Попытка систематизировать англоязычные документы с сайта Japan Center for Asian Historical Records(JACAR) National Archives of Japan, папка B07090718000, озаглавленная "Miscellaneous matters on Russian naval fleet escaped into ports of neutral countries during Japan-Russia War / Zhifu".

Часть первая (reference code B07090718400).
Часть вторая (reference code B07090718500).
Часть третья (reference code B07090718600).

- машинописный текст телеграммы, отправленной послом в Лондоне Hayashi 22-го августа 1904 года в 5:55 вечера министру иностранных дел Komura, получена 23-го августа н. ст. в 11:10 утра (стр. 3).
- машинописный текст ответа министра иностранных дел Японии на протест России (стр. 9).
- машинописный текст телеграммы, отправленной консулом в Чифу Midzuno 24-го августа 1904 года в 1:55 ночи министру иностранных дел Komura, получена 24-го августа н. ст. в 5:25 утра (стр. 10).
- машинописный текст телеграммы, отправленной послом в Берлине Inouye 23-го августа 1904 года в 7:30 вечера министру иностранных дел Komura, получена 24-го августа н. ст. в 12:10 дня (стр. 10).
- машинописный текст телеграммы, отправленной послом в Лондоне Hayashi 23-го августа 1904 года в 8:10 вечера министру иностранных дел Komura, получена 24-го августа н. ст. в 5 часов вечера (стр. 12-13).
- машинописный текст телеграммы, отправленной министром иностранных дел Комура 24-го августа 1904 года в 4:55 вечера послам в Лондоне Hayashi, Пекине Uchida и Сеуле Hayashi (стр. 31-32).
- рукописный текст телеграммы, отправленной министром иностранных дел Komura 24-го августа 1904 года в 3:05 дня послу в Лондоне Hayashi (стр. 33).
- машинописный текст телеграммы, отправленной послом в Риме Ohyama 24-го августа 1904 года в 7:50 вечера министру иностранных дел Komura, получена 25-го августа н. ст в 11:35 утра (стр. 34).
- машинописный текст телеграммы с рукописной правкой, отправленной 26-го августа 1904 года в 4 часа вечера министром иностранных дел Komura послу в Вашингтоне Takahira (стр. 36).
- машинописный текст телеграммы, отправленной 26-го августа 1904 года послом в Вашингтоне Takahira министру иностранных дел Komura, получена 27-го августа н. ст. в 11:35 утра (стр. 37).
- рукописный текст телеграммы, отправленной 27-го августа 1904 года в 1:40 дня послу в Вашингтоне Takahira (стр. 38).
- машинописный текст телеграммы, отправленной послом в Вашингтоне Takahira министру иностранных дел Komura, получена 28-го августа н.ст в 4:10 утра (стр. 39).
- машинописный текст телеграммы, отправленной послом в Пекине Uchida 30-го августа 1904 года в 4:48 дня министру иностранных дел Komura, получена в тот же день в 10:50 вечера (стр. 53).

Отредактированно vs18 (18.05.2009 21:55:29)

His Imperial Japanese Majesty's Minister for Foreign Affairs has the honour to announce to the Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of France that having in view the existence of a state of war between Japan and Russia, the Imperial Government naturally find it impossible to give any consideration to the protest of the Government of Russia which His Excellency M. Harmand handed to Baron Komura on the 20th August. But in order to remove false impression which complete silence on the part of the Imperial Government might ocasion, Baron Komura begs to acquaint His Excellency M. Harmand that the statement of facts upon which the protest in question was based, is wholly inaccurate and that the action of Japan in the matter is entirely correct.

Department of Foreign Affairs.
Tokio, August 29, 1904.

Dated, Berlin, Augt. 23 1904. 7.30 p.m.
Received, Aug. 24 1904. 0.10 p.m.

Komura,
    Tokio.

No. 348. Concerning recent incident at Chefoo, Norddeutchen Allgemeine states that another document has been added to the diplomatic papers in regard to seizure of the Russian torpedo destroyer by Japanese, inasmuch as Japan has communicated to the Powers her views and procedure(?) of the case. Statement which has been hitherto put forth do not exclude possibility of the affairs being diplomatically settled without any serious consequences. With the exception of the above no other German papers have made so far any comment on our statement. As reported by Reuter's telegram, incident has now ceased to be talked in newspapers.

