iTow написал:

Оригинальное сообщение #760891
Да ну? Знакомый прием, но не новый.

Да ну? Не более новый, чем вести диалог с оппонентом в стиле «сам драк», у Вас это очень хорошо получается.

iTow написал:

Оригинальное сообщение #760891
Думаю, если вместо попытки уязвить меня Вы сами попробуете ответить на вопрос, что там было и к чему привело, всякие дальнейшие вопросы у Вас отпадут. Во всяком случае, надеюсь.

Думаю, если вместо попытки уязвить меня Вы сами попробуете ответить на вопрос, что  же там, по Вашему мнению было и к чему привело. Я на вопрос о казачьих пикетах по побережью ответил, а Вы отделываетесь пустыми фразами. Может Вы просто ни чего по этому поводу не знаете?

iTow написал:

Оригинальное сообщение #760891
Не только попытался, но даже и разбирался, правда, применительно к более позднему периоду, писал на эту тему. Вы, надо полагать, не читали. И в том, что представляет из себя высадка такого рода явно не разбираетесь, увы.

Вы полагаете, что все обязаны Вас читать? Видимо Вы слишком увлеклись разбором высадок «более позднего периода» и о том, что же представляет из себя высадка более раннего периода представления не имеете, увы.

iTow написал:

Оригинальное сообщение #760891
Вы представляете себе дальность стрельбы этой артиллерии и ее возможности в месте высадки? Судя по тону Вашего поста - нет.

Судя по тону Вашего поста Вы видимо большой специалист в этой области. Но как обычно ни каких доводов в свою пользу, только абсолютно пустые фразы.

iTow написал:

Оригинальное сообщение #760891
Интересно было бы узнать, что Вы понимаете под термином кавалерия?

Интересно было бы узнать, что ещё можно понимать под термином кавалерия, кроме кавалерии?

iTow написал:

Оригинальное сообщение #760911
Что касается Вашего хамства в мой адрес, то хочу надеяться, что когда Вы подрастете, юноша, то поумнеете.

Вы забавный персонаж уважаемый iTow, я ответил Вам практически Вашими же фразами, а Вы почему-то называете это хамством. Может Вам стоит пересмотреть свой стиль общения?

Ну и напоследок, хамить Вам или оскорблять, я не собирался.  Просто продемонстрировал Вашу манеру вести диспут .Если так получилось, то это ненамеренно и приношу свои извинения.

Отредактированно Chief (11.11.2013 03:24:31)

mister X написал:

Оригинальное сообщение #760899
Было бы интересно.

Из 2-томника Arnold Munthe. Flottan och ryska kriget, 1788-1790 (1914-15).
Концовка изложения Гогландского сражения с потерями шведов.
After the battle, the Swedish fleet was in a better condition than the Russian fleet. This is clear both by that it was under sail almost a full day after the battle, and that reports from the commanders of ships and thereafter by inspection. Also, a note from the head of the army-fleet’s Finnish squadron, Colonel Mikael Anckarsvärd, which can not be blamed to have had sympathy for the war fleet or its command. The ships, he wrote, had taken several shots at the waterline and had much cordage broken, but no mast, yard or spar was shot down.
Nine ships of the line, that is nearly ⅔ of the number of the proper battleships, were examined as to the rigging and spars and the damage was insignificant; the other 6 had more wear and tear. On the flagship, there was heavy spar damage, the foresail yard and the mainmast yard were so damaged that they must be repaired on land. On the ship Hedvig Elisabeth Charlotta, as the leader, had endured a severe fire, were certainly the formast, mainmast, and the bowsprit were hit by balls, the main yard and the cross mast, plus a couple of spare spars were damaged, but not bad enough that the vessel could not be operated. Vasa was far less damaged than one would have expected. Rättvisan were the recipient of 44 shots in the hull, but only one shot at the waterline; its foreyard was found to be useless, the fore- and mainmasts were slightly injured, besides the stock of the rudder was shot through and broken. On the Äran all the masts had the marks of balls on them. On the Ömheten, the foremast was shot through 1/3 of the way from the top. On the Dygden, which had the largest number of dead and wounded (1/6 of its entire crew) had taken 84 balls in the ship’s side, with 22 below the waterline; all the masts and bowsprit had been hit by balls, spare spars, boats, cabin, and the foc’sle were injured, 4 guns dismounted by the enemy. Of the 5 frigates in line had all but Thetis had one or more spars damaged; Camilla had 44 shots in the hull, with 14 below the waterline. Of all the ships in the line, the rigging, in particular the running rigging was more or less damaged; gun ports and gun carriages were in tatters. Several shot were left in the ships side.
The Swedish fleet lost even fewer people than the Russians: 127 seamen killed and 290 wounded, plus the 59 marines who fell in battle or died of their wounds in the next few days after the battle1. Of the officers were 2 vessels commanders and a second-in-command were mortally wounded, 9 officers had been more or less badly injured. Added activities 148 men were killed or wounded in Prince Gustaf and 445 men captured, the final total was 1081 men, therefore, slightly more than half the loss on the Russian fleet.
After Duke Karl uppgifves had gotten wounded in the leg. What is hereby took has not been able to examine. In any event, the Duke thought nothing of his wound until that evening when he took off the sock, and then after a couple of days he was quite recovered.

