を追尾していた駆逐艦「吹雪」が距離2,500mで「ヒューストン」に対して魚雷9本を発射し、更に12.7センチ主砲で砲撃を開始した[4]。これに対して連合軍両艦は面舵で急旋回を行い魚雷を回避しつつ急斉射で反撃したが、「吹雪」は煙幕を展張して避退した。また連合軍の船団への砲撃開始を見た駆逐艦「春風」が敵艦と船団の間に割って入り、煙幕を展張した。この煙幕は当時まだレーダーを装備していなかった連合軍艦船に対して極めて有効に働き、これによって連合軍の両艦は船団砲撃が出来なくなった。

原司令官も敵艦の味方船団への砲撃開始を確認した直後の0045、これを救援すべく麾下の第5駆逐隊と第11駆逐隊に対して「駆逐隊突撃せよ」と下令した。しかし船団傍にいた第5駆逐隊の「旗風」は敵艦との距離が3,500mまで近接しており、直ちに砲撃を開始したが12センチ砲4門では巡洋艦2隻の相手にはならず、逆に猛烈な反撃を受け離脱、一旦集結地点へ向かい北上した。「旗風」は0102、セントニコラス沖北方約10kmの海上で「春風」「朝風」と合流すると直ちに敵艦へ向かって南下、突撃を開始した。

原司令官の「突撃せよ」の命令に伴い、各駆逐隊は各々敵艦に向けて突撃を仕掛けた。0110、まず第11駆逐隊の「初雪」「白雪」が距離3,500mまで接近すると魚雷を各艦9本、計18本を発射し北方に離脱した。次に集結して戦場に戻ってきた第5駆逐隊の駆逐艦3隻が魚雷を発射しようとしたが、これは敵艦の猛烈な砲火により「旗風」「春風」が発射時期を逸して「朝風」のみが6本の魚雷を発射、離脱する。軽巡「名取」も砲撃しつつ頃合を見て魚雷4本を発射し北方へ離脱。しかしこれらは尽くかわされてしまった。「名取」と第11駆逐隊は北方へ離脱しつつ魚雷の次発装填を急ぎ、また第一撃で射点を逸して魚雷を発射できなかった「旗風」「春風」は再度の襲撃運動に入っていた。

0119、駆逐隊の攻撃の邪魔にならぬよう攻撃を控えていた第7戦隊の重巡「三隈」「最上」が攻撃に参加する。まず、距離11,200mから両艦はそれぞれ6本ずつの魚雷を発射する。更に距離11,000mで照射砲撃を開始。これらの攻撃は尽く連合軍艦隊2番艦の米重巡「ヒューストン」に集中された。「ヒューストン」は次々と命中弾を受け次第に速力が低下し始めた。しかしここで「三隈」の主接断器に故障が生じ探照灯等の電気系統が麻痺し主砲射撃が出来なくなった。「三隈」は已む無く砲撃を中止するが続航する「最上」は砲撃を続けた。

0124、「春風」が魚雷6本を「パース」に向け発射する。これが「パース」を捉え更に「旗風」も魚雷6本を発射。これも「パース」に命中する。「パース」はこれにより航行不能となった。

0127、「最上」は「ヒューストン」へ向け魚雷6本を発射する。この魚雷は後に問題となった。

決着 [編集]0130、電路修理の終わった「三隈」が戦列に復帰する。「三隈」は距離9,000mで「ヒューストン」に砲撃を開始、命中弾多数を確認後「パース」に目標を変更する。更に第12駆逐隊の駆逐艦「白雲」「叢雲」が航行不能の「パース」に向け各9本の魚雷を発射する。これが「パース」にとって止めとなった。0142、被雷した「パース」は急速に沈没していった[5]。682名の乗組員のうち、ウォーラー艦長を含む353名が戦死、100名が捕虜生活中に死亡、229人が帰国した[6]。

残った「ヒューストン」は15ktで走っていたが、機関室への命中弾で機関科兵員が全滅[5]、次々と命中する敵弾により既に主砲は沈黙し、僅かに数門の高角砲が火を吐くだけになっていた。日本軍はこの艦に対し手を緩めず攻撃を続ける。「ヒューストン」はこの時点で既に被雷4本以上、被弾50発以上の損害を受け浮いているのが不思議な状態であった。0156、「ヒューストン」の主砲が沈黙したことを確認した第七戦隊は砲撃を中止、戦隊の護衛についていた駆逐艦「敷波」を分離して「ヒューストン」に止めをさすことにした。命令を受けた「敷波」は直ちに戦隊から分離、突撃に移ると0159、「ヒューストン」へ向け九〇式魚雷を1本発射する。「敷波」は更に「ヒューストン」に銃砲撃を加えた。「ヒューストン」では既に艦長A・H・ルックス大佐が戦死しており副長が指揮を代行していたが「敷波」の魚雷命中を受けて総員退去命令が下された[6]。そして0206、「ヒューストン」は転覆、艦尾から沈んでいった。「ヒューストン」乗組員は1008名中、368名が日本軍に救助されたがそのうち76名は収容所内で死亡、266名が戦後帰国した