Inouye.

Sent, Aug. 24th 1904. 4.55 p.m.

Hayashi,
    London. No. 406 (Gokoshi)

Uchida,
    Peking. No. 491

Hayashi,
    Seoul. No. 350

[]
Without prejudice to the rights of the case, His majesty's Government advise the Imperial Government to restore the Russian destroyer to the Chinese Government. Although the action of the Imperial Government may have been justified, it is so clearly to their advantage not to expose themselves to misrepresentation, and not to let other Powers find therein an excuse for not continuing the observance of strict neutrality.
[]
The Imperial Government fully appreciate the friendly sentiments which led His Britannic Majesty's Government to advise them to restore the Russian destroyer to the Chinese Government and they beg His Britannic Majesty's Government to believe that if the question of technical right were the only one involved in the situation, they would find but little difficulty in subordinating that question to the consideration of good policy which His Britannic Majesty's Government have pointed out. But there has been present throughout the entire transaction the higher demands of military neccessity. So long as those demands, which involve the question of self-protection, continue, the Imperial Government regret that they can not with safety to their military position modify their attitude.
[]
    Komura

Dated, Rome, Augt. 24th 1904. 7.50 p.m.
Received, Aug. 25 1904. 11.35 a.m.

Komura,
    Tokio.

No. 49. Italian Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs told me his personal opinion Augt. 24th concerning the matter of Resitelinui that the Japanese defence is very solid. He also said that Italian Consul at Shanghai send telegram about the neutrality question there. To that the Italian Government sent telegraphic instructions that they cannot admit the proposal of Shanghai Taotai declining his own responsibility, for so far as China holds sovereignty, she is unable to avoid responsibility incumbent therein and also that in case of emergency to take at once proper self protection.

    Ohyama.

Dated, Washington, Aug. 26th, 1904.
Received, Aug. 27th, 1904. 11.35 a.m.

Komura,
    Tokyo.

200. In reference to your telegram 213, May I understand expression "modify their attitude" to imply even such action as the restoration of Russian destroyer to China.

    Takahira.

Dated, Washington, -
Received August 10 [28 ?] 4 10 a.m.

No. 201. August 27th.
    In reference to your telegram 313, I communicated your message this morning to Second Assistant Secretary of State in the absence of Secretary of State. He took note of substance of my verbal communication with my consent? and handed me a copy of the same.

    Takahira.

Попытка систематизировать англоязычные документы с сайта Japan Center for Asian Historical Records(JACAR) National Archives of Japan, папка B07090718000, озаглавленная "Miscellaneous matters on Russian naval fleet escaped into ports of neutral countries during Japan-Russia War / Zhifu".

Часть первая (reference code B07090718400).
Часть вторая (reference code B07090718500).
Часть третья (reference code B07090718600).
Часть четвертая (reference code B07090718700).

- Меморандум интервью посла в С.А.С.Ш. Takahira (с. 48).
- машинописная копия статьи из газеты "De Avandpost" за 18-е августа 1904 г. (с. 50-56) и ее рукописный вариант (с. 57-61).
- машинописная копия статьи из газеты "De Avandpost" за 30-е августа 1904 г. (с. 64-68) и ее рукописный вариант (с. 69-72).
- машинописный текст телеграммы, отправленной консулом в Чифу Midzuno 1-го ноября 1904 года в 4:48 вечера министру иностранных дел Komura, получена в 7:50 вечера того же дня (с. 76).
- машинописная копия письма(?) Шанхайского таможенного комиссара H. E. Hobson'а генеральному консулу в Шанхае Odagiri (c. 85).
- машинописный текст телеграммы, отправленной консулом в Чифу Midzuno 16-го ноября 1904 года в 12:50 дня министру иностранных дел Komura, получена в 2:35 пополудни того же дня (с. 90).
- машинописный текст телеграммы, отправленной консулом в Чифу Midzuno 16-го ноября 1904 года в 2:20 дня министру иностранных дел Komura, получена в 4:40 вечера того же дня (с. 93).

Отредактированно vs18 (09.07.2009 15:19:12)

(From "De Avandpost" of August 18th 1904)

The Reshitelini Incident.