1: Precise data on the number of wounded marines is not known.
Though both parties claimed the victory, the battle in tactical terms must be regarded as unsettled. The Swedish side is felt to have won the battle because the Russian fleet, the following day had an east wind, and thus the windward position, but did not made any pursuit. The reason for doing so was not only the weak breeze, but as advanced previously, that half of the Russian fleet could not make the pursuit instead.
The battle consisted exclusively of a cannon exchange. In the Swedish line, that the frigates could stay so long as they did against the large Russian ships of the line with almost twice as many guns is explained, that the Swedish fleet sailed in better order and that during the whole time there was an extremely fierce fire, which some consisted of 'double sharp’ ie two round balls. Seperate Swedish ships loosed 50 rounds per gun, ie around 3000 shots; the flagship managed 2300 shots, the Prins Gustav close to 3400 shots.  In his famous advance report, Greigh wrote: ‘I have never seen a hotter fire maintained from both sides. If a calm had not arisen then all of our ship captains had just carried out their responsibilities, the battle would have been much more workable.’
    On both sides, the crews behaved very well, they were fired with courage and enthusiasm. The Swedish navy did not have a single officer in fire and command that had participated in a large sea battle since the beginning of the 1780s. Of the Russian fleet, tribute must be given to the good attitude of the unpracticed young recruits. Moreover, many of the foreigners gave excellent service to the fleet and contributed an exceptionally good example, the fact that the vessels lay quite calm during the prevailing weak winds, whereby the sea life which was unfamiliar to the Russian crews were not inconvenienced by sea sickness. Greigh was not satisfied by all of his ship’s captains, one of them he releaved the day after the battle, and two others after their return to port. All three were prosecuted and punished.
    We have mentioned that the Russian vessels had a significantly greater crew than the Swedish ships; on every one of the eight 74-gun ships there were more than twice as many people on each one of these than on the Swedish frigates. None from the Russian side forsook the deck, nor any from the Swedish ships. This can hardly be explained in any other way than that the fire from the Swedish ships was so strong and that the Russians were at their appropriate positions. For Greigh and several of his ship captains were experienced from the war with Turkey.
    Admiral Greigh deserves the merit for the Russian fleet’s management. His determination to attack immediately with his less-practiced crews deserves recognition, however, we must remember that his fleet had the benefit of the wind. With his flagship, he had taken various places in the line and himself intervened wherever he believed his presence was needed. He had not lost the leadership of the battle. Next to Greigh, Rear-Admiral Kosljaninoff excelled himself.
On the Swedish fleet, the grand-admiral took no active part in the battle, but let the flag captain advise. Duke Karl, along with old Admiral Wrangel, had taken a place in the ship’s cabin and therefore, was away from the battle, smoking his pipe. One cannon ball killed a person in his vicinity, and another passed closely over the plumes on his hat.
      The Duke is said to have shown much sang-froid during the battle. Other versions exist however.2
2: During the battle, Duke Karl was not in a good temper. When the ship Vasa was covering the flagship, he was impatient and asked Nordenskjöld several times if soon should he not take over. Mathias Sundvall (the Duke’s private secretary during the 1789-90 campaign) states in a letter to K. R. Nordenskjöld July 4, 1843, he heard this from a credible person.
Sinclair says, the grand admiral was very much worried by the pure hellishness of the fire’s ferocity and duration, he took refuge in master pilot’s skill by means of irresistible persuation and was delivered by  being out of the line and it was too dangerous for the splendid ship to be object of the fire. The
- - - Duchess diary II, pp. 273.

commander of the ship, Major Erik Klint, came close to being hit by a ball. The ball killed the officer standing just behind him, and a wooden plinth took the telescope right out of his hand.
Then Klint showed his calm courage. His idea was that what would he do with a telescope, but that it was not his business.
It was Nordenskjöld that led the Swedish fleet. His well-adapted tact from the enemy within cannon range deserves all recognition, as well as his calm and firm behavior during the battle. But, as a result of the weakness of the wind, Nordenskjöld could not make his presence felt, which as leader of the fleet’s movements was his task. Had the breeze merely varied moderately, that the Swedish fleet would have won a tactical victory. Several of our ship’s commanders had good training and our ships easily maneuvered coming on now not in any way to his right. It only had to wait for an improved wind and in the meantime draw the enemy further westward. This Nordenskjöld had proposed to Duke Karl, and he had also of late stressed the same view to the King. But, the King’s orders were relentless. The Duke should immediately seek out and defeat the Russian fleet, it should be then off Kronstadt. Gustaf III, through his peremptory orders, tied the hands of the naval chief commander - a venture, that is always revenged. For his part, Duke Karl has not had enough insight into the nature of the see to himself fully understand, even less to clarify for the king, the naval command, not the monarch, should choose the moment for the battle.
The outcome of the Swedish fleet's first clash with the Russian fleet was not what it should have been, is was to some extent the King’s fault. Gustaf III's unfamiliarity with naval warfare and Duke Karl’s irresolution would come close to drawing this magnificent fleet into disaster.
It makes a disappointing impression, when we now know, that there was a lack of ammunition, especially 36-pound balls, which prevented the Swedish navy from taking up the war.1 In his notes did  Nordenskjöld often return to this fact, and he apparently was convinced that if he was provided with that ammunition, not missing the second day of battle would have won him a victory. This is likely, because half of the Russian fleet was unable to maneuver. The shortcomings of the Swedish naval infrastructure hampered the entire war.
Another negligence, which appeared during the day, was the poor intelligence service. The divisions and individual vessels (a few excepted), after which time another detatchment from the Swedish navy was sent to obtain information about the Russian fleet, which was not much help to the fleet commanders, it looks as if the detatchment commanders generally carried out their important mission with little understanding. Moreover, a lack of local knowledge and, above all, lack of smaller vessels suitable for reconnaissance contributed which later Nordenskjöld often is justified. It seemed that Admiral Greigh had been far better informed of our fleet than we of his.

1: Some ships, with older guns, had ammunition left, but for several of them stores were missing. Any vessel which had spent his shot, took care to keep company during the last stage of the battle.


During the actual battle, however, it was deemed that the Swedish ship commanders, in general, had done their best; it remains to be seen, if the ships closest to Wachtmeister were able to rescue him. He fought the battle to the end. It also seems that it was Wachtmeister who first conquered the ship Svyataya Elena which was forced out of the line, where it fell off and drifted downwind towards the Swedish line.


    Humble suggestions over dead and wounded in the battle of Hogland.
(Sjöexpeditioner. fleet admiral of the Royal. May:1788-90.)

Ships name         Dead    Wounded     Remarks

Hedvig Elisabeth Charlotta    13        28        Extra Fendrick: Wentzell leg wound.               
                   
Gripen              4        21        Capt: v. Horn wounded,
                                died of his wounds  d. 20/7.
Ömheten            10        13
Rättvisan            11        18
Camilla              8          9
Fröya              4        12        Lieutenant Lilljehorn of the Callmare                                 Regiment: a leg wound.
Dygden            14        79
Vasa            13        12        Lt. Colonel Count Baltzar Horn wounded;
                                died of his wounds d. 19/7.
                                Captain Fust wounded;
                                died of his wounds d. 18/7.
                                Ensign Améen wounded.
Gustaf III            11        18        His Royal Highness Grand-Admiral
                                wounded.
                                Lieutenant Sjöstierna Legert wounded.   
Fäderneslandet          1        16   
Enigheten              9          9
Äran              6        10
Minerva              6        15        Captain Fock of the Sprengtport
                                Regiment wounded.
Försigtigheten          6        12        Ensign Baron Kurck and
                                Ensign Gramén wounded.
Thetis              1          2
Prins Carl              0          6
Sophia Magdalena          5          7
Prins Fredrich Adolph          1          1
Gustaf Adolph          4          2        Ensign Baron Fleetwood wounded.       
              Total    127        290
All small wounds of the crews are not included on this proposal.

Gustav III anchored at Hellsingfors Road d. 19 July 1788.

                    CARL.
O. H. Nordenskjöld.

mister X написал:

Оригинальное сообщение #760903
Из Кронштадта пришли: Ростислав, Дерись, Память Евстафия, Виктор и Иоанн Богослов.

Похоже вину за потерю Владислава можно возложить на Грейга - это он поставил корабли кронштадтской эскадры (с наименее обученными экипажами) в авангард вместо того, что равномерно распределить их по эскадрам.

mister X написал:

Оригинальное сообщение #760946
Считал по Любеку. Хотя при внимательном рассмотрении выяснил, что Любек и Бакстрем приводят по некоторым кораблям разные данные.