    For the purpose of judging what occured at  Chefoo,  we are at present furnished only with a Chinese report of Captain Tsing, Commander of the Chinese cruiser Saiyung which was stationed in the port, a Russian report of Lieutenant Rostjokowski, Commander of the Russian torpedo-destroyer and a Japanese official telegram from Tokyo.
    With these  three documents we can gather with a sufficient certainty how the event occured in order to arrive at the conclusion and consideration of it. Apart  from the squadron which attempted on the 10th August to face the Japanese naval force, the Russian torpedo-destroyer Reshitelini made an effort to go to the Chinese port Chefoo, in order to transmit very important telegrams. Observed and pursued by Japanese torpedo-destroyers  Asashlwo and Kasumi, she steamed weswards at full speed and escaped thanks to darkness. On the 11th she entered Chefoo,  here she could only stay for 24 hours in; order to provide with necessary things for her crew, according  to the usage of war, but as her object was  attained, namely to reach a neutral port with the telegrams, the Commander communicated to the Chinese authority that he had no  intention to leave the port, as he was quite certain that his ship will fall into the Japanese harbour, under instructions from Admiral Gregoro Port-Commander of Port Arthur, he did not make objection to disarm his ship by the Chinese navy and he stuck her Russian naval ensign. On the morning, of the 11th Japanese destroyers discovered that a Russian ship had escaped into Chefoo and they took their place outside the Chinese territorial waters; but as Reshitelini did not come out before darkness set in, the Japanese ships entered and anchored near the Russian.
    As soon as Chinese Admiral Sa, who was the highest naval authority at Chefoo, observed it, he sent one of his officers to the Japanese Commander Fujimoto, informing that the Reshitelini had been disarmed. According to the Chinese communication Admiral Sa himself repeated this communication, and then Fujimoto gave assurance that he had no intention to attack the Russian vessel in the port. Admiral Sa placed a guard ship not far from the Russian ship.
    Lieutenant Rostjokowski who did not think that he was quite safe, made a request that the destroyer should be protected by a Chinese cruiser; a request which was not accoded, but which was very reasonable, even though the Japanese ships may have pretended (which they did not) to have entered the port for taking necessaries. In that case they could stay in the port; but then, the Chinese were obliged to take measures neccessary for  the maintenance  of neutrality.
    The  neutrality  should not only be claimed and exacted, but also be assured. One  who  disarms a ship is morally bound to give her the protection. If the Japanese did not give the above reason then the Chinese should have demanded them immediately to leave  the port. It has been accepted by most of civilized nations as well as by China that a war vessel of a belligerent nation can stay 24 hours in a neutral port, in order to be provided with necessaries (with no war materials). Some nations did not apply this rule as was the case of Japan during the Franco-German war of 1870, who permitted the entry of war-ships and merchant vessels free into her ports but prohibited in her ports the hostile actions of the naval force of belligerent states and ordered that when the vessels of two parties meet in a port one could not leave within 24 hours after the other. If China intended to act as Japan did then, it is very clear, that Japan disregarded China's neutrality by waging hostilities the neutral waters. Japan pronounced more clearly in 1870, in consequence of a shortcoming of the 1st. declaration, in prohibiting hostile  actions of a belligerent state within the range of a canon shat along her whole coast and added, that "the Japanese ports and seas cannot be used as a base, of warlike operations and that it is not allowed to be present in those waters for preventing the vessels of an enemy from entering or leaving nor to hide themselves there to make the act of war."
    When we read the rules given by the Japanese Government as a neutral, we find in them the Japanese disapproval of, what the Japanese ships did in the neutral port of Chefoo,  and what I am going to explain in the following which is regarded as probable from the three reports.
    Commander Fujimoto believing that the Russian ship was not disarmed, send a protest to the Chinese authorities?  Everybody would have expected  this but no, he sent Lieutenant Terashima with an armed detachment on board the Reshitelini in order to let the Commander have the choice either to leave the port before dawn or surrender  (the official English text reads as follows:-   accordingly Lieutenant Terashima sent to offer the Russian Commander alternative  either to leave port before dawn  or surrender).  What should Lieutenant Rostjokowski do against this act of the violation of the Chinese neutrality and usages of war of all the civilized nations. He should have given his ship, under protest, to the enemy and himself surrender with his crew, as the fighting could not save them.