Из новых 62-пушечников:
По Svenska flootans historia, II (1942) Aran, Dristigheten, Manligheten и Tapperheten имели (в 1788 г.) длинные 26-24 и 28-18, остальгные 6 ЛК - короткие (по 26-36, 28-24); все - по 8-6ф длинных наверху.
Backstrom (1884) приводит вооружение 7 новых ЛК, уцелевших после Выборга в 1790 г.:
только Faderneslasndet имел короткие 36 и 24; Dygden, Aran, Forsigtigheten - длинные 24ф и 18ф; Dristigheten, Manligheten, Tapperheten -  36ф короткие и 18ф длинные.
Шведский историк Ян Глете объяснил это тем, чо в ходе войны короткие пушки стали снимать и заменять на длинные 24 и 18ф (на ЛК), короткие же устанавливали на береговых батареях.
Есть вооружение 6 уцелевших шведских ЛК в 1808 г. (после "большой тимберовки", фактически - перестройки) - два имели короткие 35 и 24ф (нового образца, более тяжелые), другие 4 - 24 и 18ф длинные.

Олег написал:

Оригинальное сообщение #760947
это он поставил корабли кронштадтской эскадры

Грейг поставил ненадежнгые ЛК М. Фондезина в авангард "для лучшего за ними наблюдения", а надежного Козлянинова - в арьергард, но после поворота они поменялись местами.

Олег написал:

Оригинальное сообщение #760979
И в итоге из под конец боя из авангарда близко к шведскому флоту оказались "Владислав" и "Ярослав", остальные корабли на ветре. Распределил бы "кронштадсткие" корабли по всем частям эскадры - близко к шведам были бы 4-5 ЛК, а не 2.

Владислав из кордебаталии
Авангард Фондезин
Дерись, Память Евстафия, Кир Иоанн, Ярослав, Виктор.
Кордебаталия Грейг
Ростислав, Владислав, Мстислав, Святой Петр, Святая Елена, Изяслав, Родислав.
Арьергард Козлянинов
Мечеслав, Вышеслав, Иоанн Богослов, Всеслав, Болеслав.

Эд написал:

Оригинальное сообщение #760975
По Svenska flootans historia, II (1942) Aran, Dristigheten, Manligheten и Tapperheten имели (в 1788 г.) длинные 26-24 и 28-18, остальгные 6 ЛК - короткие (по 26-36, 28-24); все - по 8-6ф длинных наверху.
Backstrom (1884) приводит вооружение 7 новых ЛК, уцелевших после Выборга в 1790 г.:
только Faderneslasndet имел короткие 36 и 24; Dygden, Aran, Forsigtigheten - длинные 24ф и 18ф; Dristigheten, Manligheten, Tapperheten -  36ф короткие и 18ф длинные.
Шведский историк Ян Глете объяснил это тем, чо в ходе войны короткие пушки стали снимать и заменять на длинные 24 и 18ф (на ЛК), короткие же устанавливали на береговых батареях.

Спасибо. Что-то подобное предполагал. По шведски читаю медленно

Олег написал:

Оригинальное сообщение #760947
Похоже вину за потерю Владислава можно возложить на Грейга - это он поставил корабли кронштадтской эскадры (с наименее обученными экипажами) в авангард вместо того, что равномерно распределить их по эскадрам.

Есть еще такой момент - равномерно распределить 5 ЛК среди 12 - значит ставить их практически через один. Но это ведь значит нарушить даже ту сплаванность, что уже была достигнута.
Могло ли это помочь потенциально ненадежным командирам "держать себя в руках" - не известно, но вред точно бы нанесло.

А.Иванов написал:

Оригинальное сообщение #760830
против жертвенности англичанином англичанами

Грейг вообще-то шотландец...

А.Иванов написал:

Оригинальное сообщение #760830
наемнику

он принял присягу на подданство

Georg G-L написал:

Оригинальное сообщение #761074
он принял присягу на подданство

А принял ли? Его сын принял русское подданство уже в адмиральских чинах.

Эд написал:

Оригинальное сообщение #761432
Чичагов в такой ситуации скоре всего сказался бы больным и вообще в море бы не вышел.

Однако при Эланде он сражением руководил. Как раз в том стиле, который считает желательным ув. А. Иванов.
Вопрос был в другом - как бы повел себя Чичагов в бою, будучи командиром авангарда у Грейга?

Олег написал:

Оригинальное сообщение #761439
Вопрос был в другом

Это невозможно, Чичагов был старше Грейга, он стал адмиралом в 1782 г., а Грейг - в 1786.

Олег написал:

Оригинальное сообщение #761422
Насколько близко к Петербургу подходят шхеры?

От Биорке (последнего шхерного пролива) до Южного Кронштадтского фарватера 41 миля, до Северного - 45 миль. От Биорке до Петербурга - 59 миль. При этом весь путь проходит в открытом море, вдоль отмелых берегов, без шхер и бухт, способных дать мало-мальское укрытие. Т.е. на этом участке, при ожидаемом противодействии,  прикрытие армейского флота корабельным обязательно, ведь даже несколько фрегатов в этих условиях способны устроить ему форменное побоище.