    But  those, who can feel of what is passing in the heart of a soldier when there is the question of surrender, and who think in the position of a  Commander who ought first to get disarmed by a neutral and who must suffer the shame to see the enemy coming to his disarmed boat and who receives at the end a summons to render himself and the ship to the enemy,  and who saw, if the report of Lieutenant Rostjokowski is right,  the enemy's flag, hoisted on his ship, those who can feel what is going on in the heart of this Commander - will not be surprised if he had done the desperate acts,  for which no defence can be found in any law.
    He gave the order to blow up the vessel, and commenced a discussion with the Japanese officer and when the latter brooched the subject of the preservation  of life against the surrender of the ship, the Russian officer made use of his only weapon the fist - and threw down his opponent overboard. The example was followed by the Russian crew towards the Japanese detachment. During this illegitimate fighting, the ship exploded and damaged, but did not sink.
    Neither the Russian, nor Japanese report mentions how the crew of the Reshitilini left the boat; and it is why we hold what  the Chinese Commander of the war-ship had said, and, it seems correct as the version is far from favourable to the Chinese themselves.
    In  the fighting the Russians, besides some Japanese fell or jumped into the water, and made attempt to be taken in on board Chinese  junks but it was refused. Lieutenant Rostjokowski himself who was  wounded on the hip by a bullet suffered the same fate. But afterwards they were picked by the boats of the Chinese cruiser Saiyoun and  brought on board that ship. Out of 47 men only 4 were missing. The Japanese had one killed and 14 wounded (part of whom by the  explosion).
    The arrival of the Japanese detachment on board the Russian destroyer in the neutral port can never be defended. It is very regrettable that this fact had taken place, because the Japanese army and navy have heretofore respected invariably and honestly the recognized usages of war. The Chinese authorities must be also blamed because while they ought to have taken steps impartially to render such conflict impossible between the enemies, they did nothing to prevent nor to stop the action that was taken. The Japanese towed Reshitelini out of the harbour, passing before three Chinese cruisers Saiyun, Sasi, and Saithi, of which one was flying the flag of Admiral Sa. According to the Chinese information the Admiral prepared for action, but he arrived too late. He gave orders to stop and received answer to his protest that the Reshitelini would be given back, but the promise did not go any further. I do not attach much importance to this protest and the account pertaining to it.
    The capture of a ship in the neutral harbour was violation of a principle which is generally recognized. A man-of-war that seizes a ship of an enemy cannot come into the neutral harbour except in the case of necessity and for only a short time. How many more ships would he taken away from such a port!
    Assuming that the Russians have commenced the fighting-there, the violation of neutrality was committed by the  Japanese in sending a detachment on hoard the Reshitelini and Japan cannot sustain the act as a measure of reprisal. A reprisal is also an act of war and it is on that account prohibited in the neutral port. The capture cannot be considered as a self-defence, as the struggle was finished and the Russians rendered harmless. The defence cannot be found for the act of Japanese nor for the conduct of China.
    As a favourable contrast to the above, the Netherlands can show, from what she has done at Sabang with so little means, that any violation of the neutrality there will not be tolerated but will be effectuolly prevented.
    Chefoo - also named Yentai - is situated just in front of Port Arthur in the straits of Chili or Liao-ti-shan canal which is 130 kilometres wide. A conflict may be expected there. 1st the Chinese Government should prescribe clearly and strictly as to how the authorities shall act to preserve neutrality in all cases. 2ndly, capable officials should be designated to carry out such prescriptions and 3rdly, a sufficient armed forces shall also be stationed to enable the authorities to
claim and enforce all acts of neutrality. These authorities should always be at alert to act and they must and could have been ready, as they had time to think over and  the violation of neutrality by the Japanese was so efficient that an explanation was not necessary. There was a fait accompli and that must have  been treated severely: summons to undone what could have been not yet undone; the necessary protection by the force of arms of the Russian ship dismantled by China; stop, dismantle and render harmless the Japanese ships which have violated the neutrality of China in a Chinese harbour. Three Chinese cruisers  could have fulfilled these tasks without fear and ought to have done them. By the fact that China first dismantled the Russian ship, according to the existing usage, and afterwards allowed the Japanese ships to violate this usage at the expense of the dismantled ship, China has shown that she is not only weak, but was also partial in her application of justice.
    G. Nijpels.

(From De Avondpost of 30 August, 1904)

Once more on the Reshitelini Incident.

    Many persons would have learnt with pleasure that the Japanese Government have given to the public an explanation of their action with regard to the Reshitelini affair. In the first place this proves that, the protests from organs of the public opinion cannot be set aside as worthless by the Japanese Government, but that the Government, on the contrary, esteem their action being regarded as justified in the eyes of the public. On the other hand, it gives us an occasion to compare our opinion already pronounced with the defence set up by Japan.
    The Japanese Government have attempted to justify the pursuit made to the Russian war-ship Reshitelini in the Chinese harbour Chefoo, and the sending of an armed detachment on board this vessel, to demand the surrender,as well as the carrying off of this ship as a prize to a Japanese harbour, by the following reasons:-
    1. Neutrality of China is imperfect all over her dominion which is not occupied by a belligerent or by others.
    2. The reshitelini has violated the neutrality of China by her flight into Chefoo and it has given Japan the liberty to regard Chefoo as a harbour of the belligerent.
    3. The declaration that the Reshitelini had been dismantled was not true.
    4. The Russians have attacked the Japanese on board the Reshitelini, depriving Russia of the right of protest, even if the legitimacy of taking away the prize could be contested.
    5. The Japanese have more to complain of the infraction of neutrality committed by Russia; such as the establishment of a radiograph service between Chefoo and Port Arthur, and the long delay in connection with the  Askold  and Grozowoi at Shanghai.
    Nothing is added to or withdrawn from the facts of the case (vide Avond Post of 18 July) by this explanation; the  object of the communication is simply to show the event in another light, by which the light and shade fall in other way than was exhibited before. The question could be put as to whether the opinion now announced by the Japanese Government is that which is pushed so far as to action or that which has been found to excuse themselves to plead justification. With regard to this the comparison of the first official declaration with that which is now made by the intermediary of Reuter would have lead as to the supposition that the first brought more of motive and 'the latter, more of excuse; but that does not matter; the rightful judgment of an action of war does not matter whether it has been thought  before or after, but concerns only the pros and cons of the rights asserted by both parties. It is from this point of view, that I now take into consideration, for a moment, the new Japanese communication, the principal attention of which must fall on the imperfect neutrality of China.
    Our citizen Van Bynkershock gave two  centuries ago a description of the principle of neutrality which has been cited by many, namely: neither judge nor party, Bluntschli added to this in his work "The modern International  law" the maintenance of the peace in one's own territory.
    Although the principle of neutrality excludes all things made in half, and every diversion from perfect neutrality includes prejudice, yet the practice has given rise to the political proportions which have lead to distinguish perfect and imperfect neutrality. Neutrality of a country is perfect when it is accepted without exception and offered to both belligerents;  and imperfect when it believes that it can make on exception. Heffter gives as an example of imperfect neutrality, a state which has accorded by a treaty, before a war was foreseen, some advantages, as for instance, the transport of troops along the railways. The Japanese Government have the right to speak if they find, in the false position of Russia in Manchuria, the imperfect assurance and protection of Chinese neutrality by China herself and the permission of a Marconi establishment near Chefoo an occasion to consider neutrality of China imperfect. The announcement of this imperfectness is a treasure-trove by which the Japanese policy has added by the Reshitelini incident one more victory over a series of it obtained on land and sea. If I am not mistaken, this imperfectness did not exist when the examination and capture of the Reshitelini were decided upon. If it were so, the Japanese Government would have mentioned it in their first communication and so the Consul of the empire at Chefoo who did not find the excuse in his illogical declaration as "my country is fighting for its existence which is in stake, and for that we do not take into account the neutrality of China which has been violated so often by Russia," would have shown the imperfectness of Chinese neutrality. Yes, it seems to me that the Japanese Government now accept unwillingly this imperfectness as a reason for having ignored neutrality, for they have shown as much patience at Shanghai, with respect to the Russian vessels Askold and Grozowoi which had taken refuge there, as their navy had shown less clemency at Chefoo with regard to the Reshitelini, which, had also escaped to a Chinese port. Nor were they dismantled there, but continued flying the Russian ensign and stayed longer there than it was agreeable to the Japanese who considered it also as a violation of neutrality and even then the Japanese showed patience until the Tsar gave the orders to dismantle the ships and strike their flags,  by which act these ships escaped from the  Japanese to be taken  as a prize.
    The date which are at our disposal at this moment strengthen the impression that the imperfectness of neutrality has found justification after an accomplished act justification which would have made the Japanese saying "Eureka". But as I have said above, it does little matter; between the states, fore-thought or after-thought is not material in their pleading, only a good thought furnishes sound argument. General Drn Beer Portugael says in his well known work "The laws of War.": "Imperfect neutrality is without any value according to the law, even from the political point of view it is doubtful and it is always in danger of not being recognized".
    This expresses exactly what the Japanese consider it; imperfect neutrality is a house built of cards, maintained or put down by the parties according to their own will, interests or ideas.
    Even if something could be deduced from 2 to 5 points of the above-mentioned Japanese communication of Reuter, it shall not occupy myself therewith, that being an useless and superfluous task; as from my point of view, imperfect neutrality fonts a shield, which, when well applied, as the Japanese have managed, could ward off all the blows which may be given by a critic against Japan on this question.
    It is well that this is recognized and clearly pronounced, in order that there will not arise the opinion, from what occurred at Chefoo, that only perfect neutrality has the right and reason of existence, and that amphibious imperfect neutrality is absurd; and that the treatment of the Reshitelini cannot be taken as an example in future for dealing against an enemy ship in a neutral port, but only as an example of how a wrong act could find an excuse by the destroyer of all arguments: the imperfect neutrality of China.
    G. Nypels.

Отредактированно vs18 (08.07.2009 17:57:19)

Dated, Chefoo, Nov 1 1904. 4-48 p.m.
Received, 7-50 p.m.

Komura,
    Tokyo.

No. 426. In reference to my telegram 414, Customs Taotai informs me that he received instructions from Peking to allow Russian officers and men to Shanghai per German steamer Vorwart. Taotai is sending one official to accompany them.
    Above is telegraphed to Minister Uchida.

    Midzuno.

Dated, Chefoo, 16th November 1904. 0.50 p.m.
Received, Tokio, 2.35 p.m.

Komura,
    Tokio.

No. 444.
    The following is what I so far gathered about Russian destroyer:-
    She left 9.30 p.m. Nov. 14th Port Arthur under sealed orders with dispatch, was pursued a short time by our fleet.
    The above telegraphed also to Minister Uchida.

        Midzuno.

Попытка систематизировать англоязычные документы с сайта Japan Center for Asian Historical Records(JACAR) National Archives of Japan, папка B07090718000, озаглавленная "Miscellaneous matters on Russian naval fleet escaped into ports of neutral countries during Japan-Russia War / Zhifu".

Часть первая (reference code B07090718400).
Часть вторая (reference code B07090718500).
Часть третья (reference code B07090718600).
Часть четвертая (reference code B07090718700).
Часть пятая (reference code B07090718800).

- машинописный текст телеграммы консула в Чифу Midzuno, отправленной 17-го ноября 1904 г. в 8:40 вечера министру иностранных дел Komura, получена в 11:25 ночи того же дня (с. 3).
- машинописный текст телеграммы консула в Чифу Midzuno, отправленной 22-го ноября 1904 г. в 10:55 утра министру иностранных дел Komura, получена в 1:35 поплудни того же дня (с. 14).
- рукописный текст записки (?) посла Франции относительно желания д-ра Штернберга вернуться в Порт-Артур (с. 35).
- машинописная копия письма (?) командира китайского крейсера "Haiyung" K. Ching'а консулу в Чифу Midzuno от 17-го ноября 1904 г. (с. 54).
- машинописная копия письма (?) китайского чиновника Li Tsoi Chee консулу в Чифу Midzuno от 22-го ноября (с. 54).
- машинописная копия письма (?) китайского чиновника Li Tsoi Chee консулу в Чифу Midzuno от 17-го ноября (с. 55).
- машинописный текст телеграммы консула в Чифу Midzuno, отправленной 2-го января 1905 г. в 4:25 дня министру иностранных дел Komura, получена в 8 вечера того же дня (с. 78).
- машинописный текст телеграммы министра иностранных дел Komura, отправленной 3-го января 1905 г. послу в Лондоне Hayashi (c. 97).

Отредактированно vs18 (09.07.2009 17:18:20)